HOHENZOLLERN REDOUBT
October 1st, 1915.— October 17th, 1915.
We packed up during the afternoon of October 1st, and in the evening marched to
Abeele, where we entrained for a destination unknown to most of us, but presumed
to be somewhere in the far South. We made ourselves as comfortable as we could
for the expected long journey, only to be rudely awakened after what seemed to
be a five minutes' sleep, and turned out into the cold dark night at Fouquereuil,
a suburb of Béthune. The remainder of the night was spent at a somewhat elusive
Orphanage in the town itself. On the following day we moved into billets at the
Northern end of the town on the banks of the La Bassée Canal, where we were
joined by the Transport which had come from Ouderdom by road. October 3rd saw us
once more on the move to Mont Bernenchon, a clean, attractive little village, a
few miles N.W. of Béthune. Our hopes of spending a day or two in peace were soon
shattered, for on the following day we made what seemed to be another emergency
move to Béthune, where we embussed for regions unknown. Shortly after dark we
arrived at Vermelles, and picked up guides, who led us as only guides can, to
what proved to be a portion of the German front line system captured in the
fighting a few days before. The trenches, which were near the "Lone Tree," and
within sight of the famous "Tower Bridge" at Loos, were little damaged, and
seemed to have been captured without a great deal of fighting, but the incessant
rain and scarcity of habitable dug-outs made our stay as uncomfortable as the
most hardened stoic could have desired. Our work consisted of reversing portions
of the original German support trench to form a fire trench facing the other
way. Owing to the distance to the then German line (1,000 to 1,500 yards) and
the low visibility, we were able to work openly and practically unmolested. Our
only casualties were the result of an unlucky shell which fell on the morning of
October 5th, amongst a party of Signallers, killing L.-Sergt. C. E. Harrison,
Signalling Sergeant, and three men, whilst another man died of wounds a few days
later.
The same evening we got orders to leave the trenches, and after a thoroughly
unpleasant tramp, in heavy rain and thick darkness over the slippery chalk
tracks, which were guess-work to most of us, we arrived soon after midnight at
Mazingarbe, which for dirt, damp, and general cheerlessness, almost rivalled our
never-to-be-forgotten billets at Bac-St. Maur. So ended a beastly, tiring, and,
for all we ever learned, quite purposeless expedition.
After a short meal and much needed rest we felt fit for anything, and made light
of the trek on the early morning of October 6th, to our rest billets, which we
found at Fouquières, a nice clean little village about a mile west of Béthune.
Here we found ourselves, for a short time, in peace and something approaching
luxury.
Our move South had brought us into the First Army (General Haig) and XI Corps.
(Lt.-General Haking), which had been busy in the recent fighting, and we now
learned definitely for the first time that in the further fighting that was
shortly to take place we were to play a prominent part. On Saturday, October
9th, preliminary orders and plans were issued, and we learned that our task was
to be the capture of the "Hohenzollern Redoubt" and "Fosse 8," an admirably
constructed scale model of which had been made on the ground outside Divisional
Headquarters at Gosnay, where Officers and N.C.O.'s (and stray inhabitants)
spent some time in a careful and interested examination of it.
In addition, a somewhat hurried reconnaissance of the position itself was made
by Col. Fowler and the Company Commanders from our trenches in front of
Vermelles, from which the attack was to be made. In the short space of a couple
of hours they endeavoured to get a working knowledge of the maze of
communication trenches, and the hostile ground over which, if all went well, we
should have to advance. Sunday was spent in Church Parade, and in going again
through the preliminary orders and plans, and in the afternoon the Corps
Commander interviewed the Officers of the Division at Divisional Headquarters.
We were then told something more as to the reason and general plan of the
attack, and were informed that we should be supported by the heaviest
concentration of artillery yet known in the war—400 guns of all calibres,—that
all contingencies had been provided for, and that in spite of the strength of
the position, we should probably encounter very little opposition before
reaching our objective.
The object of the attack, which was to be undertaken by the XI Corps, was to
establish the left flank of the First Army, and to render possible a further
advance in conjunction with the French on the South. The objective included the
"Quarries" and Fosse 8, the 46th Division being allotted the task of capturing
the Hohenzollern Redoubt and Fosse 8, whilst the 12th Division was to attack on
our right, and be responsible for the Quarries. The Fosse and surroundings had
already been in our hands once, having been attacked and captured during the
last week in September by the 9th Division, who unfortunately, however, had been
compelled to withdraw, and a subsequent attempt by the 28th Division to
recapture it had also proved a dismal failure. What, we wondered, was in store
for the 46th Division?
Fosse 8 is, or rather was, a typical colliery pit, with the usual winding and
head gear and other plant, and pit-head pile of slag (called in this case "The
Dump"), which like its neighbour, the famous Tower of Wingles, overlooked the
whole position, whilst in rear there were the usual rows of miners' cottages.
These cottages (called "Corons") had cellars, and were thus very easy to defend
with machine guns, which could fire with great effect, and comparative safety,
from ground level. In front of the Fosse and protecting it lay the Hohenzollern
Redoubt, consisting of a salient trench system shaped rather like a big bean,
and projecting well in front of the German main system, to which it was
connected by communication trenches, and by two flank trenches known as "Big
Willie" and "Little Willie." The importance of the position lay in the fact that
it was on the top of a gentle rise, giving command and good observation of our
position on either side. Its capture was rendered difficult by the fact that the
ground in front of it was level, and almost devoid of cover, affording a very
fine field of fire, which could be swept from practically every direction. From
our trenches very little could be seen except the Dump, and the roof of the
manager's house.
The attack was to be carried out by the 137th Brigade on the right under
Brigadier-General E. Feetham, C.B., and the 138th Brigade on the left under
Brigadier-General G. C. Kemp, whilst the 139th Brigade were to be in Divisional
Reserve under Brigadier-General C. T. Shipley. To the 137th Brigade were
attached 100 Grenadiers from the 139th Brigade, two sections Divisional Cyclist
Company, and the 1/2nd Field Company, Royal Engineers (less one section), and to
the 138th Brigade, the 1st Monmouthshire Regiment (Divisional Pioneer
Battalion), 125 Grenadiers from the 139th Brigade, two sections Divisional
Cyclist Company, and the 1/1st Field Company, Royal Engineers (less one
section), whilst General Shipley's Divisional Reserve consisted of the 139th
Brigade (less 225 Grenadiers), one Platoon Divisional Cyclist Company, and two
Troops Yorkshire Hussars. The covering Artillery consisted of three groups of
heavy Artillery under the Corps Commander, and one group of Divisional Artillery
(six Brigades of 18-pounders, and one Brigade of 4.5 Howitzers).
To his immense pleasure, 2nd Lieut. R. E. Hemingway, our Battalion Grenade
Officer, was put in charge of the Grenadiers attached to the 138th Brigade, the
party also including the Battalion Grenadier Sergeant, G. F. Foster. Bombing was
now entering on the period of its greatest importance—always in our humble
opinion greatly exaggerated. The Mills bomb was rapidly ousting all other kinds,
and shortly became almost the only one in normal use. Much time was put in at
throwing practice, and every kind of artifice was adopted by instructors to make
it interesting, and at the same time improve the aim and distance thrown. A
"platoon" of "grenadiers," as they were at first called, was formed in each
Battalion, consisting of a Grenadier Officer, a sergeant and 32 men, (eight from
each Company), and to show how much we respected them, we put them when on the
march at the head of the Battalion. There was a Brigade Grenadier Officer too,
who made himself generally responsible for the training and work of Grenadiers
throughout the Brigade. The first Officer appointed to this post in our Brigade
was Lieut. A. Hacking, who had taken over the duties just before the
Hohenzollern battle. The task allotted to the Grenadiers in this fight, was to
bomb the various communication trenches leading from "West Face" to "Fosse
Trench," clear dug-outs and establish blocks in "Fosse Alley."
Information regarding the enemy, gained by Corps Intelligence during the attacks
of September 25th, and following days from our own Officers, and from the
examination of prisoners, was to the effect that the enemy trenches in the
Redoubt, with the exception of "Dump Trench" and "South Face," were badly
damaged and not strongly wired, that previous attacks had been exposed to heavy
enfilade fire from "Mad Point" or "Madagascar," that it was not thought there
would be much enfilade fire from the South-East, and that it was not necessary
to waste a lot of heavy shell on the Dump, as it could be made untenable by both
sides. How far this was justifiable will be seen.
Our few days at Fouquières passed very quickly in the bustle of completing
equipment, going again and again with all ranks through the maps and plans of
attack, detailing and organising bombing squads in the place of those detached
for duty with the other Brigades, and writing last letters home "in case——"
There was little or no excitement. We had most of us seen too much by this time
to be either unduly pessimistic or over-confident about our own chances, so that
everything seemed to go quietly and smoothly. The first steel helmets had just
arrived—quaint, antique, Japanese looking things, with ingenious corrugations to
catch the bullets—and were issued to the Machine Gunners, who had also received
the first supply of the new Box Respirator, issued in place of the Smoke Helmet.
The Machine Gun section was now commanded by Lieut. Adams.
It was at 3.45 p.m. on October 12th, after making our final inspections and
collecting blankets, packs and other surplus stores at a convenient barn, that
we moved off from Fouquières on a fine Autumn afternoon, leaving behind only 2nd
Lieut. Gray, and a few odd men, who were not fit to go into action. Transport
marched in rear of the Battalion to temporary lines behind Noyelles, where it
remained until after the battle.
We had a very pleasant and easy march up to Vermelles, where a halt was made for
tea. Here we were passed by one of the Stafford Battalions who were to make the
assault. It was too dark to see their faces, but their voices were full of
confidence and cheeriness, which it did one good to hear.
A temporary Quarter-Master's Stores was fitted up at "Clarke's Keep," Vermelles,
where Companies picked up their rations for the 13th, water in petrol tins,
grenades, Vermorel sprayers, and other odds and ends likely to be required. An
emergency ration of cold bacon and bread was also issued.
Eventually after a very slow march through Vermelles, which was a seething mass
of men and transport, we arrived about 11 p.m. at our assembly position in
"Sussex Trench," where space was allotted to us by Lieut. C. L. Hill, Signalling
Officer, who had gone on ahead with a few Signallers for that purpose. We soon
settled down and made the best we could of what remained of the night. This was
not long, for the carrying parties for the 138th Brigade, and others had to
report for duty at Clarke's Keep at 6 a.m. on October 13th. In all we provided a
total of five Officers and 300 other ranks for this duty, and they were busy
most of the morning taking up to the front line such necessary articles as
rations, water, grenades, and rum. His devotion to the last-named duty was too
much for one bloodthirsty, but very ill-disciplined member of the Battalion, who
became "non-effective" in consequence, and was reported by someone, who saw him
lying in the bottom of a communication trench, as "dead—shot through the head."
He was "dead" right enough, but he lived to fight—and, it is feared to "die"
again—another day!
Our artillery fire during the morning was normal, "so as not to arouse the
suspicions of the Germans," who, as a fact, probably knew quite as much as most
of us about the time and nature of our attack. But at 12.0 noon, every gun began
in real earnest, and it was possible to stand on the firestep of our trench, and
get an undisturbed, if rather distant, view of the shells bursting all over the
German trenches. After half-an-hour of this most unusual, but very pleasing
spectacle, one felt that there would be little left for us to attack.
At 1 p.m. the greenish yellow clouds of smoke and chlorine gas (known for some
time as "The Auxiliary") discharged from cylinders in our front line began to
roll towards the enemy lines, the breeze being exactly right both in strength
and direction, and we became happier still at the thought of paying the Germans
back in their own coin. During the whole of our bombardment we could hear very
little reply from the German guns, though from time to time we could see a few
"woolly bears" and other shell-bursts, at odd points about the forward trenches.
Probably they were saving most of their fire for the actual assault, and except
for a stray machine gun bullet or two, we ourselves were in no kind of danger.
One of those, however, which must have dropped at a steep angle, slightly
wounded Regimental Sergt-Major Mounteney, who was standing in the trench with
the Officers of Battalion Headquarters. He had only rejoined from England a few
days before, and was our first casualty in the attack.
At 1.50 p.m. the gas discharge ceased, but the smoke was continued until 2.0
p.m., when our guns "lifted" from the enemy front line, and the 137th and 138th
Brigades began the assault. As the smoke cleared away, we could get a fair view
of a portion of the attacking troops (Staffords) on the right as they went
steadily, and apparently in excellent order over the top, but, almost at the
same time we heard with surprise and dismay, the somewhat slow "tap-tap" of
numbers of those enemy machine guns, which were to have been so completely
silenced by our bombardment! We watched the Staffords for a few moments until
they disappeared from view.
Then followed a period of anxious waiting, and the only information we got was
to the effect that the 138th Brigade on the left had practically gained their
portion of the Redoubt.
Soon after 3 o'clock, we received orders to move forward, and began to proceed
by way of "Inverness Trench," "Bomb Alley" and "Left Boyau" to "Reserve Trench."
Movement was very slow, owing to the congestion of the traffic, and the
narrowness of the trenches, and took a long time to complete. There we were
destined to remain for several hours, and suffered a few casualties from shell
fire, apparently directed at the junctions of the trench with "Central" and
"Right Boyaux." We were now nominally at the disposal of General Officer
Commanding 137th Brigade, but never received any orders from him, and eventually
drifted to the command of General Officer Commanding 138th Brigade.
Traffic became more and more congested by the stream of wounded which was now
pouring down Central Boyau and "Barts Alley," and by carrying parties and
supports endeavouring to get along the Reserve Trench up to the Redoubt.
Soon we began to gather scraps of information from those who were coming down,
and to realise that things were going far from well. The usual answer was "Don't
ask me, all I know is it's Hell up there!" It was now getting too dark to see,
and we could only gather that at any rate we were holding the West Face and
having a pretty bad time in doing so; also that our Grenadiers attached to the
138th Brigade, had suffered heavily. Sergt. G. F. Foster was carried down dying
from wounds in the body, and Hemingway was reported to be dangerously wounded,
if not already dead.
Things had not gone well. As we learned afterwards the attack of the Staffords
on the right had been held up almost immediately by machine gun fire, and very
little ground had been made. On the left, the Lincolns and Leicesters at first
were more fortunate, and reaching West Face with comparatively few casualties,
began to make their way up to Fosse Trench. But the further they advanced, the
more heavy became their losses, until eventually the advance came to a
standstill, the furthest point reached being about 100 yards from Fosse Trench.
From these more advanced positions they were gradually forced back, until only
the West Face was in our hands. It is abundantly clear that the effect of our
bombardment did not come up to expectations, and that many machine guns were
untouched, and, worst of all, that the Dump, on which "heavy shell need not be
wasted, as it could be made untenable by either side," proved to be a miniature
Gibraltar, honeycombed with shafts and galleries leading to concealed machine
gun emplacements. Small wonder that little ground could be made or held in the
face of such defences.
The news that things were going badly induced a Battalion Commander of another
Brigade, whose Battalion had been taken from him piecemeal and scattered to the
four winds of heaven, to order A Company, in the absence of Col. Fowler, to go
across to the Redoubt to reinforce the troops there. Information, however, was
brought by L.-Corpl. Simpson of A Company (killed a few hours later), who made a
rapid and courageous journey over the open to West Face, to the effect that that
trench was already overcrowded, and that the troops there required thinning,
rather than reinforcing.
It was now getting late and things seemed to be in a very unsatisfactory state,
when orders were issued by Col. Fowler, who had met General Kemp in the
trenches, and received verbal instructions to be prepared to carry out an attack
at short notice on the right portion of the Redoubt, for Companies (except B who
were detached for other work) to begin to move up in readiness to our front line
trenches. This movement began about 9.0 p.m. very slowly along Reserve Trench
and "Hayward's Heath." The difficulty of moving a Battalion at night, in single
file, through a maze of unfamiliar trenches without losing touch, may be better
imagined than described, and it was after midnight before we had covered the 400
or 500 yards, which was all we had to do.
Whilst this was going on Col. Fowler and the Adjutant, accompanied by the Staff
Captain, Major Wordsworth, made a hasty reconnaissance of the position, and
found that elements of the 138th Brigade and Monmouths were holding the
North-Western portion of West Face, whilst the Eastern portion of Big Willie was
held by the 6th Battalion. Except for a short distance near the barricade on
each flank, the trench between these points was held by the enemy.
At 2.45 a.m. on October 14th, we received from General Officer Commanding 138th
Brigade, written orders to attack and consolidate "as soon as possible" the
South-Eastern portion of West Face, the junction of South Face and Big Willie (shewn
on the map as Point 60), and if possible the "Chord" of the Redoubt. The order
stated that the 6th Battalion in Big Willie would co-operate by a bombing attack
along that trench "at the same time." Owing to the difficulty of getting
messages to and fro, in the maze of unknown trenches in the dark, it was quite
impossible to get in touch with the 6th Battalion so as to give them any idea
when our attack would begin, so that we were not able to rely on getting much
help from them. The Commanding Officer decided that two Companies would be
sufficient for the attack, which was of course going to be without artillery
support, and A Company (Major A. L. Ashwell), and D Company (Capt. B. W. Vann),
were detailed. A hasty conference was arranged at a small dug-out at which Col.
Fowler, who intended himself to lead the attack, gave the few orders that were
possible in the circumstances:—"A quiet advance, no firing, and in with the
bayonet."
Owing to the darkness and the unfamiliar ground, it was necessary to make some
arrangement for keeping direction. Major Becher was, therefore, sent across to
the West Face, with instructions to stay at the extreme right flank of the 138th
Brigade position, and there to show a light from a flash lamp on which the left
flank of our attack would be directed.
As soon as this was settled, and Company Commanders had issued their
instructions, we began to deploy in front of our original front line trench, as
nearly as possible opposite our objective.
It was again a very slow job getting the men out of the deep and narrow support
trenches, and over a single duck-board bridge across the front line into
position; indeed many men of D Company never received the order at all, and
remained in the support trench in ignorance of what was going on. The men were
extended to about four paces, D Company on the right, A on the left. This
movement was carried out very quietly, with entire absence of hesitation or
confusion, and the men were then dressed as nearly as possible on the required
alignment—no easy matter when one has only a map, and has never seen the
objective or the ground in front of it. Rifles were loaded and bayonets fixed,
Col. Fowler with characteristic unselfishness, giving his rifle to an Officer
who had a bayonet, but no rifle to put it on. All these preliminaries were
carried out without attracting the attention of the enemy, who were about 250
yards away. Finally at about 3.45 a.m. the order was given to advance, keeping
our left flank on Becher's lamp, which we could see from time to time across the
intervening ground. It was a strange experience, this slow night advance through
the darkness and mist in the almost uncanny stillness which, sooner or later,
always follows heavy fighting; so like what many of us had done in peace-time
"night-ops," that it was difficult to realise that this was war, and would end
in hand-to-hand fighting; that, however quietly we went, we must eventually be
discovered, and perhaps swept away by machine gun and rifle fire. The ground was
for the most part level, and not badly cut up, and there was little wire. A few
of our dead, one or two severely wounded still struggling painfully back to our
lines, and a number of abandoned rifles were all that were left to show what had
happened on the previous day. When we were about half-way across it was realised
that we were getting too far to the left, and direction was changed half-right.
It was not until the right of the line was close up to the old German wire, that
we were discovered. Fire was opened from somewhere half-right, probably in the
neighbourhood of Point 60, but it was not severe, and only a few casualties were
caused. On arriving at West Face it was found to be practically empty on the
right, the few Germans who had been there having probably left hurriedly as we
approached. On the left we found a mixed crowd of Lincolns, Leicesters, and
Monmouths, with a few Robin Hoods, all under the command of Col. Evill, of the
Monmouths. Many of them were wounded, and nearly all were exhausted by their
dreadful experiences of the previous day. Our arrival was, therefore, very
opportune and put fresh life into them.
It was now quite evident that we had come too far to the left, and although we
had gained 100 yards or so of the West Face, our right flank was not in touch
with the 6th Battalion in Big Willie. In their eagerness to get at the Germans,
and urged on by the shouts of the Lincolns and Leicesters, the left half of A
Company ran through the West Face and began pushing on. The enemy, however, were
waking up, and our men were met with much heavier fire, which, although unaimed,
caused a number of casualties. Edge was severely wounded in the arm and chest,
and Everard Handford was killed instantaneously by a bullet in the head, whilst
numbers of men also fell. It was then seen that any further advance was out of
the question. The only thing to be done was to consolidate what we had, and try
to extend our gains laterally by bombing along the West Face. Grenadiers and
grenades (English and German) were collected, parties were organised by Ashwell
and Vann, and several more yards of trench were gained. Strachan leading one of
these along the trench with utter fearlessness was never seen again, and was
probably killed at once. Shortage of grenades soon made it clear that we must
stop and build a barricade to hold up the Germans, who as usual seemed to have a
never-ending supply.
On the extreme right, Vann and others of D Company had come across some Boches
out of the trench, apparently preparing to make an attack over the open. Most of
these were slaughtered, and the rest made all possible haste back to their
trench. This appears to have been part of an organised counter-attack, as the
enemy tried a similar attack on the left as well, which also failed. Nothing was
heard of the bombing in Big Willie by the 6th Battalion, but we learnt
afterwards that they had made several attempts to progress along that trench
without success.
All available tools and sandbags were got together in the trench to build a
barricade at the right flank. It was now getting light, and this was attended
with much danger, and in the work of filling sandbags and placing them at the
barricade, we had several men killed in a very short time.
Vann had already been wounded by a bullet in the left forearm, and had gone down
to be dressed, returning with his usual courage and tenacity, after having his
wound attended to. The Commanding Officer, however, would not let him stay, and
he had to go down again to hospital. Ashwell was hit by a bullet in the right
shoulder a few minutes after Vann, and he, too, had to leave us.
The enemy were not more than fifty yards away, and the least exposure brought a
bullet with deadly aim, though in this respect they did not have things entirely
their own way. We could distinctly see the tops of their helmets over the
parapet, and at one time there was such a collection that we thought they were
going to attack, but nothing came of it, and we settled down to work again.
There was no wire or obstacle of any kind between the two trenches. We were too
close to get our guns on to them, otherwise we could have done much execution.
Practically all the work on the right was done by men of D Company, who
eventually made a barricade, which was more or less bullet-proof, and dug a
length of trench to protect that flank. Here Sergt. W. L. Green did excellent
work, encouraging everyone by his fine example. For nearly 24 hours he stuck to
his post in spite of bombs and rifle fire. He was ably assisted by Sergt.
Turgoose and Pvtes. Keeling, Hubbard, Dickinson, Offord and Sly of D Company,
also Pvte. F. Attenborough of A Company, whilst L.-Corpl. Skelton did splendid
work in attending to wounded.
Meanwhile Col. Fowler had made arrangements for the defence of the trench on the
left, from which, much to their relief the Lincolns, Leicesters, and Monmouths,
had been withdrawn during the early hours of the morning. Their place had been
taken by A Company, which having lost all its Officers, was now commanded by
Sergt. L. Bell. Parties were set to work to improve the trench, which was badly
knocked about, and during the following night the Company dug a new trench a few
yards in front, in order to get a better field of fire and for better
protection. The Northern end of West Face was all this time held by the 7th
Battalion.
C Company (Capt. H. B. S. Handford, in place of Capt. G. S. Heathcote, who had
left to do duty at the Base) who had been left behind in Hayward's Heath when A
and D Companies went over to attack, stayed there until 5.0 a.m. when 2nd Lieut.
R. A. Abrams and a party of 15 were detailed to carry grenades up to A Company
in the Redoubt, where many of them remained. The rest of the Company moved up to
a communication trench near the original front line, where they received orders
from a Battalion Commander of another Brigade, to carry water and grenades over
the open to the Redoubt. They started shortly after 7.30 a.m., but as it was
quite light, they were seen immediately, and heavy machine gun and rifle fire
was opened on them at once. Basil Handford and several others were killed
instantaneously, and several were wounded. The attempt was foredoomed to
failure, and the men were ordered back into the trench. For the rest of the day
they helped to carry stores to the Redoubt by way of a new communication trench
and to fetch in and attend to the wounded. Very gallant work was done in this
operation by Comp. Sergt.-Major Haywood, Sergts. Leivers and Bexton, and Pvtes.
Winterbottom, Allen, and Eyre.
B Company (Capt. Turner) had been detached about 5.0 p.m. on October 13th, and
ordered to proceed over the open to reinforce the garrison of our original front
line. They remained for some time in the old support line, from which all the
Company Grenadiers were sent up to reinforce the men in the Redoubt. One of
these, L.-Corpl. G. W. Moore, did very gallant work in remaining alone for
three-quarters-of-an-hour on the enemy's side of a barricade, which was being
built up behind him, and then continued to bomb the enemy for eight hours. The
Company was later ordered to dig a communication trench to link up the Redoubt
with our old front line. They started about 9.0 p.m., and worked continuously on
it throughout the night, much of the time under heavy rifle fire, and by dawn a
serviceable trench had been dug, and a very important communication established.
Capt. Turner was congratulated by the Officer Commanding the 7th Battalion on
the very good work of his Company, in the supervision of which he had been most
ably assisted by Sergt. Rawding.
October 14th seemed a never-ending day for those in the Redoubt. Fortunately in
a way, the lines were too close together for us to be shelled, but bombing went
on almost uninterruptedly, and our casualties mounted rapidly. Grenadier
reinforcements were sent along from time to time from every Company in the
Battalion, also from the 5th Battalion, whilst 2nd Lieut. G. H. Fisher, who was
acting as Grenade Officer in the absence of Hemingway, came up during the
morning, and at the right barricade displayed the greatest courage until he was
badly wounded and had to leave, dying a few days later. Bombing was also going
on at the left barricade, and throughout the day from one flank or the other,
the cry was ever "more bombs" or "more Bombers." We had fortunately been able to
get a signal line up to the Redoubt, and a station established there, in a
fairly deep dug-out, so that most of the time we were in telephonic
communication with those behind.
Our relief promised for the night of October 14th, never came, and we were
compelled, alas, to remain in the Redoubt. Everyone was tired out, having had
little or no sleep, and very little food, for 48 hours. As soon as it was dark
the Sappers put out some wire in front of West Face, which encouraged us
considerably, and we got through the night without any untoward incident. About
6.30 a.m., on the morning of October 15th, we were relieved in West Face by
portions of the 5th and 6th Battalions, and by Grenadiers of the Irish Guards,
and withdrawn to "Railway Reserve Trench," where we joined up with the remainder
of B and C Companies. By the tragic irony of fate, as the Guards were actually
filing into West Face and the relief was nearly complete, Col. Fowler, who was
taking a last glance over the top to see if he could find any trace of Major
Becher, the last signs of whom had been the flashes of his lamp, to guide us
across to the Redoubt—was killed instantaneously by a sniper's bullet. So
determined had he been to find Becher, that he had himself gone out during the
night with Sergt. Stokes in a gallant but unsuccessful endeavour to find him.
Major J. E. Blackwall of the 6th Battalion took over the remnants of the
Battalion the same evening, and shortly before midnight we were devoutly
thankful to be relieved by the Irish Guards. As the relief was taking place, the
enemy attempted an attack against the garrison of West Face, but as this was now
swelled by the relieving troops, they got rather more than they bargained for,
and were beaten off with heavy loss. At the same time they put down quite a
barrage on the reserve trenches, and made our relief distinctly unpleasant, but
eventually we got it completed without further casualty.
Much to our delight, just before leaving, we heard that Becher had been found.
It appears that whilst we were going over to the attack, he had been bombed by
the Boches, and badly wounded, as also had Daniels, his batman, who was with
him. They got separated, but both managed to crawl away, though Becher
eventually had to lie by in an old bit of trench near the German lines. It was
from here that, after having been discovered by an Officer of the Leicesters, he
was eventually rescued on October 15th, by Comp. Sergt.-Major Haywood, and
L.-Sergt. T. Martin, who carried him a distance of 200 yards under more or less
continuous rifle fire. Alas, however, he was not to recover, and after lingering
on for ten weeks, he died in hospital on January 1st, 1916. In John Becher the
Battalion lost one who was beloved by all, who had throughout ever had at heart
the welfare of his men, whether in or out of the trenches, at work or at play.
What he did in the early trench days at Kemmel, was known to few. Often and
often he was out on patrol at night in "No Man's Land," mainly for the sake of
example, for it was part of his creed never to tell a man to do anything that he
would not dare to do himself. He lies buried in the British cemetery at
Abbeville. It was a hard fate that struck down John Becher and his two
brothers-in-law, Basil and Everard Handford—two of the most promising young
Officers in the Battalion—within a few hours of each other.
Much untiring energy and devotion were shewn by many during these strenuous
three days, not by any means the least by our Medical Officer, Capt. C. B.
Johnstone, and his stretcher bearers. Johnstone himself worked almost
incessantly for over 48 hours in attending the wounded, and in many cases helped
to carry them long distances, often under heavy fire. To him and all his helpers
are due our grateful thanks for their work on that occasion.
On relief we marched out to the Transport Lines behind Noyelles, where, in the
early hours of October 16th, we got some most welcome and refreshing tea,
supplied by Torrance and his followers, and then moved on, most of us more
asleep than awake, to Vaudricourt, where we arrived about 6.30 a.m., and at once
got down to sleep in some of the poorest billets it was ever our misfortune to
strike.
Thus ended the more or less fruitless battle of Hohenzollern Redoubt. Though we
held a portion of the Redoubt as a result of the fighting, it was of no tactical
value, and indeed later on was evacuated or blown up. The 12th Division fared no
better, and we can only look back on the whole attack as, through no fault of
our own, a dismal failure. The battle caused us enormous casualties, all to no
purpose. Our Battalion alone lost seven Officers and 35 other ranks killed or
died of wounds, three Officers and 132 other ranks wounded, and 14 missing, all
of whom were afterwards found to have been killed. Amongst the casualties were
Sergt. H. Hall, killed, and Sergts. Archer, Burn, Barrow, and I. B. Bell and
Corpl. Bruerton wounded.
It was a pleasure to all to hear a little later that for his gallantry and
splendid work in this attack, and on many other occasions, "Pat" Ashwell was
awarded a well-deserved D.S.O.
At 5.0 p.m. on the afternoon of October 17th, the whole Battalion and many
Officers of the Brigade and Division, attended the funeral of our beloved
Colonel in the English cemetery, under the Church at Fouquières, the service
being taken by his old friend Padre Hales. Some 18 months afterwards the
Battalion arrived in billets six miles away from this spot, after a long and
tiring march. They were expected to move into the line the next day, and some
Officers who were lucky enough to be mounted, rode over to see the Colonel's
grave. Around the grave, which had been carefully looked after by the Curé and
other kind friends, and was covered with snowdrops and daffodils just in bloom,
they found a number of the old Warrant Officers and N.C.O.'s of the Battalion
paying a silent tribute to their old Commanding Officer. Such a tribute, surely
is the finest testimonial to the character of a man who ever inspired in all
ranks an affection and respect, which can never have been exceeded in any unit
of the army.