HISTORY OF 1/8th BATTALION
VIMY RIDGE
March 6th, 1916.— April 21st, 1916.
Vimy Ridge will always bring up in the minds of those of the 8th Sherwood
Foresters, who were with us at that time the word "Mines." Everyone seemed
somehow or other to have heard that that part of the line was famous for mining
warfare, and as the news was passed on from one to another that Vimy Ridge was
our destination, a kind of whisper of "Mines" passed with it. The area proved to
be a mass of mines, and we found that mining warfare was extremely unpleasant,
though most of our own experience was confined to the latter part of our stay
there.
The front line in this sector, in the early part of 1915 had run through the
East end of the Lorette Ridge to Carency, and thence to La Targette, but on
September 25th of that year, the French had driven the enemy back nearly a mile,
practically to the foot of the Vimy Ridge itself. In this area were portions of
the front having such well-known names as "The Labyrinth," and Souchez Sugar
Refinery—reminders of the fact that some of the most savage fighting of the
whole war took place there, owing to the struggle of the enemy to retain a
footing on that splendid line of observation, the Lorette Ridge. The Arras-Béthune
Road, known as the Route de Béthune, and bordered by a few scraggy trees, ran
through the sector more or less from North to South—about a mile behind the
front line, and two miles in front of Mont St. Eloy. The forward area was a
scene of desolation—trenches and wire, shell-holes everywhere, mine craters here
and there, shewing more or less where No Man's Land was, and beyond them the
gently sloping ridge, with little variation except a few shattered trees marking
the site of La Folie Wood.
Such was the sector that our advance party of Officers went up to reconnoitre on
March 5th. The French were holding the line, and this was the Battalion's only
experience of taking over from them. We were not let into the secret of the why
and wherefore of the move, but doubtless we relieved in order to allow them to
send much wanted help to their friends at Verdun, who were now so hard pressed
owing to the enemy's continued attacks. It was hoped that the fact of our taking
over this part of the line could be kept from the Boche, at least until relief
was complete, and to further this object the advance party were given French
"tin hats" to wear so as to maintain the deception. We fear that despite our
efforts, the enemy knew just about as much of the relief as we did, and rumour
says that a Boche scout, on getting across to the French front line two days
before we relieved them, openly expressed his surprise to the French sentry that
the English had not already arrived! We were shewn the greatest kindness by the
French when we went up to reconnoitre, and they did all they could to explain
the situation, and many an Officer drank confusion to the enemy in a glass of
sweet sparkling wine. Those who were there will doubtless well remember the
group of Officers being assembled just behind the Arras-Béthune road, in full
view of the German lines, under the French Brigade Major, who was acting as
guide, when the Hun gunners, not being able to let such an opportunity slip, at
once put over a few "pip-squeaks," and we discovered with a considerable amount
of pleasure, that our gallant Allies were just about as good in getting to
ground as ourselves, if not a trifle better. It was, however, a rude awakening
to the fact that a war was still on, which we had rather forgotten during our
stay in the South of France, and in the back areas.
Leaving Candas on March 6th, we marched on a very snowy day, via Doullens, to
Iverny, moving on the 8th to Maizières, and on the 9th to Acq, where we had to
make the best of most uncomfortable billets, the whole village being a seething
mass of troops, French and English, and every billet crowded to its utmost
limit. On the occasion of this move we marched, in accordance with instructions,
in column of three's. This system was tried owing to the narrow roads, but only
lasted a few months.
On the following day we moved up into support trenches, just in front of the
Route de Béthune, where we stayed for four days cleaning trenches, carrying out
general trench repairs, and improving dug-outs. There were a certain number of
deep dug-outs in this sector—our first experience of them—proof against all but
the heaviest shells, though in every other respect a bad invention. Further
behind, at Berthonval Farm, were huge caverns hewn out of the chalk, fitted up
with wire beds, absolutely shell-proof, and having accommodation for about two
Companies. The dug-outs in the front line trenches, however, were mere shelters.
Later on we were told to make our shelters in this area of a uniform pattern in
small saps running back from the trenches, and when men could be spared from
other more pressing work, a certain amount of progress was made in this respect.
The French dug-outs possessed one unique quality; they were decorated as only a
Frenchman could decorate them, with most wonderful designs in pokerwork, which
were always objects of the greatest interest to our visitors.
On March 15th, we were relieved by the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles, and withdrew for
four days to rest billets, which consisted of some French huts partly in the
wood, and partly in the open, just behind Mont St. Eloy. We are afraid we could
not have given our predecessors a "billet clean" certificate in respect of these
huts, many of which were a foot or more deep with accumulated rubbish of every
description. There were no baths, and we had to rig up home-made ones with
ground sheets and other means, using the cookers for providing the necessary hot
water. We managed, however, to get clean clothing from time to time from the
Staff Captain, Major Wordsworth, who got together a fascinating crowd of French
ladies, and did much useful work as Officer Commanding Laundry, at Mont St. Eloy.
We were at this time called upon to provide a contribution towards the Brigade
Mining Section, which was re-formed to help the French Miners in the sector, and
on March 17th, we had to part temporarily with Lieut. R. V. Harvey, Corpl. Boot
and 12 men, who joined the Brigade Section under Lieut. Webster, of the Robin
Hoods. The arrival of 140 reinforcements the previous day had, however, swelled
our numbers considerably, amongst several old friends in the draft being Sergt.
G. Powell, who shortly became Comp. Sergt.-Major of A Company, Sergts. I. B.
Bell, S. Foster, Collins and Beniston, and Corpl. A. B. North. We thus had a
reasonable trench strength when we relieved the 7th Battalion in the left
sub-sector on March 19th.
In this area we always kept to the same sub-sector, relieving as on many other
occasions with the Robin Hoods. The 5th and 6th Battalions shared the right
sub-sector, whilst the 138th Brigade were on our left. Each Company, too, had
its own section of trench, finding its own supports. From right to left they ran
in order: D (Capt. Hill), B (Capt. Turner), C (Major G. S. Heathcote), A (Capt.
Vann, who had recently rejoined; during his absence on a course at 3rd Army
School, his place was taken by Capt. Lawson). Battalion Headquarters was in a
delightful spot just under the steep side of the Talus des Zouaves, and well
nigh out of reach of everything but aeroplane bombs. Second Lieut. Cox was
Signalling Officer, 2nd Lieut. Simonet, Lewis Gun Officer, 2nd Lieut. Peerless,
Grenade Officer, and 2nd Lieut. Marshall, Intelligence Officer. The last-named
was the first Officer in the Battalion to hold that newly created appointment.
The enemy front line was close to ours, in most parts about 70 yards away, but
bombing posts in saps were in several cases not more than 10 to 15 yards apart.
Talking and movement in the front line could often be heard quite plainly,
whilst our Bombers in the posts used to indulge sometimes in lobbing practice,
and spent their odd moments in erecting or repairing wire netting to catch the
Boche "potato mashers."
Our two communication trenches running forward—"Boyau Central" and "Avenue
Lassale"—though well cared for and kept up by the French, were almost straight,
and hardly traversed at all, particularly the former, and movement along them
was precarious. The fire and support trenches, bearing such names as "Schiller,"
"Grange," "Broadmarsh," "Duffield," and "Bertrand," were in very bad order, and
work was at once concentrated in an effort to make a good line of resistance
along "Guerin Trench," practically the support line. Some work was also done on
a reserve trench, known as "Blanchetière." We felt this all the more necessary,
as just before we took over from the French, the Boche had driven them out of
their front line, and it seemed quite within the range of possibility that he
might try to make a further advance. Our fears turned out to be correct, for
later he did make an onslaught, though luckily not whilst we were there.
Unfortunately the enemy in capturing the trenches, had secured the shafts of all
the French mines, and had consequently got a good start at various points along
the front before the French could begin again. The result was that practically
all the French mines were defensive, and intended merely to try and blow the
Germans, before they could get under our lines. No doubt each side knew almost
exactly where the other side was working, and at what approximate time any
particular mine would go up. These were all shewn to us on a plan, and carefully
explained by the Officer in charge of the French Miners, who were still at work
in the sector. Each Company had a cut-and-dried scheme for carrying out the
instant a mine went up in its own or adjoining sectors. Anticipating the mine,
parties were kept available to seize the near lip of the crater formed, with
covering parties of Lewis gunners, riflemen, and bombers to go out on each
flank, and working parties behind them to begin at once to dig a trench to join
up the broken front line across the lip of the crater, wire the front and
establish observation posts on the lip. All this work had to be started the
instant the mine was exploded, in order to make certain that the Boche did not
get possession of our lip of the crater, as well as his own. This entailed
constant readiness and considerable anxiety on the part of those holding the
front line.
The enemy shewed no special activity, though on several occasions our front and
support lines were badly knocked about, both by shells and trench mortars, which
necessitated a vast amount of repairs, and caused us considerable casualties. In
addition to high explosive he now began to send over for the first time
"lachrymatory" gas shells, having a sweet smell and doing little harm except to
make our eyes water. In the later stages of the war, they became, as we shall
see, much more disagreeable.
As it was so difficult in this sector for our Gunners to be able to identify our
front line, we had to mark it with "artillery boards,"—white boards about 3 ft.
by 2 ft., marked with different letters denoting the different sections of the
front. These were stuck up by the Infantry at night, in such a position that
they could be seen by our Gunners but be invisible to the enemy. Whether they
were any real help or not is doubtful. Later on we were given a smaller portable
type of board, coloured brown and marked with a black cross, a number of which
were issued to each Battalion, and carried with us as part of our equipment.
They were intended for use in moving warfare to mark our advanced positions, but
were eventually discarded as unsuitable.
We now began seriously to try and harass the enemy with trench mortars, for
which purpose Trench Mortar Batteries were formed. The medium batteries fired a
fairly heavy shell with a long tail (known as "Footballs" or "Toffee Apples"),
and the Stokes batteries a light shell, which could be fired at the rate of 20
or more per minute. We had recently sent 2nd Lieut. Kebblewhite and five men to
a school for a course in this work. It is feared, however, that the first
efforts of the trench mortar experts in the trenches were not fully appreciated.
A very nervous Officer would go to his emplacement, fire off a few shells, and
then gracefully, but rapidly retire, leaving the people on the spot to put up
with any retaliation. And we well remember Capt. Lawson being so annoyed at this
going on, that on one occasion the bed plate mysteriously disappeared. On
another occasion an emplacement was made one night with much care on D Company's
front, ready for a big bombardment, but when completed was found to be in full
view of six enemy sniper plates, about 100 yards away!
At sniping we more than held our own, though the enemy were very keen, and used
to fire from steel plates fixed round the mine craters. We were unfortunate in
losing at this period Sergt.-Drummer Clewes, who went home for discharge. He had
done much excellent work in charge of the Brigade Snipers, his own "bag" being
stated to amount to considerably over 100. As some recognition of his good work
he was later awarded the D.C.M. His son, Corpl. G. W. Clewes, another excellent
sniper, left at the same time. L.-Corpl. Hagues took over the duties of N.C.O.
in charge of Snipers, and with 2nd Lieut. Marshall, did some splendid work,
including the blowing-in of several loophole plates with Col. Fowler's Elephant
Gun, which was now brought into use again.
Marshall's "pet," however, was the "dummy tree" on the Route de Béthune. This
was a hollow tree about 20 feet high, formed of steel casing, and covered with
imitation bark. Inside there were ledges to climb up by, and from it a most
excellent view for a very long distance around, could be obtained. It had been
erected by the enemy before they had been driven back.
Another item in the "Intelligence Department" which now came into use, was that
extraordinary instrument known as the "I-Tok," intended for picking up enemy
telegraphic and telephonic messages. We never were supposed to know where its
operators performed, and rarely did know, but more often than not they placed
themselves near Battalion Headquarters, and the sheaves of papers they sent to
Brigade were mostly filled with scraps of our own messages. It is doubtful if
much of value was picked up from enemy messages, but they certainly did good in
keeping a check on our own conversations over the telephone, and were regularly
used from now onwards. The "Fullerphone," which was introduced a little later,
and largely superseded the ordinary telephone, was reputed to be capable of
transmitting messages in such a way that they could not be picked up.
Our Firework Artistes, too, decided that they ought to have a show, and
accordingly arranged for us one night to have a display of red rockets in the
front line. These rockets had been issued for use for night S.O.S. When the time
came for them to be let off, the only visible result to those behind watching,
was one feeble rocket which made a short lob, and fell to the earth. Only one
other went off at all, and it had a great tussle with John Turner, nearly
knocking him through a traverse, and then fizzing itself out in the bottom of
the trench.
Another brainy person, one of our German scholars, decided one day to try the
result of putting up a placard to give the Boche the news that the L.15 had been
sunk in the Thames. This was on April 2nd. Two days later a notice was put up
opposite B Company's front, which said "Thanks for your news: you are all mad"—shewing,
we thought, a lack of originality on his part. This was one of the very few
occasions upon which we either sent or received a message in this way.
Regtl.-sergt.-major A. Westerman. Comp. Sergt.-major J. T. Slater And N.C.O.'s
Of
'A' Company, 1917.
Regtl.-sergt.-major A. Westerman. Comp. Sergt.-major J. T. Slater And N.C.O.'s
Of 'A' Company, 1917.
Just about the same time, we had the pleasure of seeing a Hun plane brought down
by one of our own, after a short sharp scrap in mid-air. Our man dived at the
Hun and opened with Lewis gun fire, killing both the pilot and observer. The
plane took charge of itself, and after a brief wild career, crashed near our
Battalion Headquarters. It was no sooner down than it was shelled by the enemy
and eventually set on fire. Various useful documents, however, were secured from
it including some maps and a signalling code. The bodies of the pilot, Lieut.
Ziemssen, and the observer were buried at Mont St. Eloy by Padre Hales, who a
little later received an appreciative letter from the pilot's widow.
With these and sundry other excitements, we got through two six-day tours in the
line, and also spent two periods of similar length at our rest huts cleaning,
training, and reorganising, for we were continually losing Officers and men in
various ways, and fresh ones were joining. Amongst the former we lost 2nd Lieuts.
G. G. Elliott and Pitt, invalided to England, and the following Warrant Officers
and N.C.O.'s who left us on completion of their term of service: Regimental
Quarter-Master Sergt. Tomlin, Comp. Sergt.-Major Haywood, Comp. Quarter-Master
Sergt. Shelton, and Sergts. Murden, Handford and Kettle. Arrivals included Major
Ashwell, Capt. H. Kirby, Lieut. G. Wright, 2nd Lieut. W. P. Duff, and about 70
men, many of whom were returned casualties, and in some cases anything but fit
to resume active service. Comp. Quarter-Master Sergt. Dench became Regimental
Quarter-Master Sergt., Sergt. Bee Comp. Quarter-Master Sergt. of B Company, and
Sergt. Hotson Comp. Quarter-Master Sergt. of C Company.
We were able to offer very little in the way of amusement just at this period,
entertainers either being more or less non-existent, or somewhat shy. One
afternoon, however, we succeeded in rousing sufficient enthusiasm to organise a
boxing contest, one of the very few ever carried through by the Battalion. In
the heavy-weight contest between those two stalwarts, Sergt. Slater and Corpl.
Bryan, the latter retired after the third round with an injured hand. The
middle-weight competition was won by Sergt. L. Green, and the lightweight by
Sergt. Attenborough. The same evening, we managed an impromptu concert in one of
the huts.
Our Transport Lines and Quarter-Master's stores during this period were back at
Acq, and were fairly comfortable. Here for the first time we had the experience
of taking rations and stores up to the line on the light railways, already
constructed by the French, a system of transport in which both they and the
Germans were much ahead of us. Stores were unloaded from the limbers at Ecoivres
on to flat trucks, each of which was pulled by three mules. The "Decauville
Track" ran past "Berthonval Farm," across the Béthune road, branching there
right and left for the various Battalion dumps, ours being in the Talus des
Zouaves, near Battalion Headquarters. At first, the system did not work well,
and there was much confusion, but later it was properly organised so that
rations went up first, and Royal Engineers' stores about midnight. When we first
took over the sector, the French caused much alarm to our men by carrying their
stores to and from the Béthune Road by electric trucks, actually the chassis and
platforms of trains from Paris Plage, to which the bells used for warning
pedestrians were still attached. One brakesman, Alphonse by name, like a wise
person, usually went about his own business on arrival at the Béthune Road Dump,
which was often a warm spot. The driver meanwhile got his load to take back, and
anxious as all were who ever had a job of work at that particular spot, to get
it done and be off, he adopted the practice which seemed to us rather foolish,
of vigorously sounding his gong time after time, at the same time shouting
"Alphonse, Alphonse," with the result that all our men vanished "tout-de-suite,"
leaving him and the errant Alphonse to face any whizz-bangs which might result.
Truly, the French are a remarkable race!
We must, however, congratulate them on that excellent institution in the Vimy
sector, Trench Coffee Shops. Where cooking for the trenches was a matter of some
difficulty, as in this sector, it was a great boon to be able to get such
excellent supplies of hot tea and other comforts as they provided. They were run
by the French for some time after our arrival, but later were taken over by our
own Brigade, and put under the care of Capt. E. M. Hacking, who was attached to
Brigade Headquarters. We feel, however, we must attribute to the somewhat casual
sanitary measures adopted by the French, the presence of so many rats in this
sector. One often met them in droves in the trenches, and never before or after
did we come across such numbers of the beasts, and such colossal specimens as we
found during our stay in the Vimy trenches.
On April 12th, after a brief inspection near our huts by Major-General Stuart-Wortley,
we went up to the trenches for our last and most eventful tour, which was
destined to last eight days. Owing to falls of snow and rain, the trenches were
in a deplorable state, and gumboots were in great demand, and our only means of
keeping the men at all dry. At this time we had no such luxuries as
drying-rooms. Heavy shelling by the enemy during the first three days made
things still more uncomfortable. The real business of the tour, however, began
on April 16th, on which night the French had arranged to blow one mine on our
front, and another on the front of the 6th Battalion. Combined with this we had
arranged for a small raid to be carried out by Lieut. A. Bedford and 12 other
ranks, who immediately the mines were exploded were to rush forward round the
left edge of our crater, and endeavour to capture any Germans found in a small
forward trench they had recently dug there. The mines were to go up at midnight,
and at the same time our guns and trench mortars were to put down a barrage on
the Boche trenches, which was to be augmented by rifle grenades and showers of
grenades thrown from West Spring Throwers, under the arrangement of our Grenade
Officer. Unfortunately, there had evidently been some bad synchronisation
somewhere, for at five minutes before zero two Frenchmen suddenly came rushing
towards Bedford, who was waiting in a communication trench with his party,
shouting "Tout-de-suite! Tout-de-suite!" and almost at the same instant the
mines went up. This was very unfortunate, as it enabled the Boche, who evidently
knew all about it, to get their barrage down before our own Gunners, who were
waiting for zero. Bedford at once pushed on with his party with much dash in
face of heavy fire from machine guns, rifles, trench mortars and bombs. He got
as far as the advanced trench, which, however, was held in considerable
strength, and finding himself bombed on both sides, he had to withdraw without
getting a prisoner. His party got back alright, but unfortunately Bedford
himself was knocked down by a bomb, and although only slightly wounded had to
leave us, and a few days later was invalided to England. Capt. Hill meanwhile
carried out the consolidation with much success. As soon as the mass of débris,
chalk and stones had stopped falling, parties at once got to work digging a new
trench across the crater which was something like 30 yards wide by 30 feet deep,
to connect the broken front line, establishing observation posts and putting out
fresh wire. In spite of intense fire a sufficient trench had been dug by dawn,
and the position made good. Great assistance was rendered by Capt. Gray and the
N.C.O.'s of D Company. Unfortunately Sergt. Markham, after most gallantly
controlling the fire of his platoon for nearly two hours, under very heavy fire,
was shot through the head and killed instantly. Another excellent piece of work
was performed by Pvte. E. Dobb, who leapt out of the trench on seeing a party of
Huns trying to get round the crater, and hurled two bombs right amongst them. If
they had had any doubts as to the possibility of getting round, this made up
their minds, and they retired hurriedly.
The following night at midnight, the enemy sprang a mine on the front of our
left Company (A), which caused considerable trouble and heavy loss before the
position was finally made good. A portion of our front line was blown up, and
owing to the heavy state of the ground, which was much water-logged, and to the
intense hostile bomb, rifle and machine gun fire, it was impossible to get a
trench dug round our lip of the crater. It was not until three nights after that
the situation was cleared, and our lip of the crater finally occupied, after
some of the most difficult and miserable nights that it was ever our misfortune
to experience. During these days there was little rest for anyone, and much
excellent work was done by all ranks. Marshall carried out some splendid
patrols, ably assisted by L.-Corpl. Hinchley, going out nightly through mud and
filth, to ascertain the position around the crater. Duff did almost superhuman
work with bombs and rifle grenades, being at it practically the whole night, for
three nights in succession, and this was only his second tour in the trenches.
The Stretcher Bearers too, as always, did most notable work, particularly Pvtes.
Holbery and Thomas, who fetched in our wounded from the slopes of the crater
only a few yards below and in full view of the German sentry post, whilst Sergts.
Deverall and Collins, and L.-Corpl. Ostick also did very gallant work, and
L.-Corpl. J. T. Templeman throughout carried out his work of repairing telephone
wires, with his usual skill and courage. So uncanny was the work of this period,
that Lieut. Peerless was able on one occasion to take deliberate aim, at 30
yards range, at a German digging hard in the bright moonlight, on the top of a
crater.
On April 19th, the French sprang another mine, just to the left of our Battalion
front, as a result of which we got a certain amount of hostile shelling, whilst
on the 20th, the enemy put up another, slightly to our left, which also brought
its share of shelling on us. This, however, was our last, for much to our
relief, and at comparatively short notice, the 10th Cheshires (25th Division)
took over our sector on the night of the 20th, and after a weary trudge over
that never-ending duck-board track, we got to Ecoivres by 1 a.m. on the 21st.
Having done full justice to the excellent tea which the Quarter-Master and his
followers had ready for us, we were taken in 'buses to Tincques, where we
arrived about 6 a.m., and found that we were to be billeted partly there, and
partly in the neighbouring village of Bethencourt. We fear we did not present a
happy sight at that early hour to the ladies just going to church on a lovely
Good Friday morning. Dawn is not an ideal time for seeing a Battalion at its
best, especially after an exceptionally hard eight days in water-logged
trenches. Our total casualties in the Vimy sector amounted to 17 killed or died
of wounds, 69 wounded and five missing.
It was a matter of great regret to us to hear later that the 25th Division
suffered very heavily shortly after we left, when the enemy made a determined
attack on the front recently held by us, and recaptured several trenches.