HISTORY OF 1/8th BATTALION
LENS
March 17th, 1917.— July 4th, 1917.
After relief at Gommecourt we spent two days at Souastre, and then marched via
Bayencourt and Courcelles-au-Bois to Contay, where we arrived on March 23rd. The
roads for much of this journey were in an appalling mess, partly as a result of
constant shelling, and partly through being cut up by the masses of transport
which had passed over them during the recent wet weather either in following up
the retreating enemy or in withdrawing to back areas. Vehicles were often up to
the axle in mud, whilst bicycles gave an immense amount of trouble, and this was
not the only occasion on which we found it far preferable to foot-slog, even
with heavy packs, than to be Signallers with bicycles, which practically had to
be carried. Loaded with pack and other paraphernalia, the heavy army pattern
bicycle is not a lovable companion, except on a more or less perfect road. A
really first-class exhibition of bicycle manoeuvring was given during the move
by Pvte. Bunce, who always seemed to be in trouble, and was a source of much
amusement to his fellow Signallers. We stayed one night at Contay, moving the
following day to Bertangles, and on March 25th to Revelles, a delightful village
about seven miles West of Amiens. We were taken through Amiens itself in motor
'buses, which picked us up just North of the town, and deposited us on the other
side, leaving us to finish the journey on foot.
On passing through one village during this backward march we saw some men
wearing Sherwood Forester badges. They turned out to be men of the 2/8th
Battalion, and proved the correctness of rumours we had recently heard that that
Battalion was actually in France. One of the 2/8th men accosted a fellow man of
our Battalion, as he passed, with the remark "Who are you?" "1/8th" was the
reply, "Who are you?" "2/8th"—"Right", said our friend—we believe a
Signaller—"You can tell your mother you've seen some real soldiers now!"
We were supposed to entrain for the North almost at once, but as five or six
other Divisions were being moved besides ourselves it was not surprising that
trains were running a day or two late, so we were able to have a short rest at
Revelles, which was much enjoyed, especially as we were able to make trips to
Amiens, which at that time had only been slightly damaged by bombs, and was full
of life. The chief centres of attraction were the Hotel Godbert, The Savoy,
Charlie's Bar, and the Café du Cathédral.
Eventually we entrained at Bacouel Station in the afternoon of March 28th, the
entrainment being one of the most expeditious ever carried out by the Battalion.
Not so, however, the journey! Times without number we came to a stop with a
succession of jerks, not on account of signals—indeed it would appear that few,
if any, existed—but because other trains were in front. During a tedious night
of such progress, we passed through Abbeville, Boulogne, Calais and St. Omer,
and arrived about 9.0 a.m. on March 29th, at Hazebrouck. Being told there by a
French Railway Official that the train would stop for 15 minutes, most of the
Officers dashed for the buffet on the opposite platform and ordered "Omelettes
et café." As one might have imagined, the train began to move without warning
just as breakfast was started. There was a wild dash, but all to no purpose, for
the train was well under way. By the best of good luck, however, a supply train
was found, which apparently was going in the same direction, though the guard
and driver appeared to have different views on the subject, which led to a
decidedly heated argument between them. At any rate our party boarded the train
and fortunately found it brought them very shortly to Berguette Station, where
the rest of the Battalion were just detraining.
The Adjutant's duty of seeing the Battalion safely across the railway, near the
station, was indeed a pleasant one, and less fortunate members of the Battalion
have accused him of carrying on in an unseemly manner with the fair keeper of
the level crossing. We have his assurance, however, that though he felt proud
indeed at having such a charming young lady by his side, his behaviour was
beyond reproach! A few hours' march brought us to Westrehem, where we found most
comfortable billets, and were welcomed and treated in the most cordial manner by
all.
This move brought us into the First Army (General Horne), of which we were now
to form part for many months, and into the II Corps, and though we only remained
in this Corps for a few days the Commander, Lieut.-General Sir C. Jacob, lost no
time in coming to make our acquaintance, having all the Officers paraded to meet
him at the School at Westrehem, two days after our arrival.
We spent about a fortnight there refitting and training, the most important part
of the latter being practice in the new Company and Platoon formations for
attack, in which much attention was paid to the question of the numbers and
positions of the personnel attached to Company and Platoon Headquarters.
Practice advances were also carried out with these formations behind a creeping
barrage represented by flags and drums. Outposts and advance guards were
practised, as well as tactical open warfare schemes, with Officers and N.C.O.'s,
and firing was carried out on a range near the village. One day was devoted to a
Divisional Route March, in which every unit in the Division took part. It was
carried out as a tactical scheme, the Division supposed to be pursuing a
retreating enemy, and the 8th Battalion forming part of the Advance Guard.
On the recreational side, football was the chief feature, and several very
interesting matches were played, in one of which the 7th Battalion Officers got
their revenge by beating us three—nil at Nédonchelle. Westrehem was also the
venu of a Rugby football match, between a team from the 6th and 8th Battalions,
and one from the 5th and Machine Gun Company, which ended after a hard fight in
a draw. Padre Uthwatt, who had recently joined us, did his best to try and
organise amusements, and the Divisional Cinema came over and gave one or two
shows. There was small attraction in the village except one or two shops and
estaminets, but you could get anything from chewing gum upwards at "Lane's
Emporium," and the inhabitants were so extremely kind that we lacked little. The
chief drawback during our stay at Westrehem was the weather, which at times was
very cold, and on several days there were heavy falls of snow.
On April 13th, we began to move towards the line once more, spending that night
at Vendin-lez-Béthune, and proceeding the following day to Houchin. There we
went under canvas, sharing a camp with the 7th Battalion, and had a comfortable
if chilly stay of three days.
Changes which took place about this time included the departure of our Medical
Officer, Capt. C. B. Johnstone, who was replaced for a brief period by Capt.
Walsh, and later by Capt. W. C. Gavin; Capt. E. M. Hacking, and Lieut. Moore
were invalided to England, and "Weetie", who had been our Adjutant for over 18
months, handed over his duties to Lieut. Whitton on being attached to Brigade
Headquarters. A little later he succeeded "Peter" Wordsworth, who left to take
up a higher appointment after being Staff Captain for over three years, during
which we were grateful for his kind help on many occasions. Regimental
Quarter-Master Sergt. Dench went home to train for a commission, but we met him
again in the later stages of the war, when he did excellent work with the 5th
Battalion, gaining the M.C. and two bars. His place was taken by Comp.
Quarter-Master Sergt. Pritchard, who was succeeded in D Company by Sergt.
Gammon; Armourer Quarter-Master Sergt. Loughman went to hospital, and from that
time onwards no official armourer was allowed.
We left Houchin on April 18th, and soon found familiar signs of our proximity to
the front. In Noeux-les-Mines, a not exactly encouraging notice said "These
cross-roads are registered." Needless to say we did not loiter there, especially
as it had been shelled several times during the preceding few days. Passing
Petit Sains and Aix Noulette—the latter mostly in ruins—another notice warned us
that "Small box Respirators must be worn in the alert position East of this
point". A little further on we found parties of men at work making good the
roads, and laying temporary corduroy tracks across what had recently been No
Man's Land. Passing over this waste we descended to Angres—known later as "Angry
Corner"—and entered Liévin, where we took over billets from the 13th Middlesex.
Liévin had only been evacuated by the enemy and occupied by the 24th Division
two days before our arrival. This evacuation was not part of his general scheme
of withdrawing from some of his salients and shortening his line, which we had
experienced at Gommecourt, but had been forced on him by the capture by the
Canadians early in April of Vimy Ridge.
Included in the line now held by the enemy West of Lens were the strong
positions of Fosse 3 and Hill 65, opposite the South of the front taken over by
the 46th Division, and Hill 70 on the North. His outpost line ran through the
Cité-de-Riaumont and Eastern outskirts of Liévin, across the Lens-Liévin Road,
through Cité-St. Laurent to Hill 70. Lens itself was one of the most important
centres in the mining district and the whole area was a mass of mining villages
or "Cités," with their rows of cottages and neat gardens, pits or "puits,"
slag-heaps, and other usual features of a colliery district.
The town of Liévin lay astride the Souchez river, about three miles West of
Lens. Previously a thriving mining centre, it had now been badly knocked about
by shelling, though large numbers of houses were still more or less intact. The
Boche had done much work in strengthening the cellars of the houses by covering
them with concrete, paving setts torn up from the road, bricks and other
material, the only drawback being that much of the extra strengthening had been
put on the side facing the old front line, so that we now got little advantage
from it, and felt we should like to turn the houses round, as the side towards
the enemy was often none too strong. The evacuation had been so hurried that the
enemy had not had time to destroy or remove much of the furniture and clothing
from the houses, in many of which we found all the available beds collected in
the cellars, which were also well furnished with chairs, tables, cupboards,
cutlery and much other civilian property and made very comfortable billets.
Sappers made an inspection of all these cellars, and of the dug-outs recently
evacuated by the enemy before we occupied them, in order to ensure the absence
of "booby traps," and in this respect we had no excitement.
Information from prisoners indicated that a further retreat behind Lens was
imminent, and the impression of the Higher Command was that only slight pressure
was necessary to push the enemy outposts out of Cité-de-Riaumont and Hill 65,
and to establish a line East of that town. Unfortunately this information was
true only up to a point. It has transpired since that for a day or two before
the 46th Division came into the line there really was something approaching a
panic in the German Command in this sector, and that all preparations had been
made to evacuate Lens. By the time of our arrival, however, the panic was at an
end, and the enemy were undoubtedly holding the Southern portion of Cité-de-Riaumont
and the strong defences of Hill 65 in considerable strength. Corps and Army
Intelligence refused, however, to believe this to be more than a show, and the
general trend of orders was that attacks by small numbers should be made at once
to clear the enemy out of Cité-de-Riaumont and finally from Hill 65. The loss of
this last covering position should, it was thought, necessitate their withdrawal
from Lens.
The flexibility of the position is indicated by the fact that a Divisional
Commander, in making a reconnaissance in Riaumont Wood, had run against an enemy
patrol. History does not relate which was the more surprised, but both escaped
without casualties.
On April 19th we took over the left sub-sector of the Brigade sector from the
7th Northamptons, commanded by that gallant sportsman, Col. Mobbs. The main
defence just established was on the Eastern edge of the Bois de Riaumont. The
Northern two rows of houses in the village of Riaumont were occupied by our
outposts, and the enemy were reported to be holding the remainder in force. A
Company (Capt. A. Hacking) took over the outpost line; B Company (Lieut. G.
Wright, during the absence on leave of Capt. Turner) were in support in the Bois
de Riaumont and Cité des-Bureaux, whilst C Company (Capt. A. Bedford) and D
Company (Capt. Simonet) were in billets in the "River Line," not far from
Battalion Headquarters, which were at the White Château.
It was clear that no attempt to capture Hill 65 would be possible until the
whole of Riaumont village was in our hands, and instructions to this effect were
given to Capt. A. Hacking, operations to secure which were carried out on the
night after relief in conjunction with the 6th Battalion on our right. The
advance took place quietly in pitch darkness. Several parties of the enemy were
encountered, some being killed and one captured. By midnight the Battalion's
objective had been secured, and posts established in the Railway Cutting along
the Company front. In this difficult and rather uncanny work of clearing and
searching the houses and cellars of the village, Lieut. Geary, Sergt. Stokes and
Corpl. Brett did splendid work, for which the first-named—who was the last
Officer of the Battalion to be killed, a fortnight before Armistice—was awarded
the Military Cross. Later in the night the enemy opened a sudden and very heavy
bombardment, and parties were seen advancing down one of the streets, but were
driven off with loss. We had no casualties during this operation.
Meanwhile the 6th Battalion were not able to make good the remainder of the
village South of the cross roads, which the enemy were holding in greater
strength, and it was apparent that he intended to hold the trench on the South
side as part of his Lens outposts.
The work put into the cellars of the colliery houses here was quite
extraordinary. In several cases, fifteen feet under the cellars, were found
subterranean passages with large dormitories and rooms capable of accommodating
large numbers of men. These were well furnished, but owing to their depth and
the proximity of the enemy, we were unable to use them as much as we should have
liked.
Further fighting and a good deal of shelling took place during the night of
April 21/22, causing us several casualties, but not any material alteration in
the situation. Particularly good work was done during that time by Sergt.
Bolton.
It was in these circumstances, and rather to the surprise of those who were
acquainted with the position, that orders were received that we were to attack
and capture Hill 65 in conjunction with the 6th Battalion, who were at the same
time to attack Fosse 3, and make good the remainder of the village and the enemy
trench to the South. The attack was to be carried out by C Company, starting
from the railway cutting, so far as this had been established by A Company.
There was little time to make any preparations. A hasty reconnaissance was made
from an old Boche reinforced observation post East of the railway cutting, just
off "Absalom" Trench, kindly placed at our disposal by a Gunner Officer, from
which an excellent view was obtained of Hill 65, a bare hill with a row or two
of colliery cottages on the top, later found to contain the inevitable deep
cellars. The rest of the details were fixed at hurriedly summoned conferences of
Officers and N.C.O.'s. The final objective was "Advance" Trench, just beyond the
Hill. The 137th Brigade on the left were to send patrols to gain touch with us
at "Abode" Trench, and the 6th Battalion on the right were to meet our parties
in "Admiral" Trench. Their attack was not in line with ours but was more or less
echelonned in rear.
As soon as it was dark the Company moved up from their quarters in the River
Line to Cité-de-Riaumont, where the men were safely got into the cellars of the
houses, relieving part of A Company. Pvte. Bradshaw, a most excellent Company
cook, having decided that a Company Mess in Advance Trench would be a dreary
place for his Officers without whisky, slung on his back a bottle which the Mess
President had thought of leaving behind for the incoming Mess. Unfortunately it
proved to be a case of "Love's Labour Lost," for the man, and it is feared the
bottle too, fell into the hands of the Boche!
D Company, who were to "mop up," took over the rest of A Company's area, the
latter Company returning to Liévin, and two platoons of B Company occupied
Absalom Trench. The imminence of our attack was evidently known to the enemy,
whose artillery during the night liberally shelled Absalom Trench, Riaumont
Château, the Eastern edge of the village, and the approaches from Liévin. Trench
mortars were also very active on the village, in fact, at one time it was
thought that the Boche himself might be attacking, and shortly after midnight C
Company were got out of the cellars and ordered to stand to. During that time
Comp. Sergt.-Major Haywood was slightly wounded and had to go back. Nothing
further happened, however, and the Company eventually took up their final
position in the railway cutting about 4.0 a.m. on April 23rd (after waiting for
the rum and tea which were delayed by the shelling and arrived too late).
Several casualties were caused now by our own artillery firing short, one shell,
which luckily was a "dud," burying itself in the side of the embankment amongst
a group of men.
Leaving a right flanking party to deal with the enemy in the railway cutting,
the remainder of the Company, deploying from the cutting at Zero, 4.45 a.m.,
changed direction half-right and moved forward under a barrage of artillery and
trench mortars. The preliminary bombardment had more or less destroyed the
houses on the hill and cut good gaps in the wire, which the party had little
difficulty in getting through. The right leading platoon under Lieut. Skinner
got into one of the numerous trenches and at first met with little opposition,
but being separated from the rest of the Company, were rapidly surrounded by
large numbers of the enemy, and practically all were killed or captured. The
left platoon, under 2nd Lieut. Hopkinson, reinforced by the remainder of the
Company, were held up by machine gun fire, which caused many casualties, until
Corpl. Fletcher managed to get a direct hit on one of the guns with a No. 23
grenade. A message was meanwhile taken by C Company runner, the redoubtable "Mungo"
Marsh, to D Company, asking them to try and work a party round to the North side
of the houses. Further attempts made to rush another gun which was doing much
damage, were met now with bombs thrown from a trench just in front of the
houses. The folly of attempting the attack with the Southern half of the cutting
still in the hands of the enemy, now became apparent, for at this moment large
parties of the enemy appeared on the right rear, with which the flanking party
had apparently been quite unable to deal. Then from the cellars of the houses on
top of the hill also emerged many of the enemy, and the now small remains of the
Company were in imminent danger of being completely surrounded. Orders were
given to withdraw, but few returned to tell the tale. Duff, one of the most
heroic and stout-hearted Officers the Battalion ever possessed, was last seen
firing his revolver amid a horde of the enemy. Hopkinson was never heard of
again. Sergt. Cox died of wounds and Sergts. Curtis, Sansom and Chalk were
amongst the 70 missing, whilst the wounded numbered 34. The highest praise is
due to all ranks of C Company for their magnificent efforts and especially to
Capt. A. Bedford, who throughout worked incessantly and led the attack with the
utmost gallantry. It was only through a hard fate that his endeavours did not
meet with the success they so well deserved. Very good work was also done by the
mopping-up platoon of D Company, under Sergt. Painter, which helped to cover the
withdrawal of the remnants of C Company.
The 6th Battalion fared no better, and the attack produced, what was suspected
by those who knew the ground, exactly nothing except a total of casualties which
are felt to have been sacrificed on the altar of faulty intelligence.
It is easy, perhaps, to be wise after the event. All information received by
Corps Intelligence indicated an imminent retreat by the enemy. On no other
premises could an attack by so small a force on so strong a position have been
justified. One further principle of warfare, by no means new, was justified to
the hilt—no frontal attack should ever be attempted unless all counter attack
from a flank is impossible, or unless sufficient forces are available to render
such an attack an impracticability. The ultimate capture of the Hill
necessitated nearly two months' artillery preparation and the employment at
intervals of two Brigades. Perhaps there is one further illustration of the
uncertainty of modern warfare in the history of Hill 65. With that Hill in our
hands, and later on the dominating position of Hill 70, all the tenets of war
would conclude that Lens would be completely untenable, and yet it was not until
more than a year afterwards that the enemy, in the last stages of the war,
evacuated a town which will, in the history of the Battalion and of the 46th
Division, be for ever associated with the fortunes of Hill 65.
On April 24th we went back into Brigade Support with Battalion Headquarters at
the Red Mill, and Companies billeted in cellars. Some readjustments had to be
made the following day, when Battalion Headquarters moved to cellars on the Lens
Road. This spot seemed to be a favourite target for a Whizz-bang, which fired
straight down the road, and was responsible for many sprints and much language
at different times on the part of various members of Battalion Headquarters.
Three days later the Brigade was relieved by the 137th Brigade and moved into
Divisional Reserve, the Battalion proceeding to a delightful little spot known
as Marqueffles Farm, nestling under the wooded slopes of the Lorette Ridge. Here
we were extremely comfortable, and on this and a future occasion spent a most
agreeable time, being especially fortunate in the matter of weather. It was a
stiff climb to the top of the ridge, at the Eastern edge of which were the
remains of Notre Dame de Lorette. This was the favourite spot of the Gipsy
bomber, whose story was told in Punch a few years ago:—
"But most he loved to lie upon Lorette
And, couched on cornflowers, gaze across the lines
On Vimy Ridge—we had not Vimy yet—
Pale Souchez's bones, and Lens among the mines.
Till, eagle-like, with hoarse indignant shrieks.
Gunners arose from some deep-delved lair.
To chase the intruder from their sacred peaks
And cast him down to Ablain-St. Nazaire."
Torrance on one occasion climbed the ridge with Col. Blackwall, and can testify
that the view from the top was worth the walk! It formed a perfectly ideal
observation post, and we now understood why the Hun had fought so strenuously to
maintain a footing on the ridge.
The chief item whilst at rest was the reorganisation of C Company, which was
practically non-existent. Each of the other three Companies contributed a quota,
the transfers including Sergt. Stokes, from A Company, who was appointed Comp.-Sergt.
Major. A little later Sergt. H. J. Wilson, who for a long period had ably
superintended the Battalion cooking arrangements, was appointed Comp.
Quarter-Master-Sergt., and was succeeded as Sergt.-Cook by Corpl. Bateman. In
addition to other casualties we had lost Lieut. G. Wright, who injured his knee
up in the Riaumont sector and was now invalided to England, whilst 2nd Lieut.
White went to England for temporary duty as a Bombing Instructor, and 2nd Lieut.
Mitchell was appointed Adjutant of I Corps School. Our strength was thus
considerably reduced, whilst reinforcements at the moment were exactly nil.
On May 6th we relieved the 5th Lincolns in the left sub-sector of the left
Brigade sector, with Battalion Headquarters in the remnants of some mine
galleries at the back of Hart's Crater, just in front of Loos. There were only
two Brigades of the Division in the line at this period, and each Brigade went
to each sector in turn. We always went into the left sub-sector of each sector,
relieving with the 7th Battalion. The trenches here were very bad, so shallow
that it was almost impossible to get round by day, and considerably overlooked
by the enemy, particularly from the tower of Fosse 14. Their names began with
the letter N, the best known being "Nero," "Novel," "Netley," and "Nash." They
were old Boche trenches taken in the recent advance. The whole sector had a very
desolate appearance and life was not pleasant there. The discomfort was
increased by the enormous number of wing bombs and rifle grenades and occasional
deluges of gas bombs and shells fired by the enemy, which in our first six-day
tour there, caused us 39 casualties. This was followed by six days in support,
when we lived in dug-outs in some trenches between Loos and the famous Colliery
slag heap, known as the "Double Crassier." Battalion Headquarters were at an
exceptionally fine dug-out known as "Elvaston Castle," which had been dug by the
2nd Sherwood Foresters. Here, in addition to ordinary work, we amused ourselves
at times by cutting the vetches which were thriving on some parts of the area,
and sending them back for the transport animals. It was here also that a certain
Padre was overheard one day by the I-Tok, arranging for a funeral at Maroc, with
the result that he was requested to attend at Brigade Headquarters to explain
his indiscretions.
After a short rest at Noeux-les-Mines, we went back to the Liévin sector again
on May 25th and took over the line from Fosse 9 and Cité-St. Théodore to just
South of the Liévin-Lens Road. Battalion Headquarters were at the corner house
near the "Marble Arch" in Liévin. Here the monotony of trench life was varied by
long distance patrols, and an enemy raid on the night of May 29/30th on our post
at the junction of "Crocodile" Trench and the railway cutting, when we lost two
men captured, three killed and seven wounded. Casualties during the whole of
this period unfortunately were heavy and reinforcements few, one Officer, 2nd
Lieut. H. C. Orton and 36 men who joined in May, being our sole additions. We
also lost Sergt. Burton, who had done much excellent work as
Signalling-Sergeant. He went for a Commission, and was succeeded by Corpl. J. T.
Templeman. Our strength at this period was so small that for some time Companies
had to be organised in three platoons instead of four. About the same time, much
to the regret of all those who had been privileged to serve under him at any
time, during the long period in which he so successfully commanded the Brigade,
both in England and France, General Shipley left for a tour of duty at home, and
was succeeded by Brigadier-General G. G. S. Carey, C.B., R.A.
The first six days of June were spent in Brigade support in Liévin, at the end
of which time we went back into the line in front of Cité-St. Théodore, where
the only excitements were the pushing forward of advanced posts to help to
protect the left flank of the 138th Brigade in an attack on Fosse 3, and a
number of long distance patrols in which Lieut. Martelli and his Scouts always
played a prominent part. After another short rest at Marqueffles Farm, where on
June 12th we won first prize for the best Transport turnout at the Brigade Horse
Show, we went back for a short tour in Brigade support in front of Loos on June
15th.
We had now fairly sampled most of the area and found little of it to our liking.
Hart's Crater sector was the most monotonous for both front line and support
work, there being nothing but trenches to live in. In Liévin sector, though the
front line work was more interesting and we had fairly comfortable billets when
in support, the enemy shelled the town itself so incessantly both with high
explosive and gas, that one had to take more than ordinary precautions. Apart
from the fact that our own Division and the Canadians on the right were carrying
out "stunts" of one kind or other almost every day, provoking considerable
retaliation, we had an immense number of batteries tucked away amongst the
houses in Liévin, and under almost every bank round about it, besides many more
or less in the open. The Boche located these batteries with considerable
accuracy, and from time to time literally rained shells (principally 5.9's) on
to them, and almost every day knocked out numbers of guns.
Many of the gardens in the area close behind the front line were now in full
bearing and provided a very welcome addition to our rations, and more than one
has pleasant recollections of the excellent dishes of early asparagus and stewed
gooseberries gathered from the garden of Riaumont Château. Strawberries,
currants, gooseberries and rhubarb were also plentiful in Cité-St. Pierre.
Indeed the attractions of the first were too much for one greedy German, who was
so much occupied in filling his helmet with this luscious fruit that he walked
into one of the outposts of the 6th Battalion. It is doubtful if he was allowed
to reap the fruits of his labour, at any rate when he eventually arrived at
Battalion Headquarters both the helmet and the strawberries were conspicuous by
their absence!
The Transport and Quarter-Master's Stores were back in a very nice spot at Sains-en-Gohelle,
but their journeys to the line with rations and stores were almost as unpleasant
as they could be. In going to Liévin they usually got shelled with high
explosive and at Loos with gas, and it says much for the excellent way in which
Capt. H. Kirby and Sergt. Blunt handled the Transport on these occasions that
they never failed to deliver the stores and had scarcely a single casualty. For
a short period in the Liévin sector, stores were sent up by light railway from
Bully Grenay or Aix Noulette.
The Higher Command all this time had the fixed idea that the enemy could be
driven out of Lens, and all the efforts of the 46th Division and of the
Canadians on the right were concentrated to bring this about. The idea was
probably strengthened by the fact that fires and explosions were observed almost
daily in Lens itself, evidently due to the enemy's desire to leave as little as
possible in the event of his having to withdraw. Numerous small enterprises
carried out from time to time enabled some slight advance to be made, but
towards the end of June operations took place more frequently and on a larger
scale.
The Canadians having just captured the Generating Station and the high ground
around it, South of the Souchez River, which overlooked the Boche positions
about Fosse 3, the 138th Brigade were ordered to attack the Fosse again on June
19th, and this time succeeded in taking it, and on the night June 21/22nd, we
relieved the 5th Leicesters in their new outpost line in "Boot" and "Brick"
trenches, having spent the last three days at Calonne, to which place we had
moved from the Loos area on June 18th. The two days spent there were two of the
most unpleasant in the history of the Battalion. All four Companies were in the
line, there was little accommodation or shelter, the enemy shelling and
trench-mortaring were intense, and there was the constant fear of a
counter-attack from the right—altogether rather a nightmare. We were lucky in
not getting more casualties than we did; as it was we lost ten killed and 31
wounded in the two days, during which we were attached in turn to the 138th and
137th Brigades. We were relieved on the night June 23/24th and went back to
Calonne. A Company had a particularly unpleasant relief, as the enemy chose that
time to send over a number of gas shells and trench mortars, most of which fell
amongst that Company, causing them several casualties.
On June 25th the 137th Brigade, with little or no trouble, at last occupied Hill
65, and the same night we were again attached to that Brigade, and moved into
Liévin, with Headquarters at the Red Mill.
Here we got orders for working parties required for carrying and digging
assembly trenches at Cité-de-Riaumont for the 137th and 138th Brigades, who were
to carry out further operations. Company Commanders assembled at the Red Mill to
get their orders for this work at the same moment that the Boche had planned to
shell a battery of our guns almost adjacent to it. Heavies arrived in salvoes
for some time; several direct hits were obtained on the guns, the ammunition
dump just behind it was hit and explosions continued for days. It caused
considerable inconvenience to Company Commanders and further entailed the hasty
exit of Lieut. Tomlinson from the delightful bathing pool which had been made in
the stream adjoining the Mill. It was whilst out with one of these working
parties at Riaumont that Moffat Johnston, temporarily in command of B Company,
got badly knocked about by a shell and had to leave, the Company then being
taken over by 2nd Lieut. Day, Capt. Turner being away with the 46th Division
Depôt Battalion. On the night of June 27/28th we moved back to billets in Maroc.
The following evening the 137th and 138th Brigades made further progress in
another successful attack, the Canadians also pushing on South of the River
Souchez, practically into the outskirts of Lens itself. At the same time the 6th
and 7th Battalions co-operated with considerable success North of the Lens-Liévin
Road.
The Higher Authorities were now more convinced than ever that the Germans
opposite us were completely demoralised, and that with a small push we should
capture Lens itself. Hasty plans were accordingly devised, and, although we were
now lamentably weak in numbers, it was resolved to put the whole Division into a
final effort on the morning of July 1st. The 137th and 138th Brigades were to
attack South of the Lens-Liévin Road and the 139th Brigade North of it. For this
attack the 2nd Sherwood Foresters and the 9th Norfolks from the 6th Division on
our left were attached to our Brigade. The assaulting Battalions were the 2nd,
5th and 6th Sherwood Foresters. We were in support and late on June 30th moved
into St. Pierre. A and D Companies were attached to the 6th Battalion, A being
now commanded by Capt. Andrews, who had recently succeeded Capt. A. Hacking on
the latter's appointment as Second-in-Command of the 5th Battalion. This Company
held the 6th Battalion left Company front, whilst D Company remained in support.
B Company were attached to the 2nd Battalion, but were not required until the
following afternoon, when they were taken up to "Crook Redoubt." Owing to
casualties this Company came under the command of Sergt. Cobb, who carried out
his duties and looked after the Company during a rather trying time in a most
excellent manner. C Company were attached to the 5th Battalion and were in
support in "Cowden" Trench.
The attack was launched at dawn on July 1st and part of the objective taken, but
an enemy-counter attack found our men too weak to hold the position, and apart
from a small portion in the neighbourhood of Crocodile Trench, the ground gained
had to be evacuated. The 137th and 138th Brigades on the right met with no
greater success and Lens remained in the hands of the enemy. July 1st is not a
lucky day in the history of the 46th Division.
We remained in St. Pierre, with some Companies still detached, until the night
of July 3/4th, when we were relieved by the 23rd and 27th Canadian Battalions,
and went back to the Square at Bully Grenay, where 'buses picked us up soon
after dawn on July 4th, and took us back to the delightful little village of
Chelers.
In spite of considerable shelling our casualties during the last few days had
only been two Officers (Day and Hammond) and four men wounded. Our total
casualties during the Lens operations amounted to five Officers wounded, three
missing, 42 other ranks killed, 180 wounded, and 72 missing.
The whole history of the Lens operations proves, if proof were needed, how
important a part intelligence plays in modern operations. Intelligence is gained
by reconnaissance by land or from the air, and from information from prisoners
and captured documents. The responsibility of the Officer, who must judge the
truth from what must often be conflicting reports from these sources, is serious
indeed. On his appreciation of the position depends to an extent not always
recognised the success or failure of active operations. The Infantry in the line
unfortunately take the hard consequences of faulty information or false
appreciation.
In reviewing the short history of these operations we are inclined to forget
other occasions in which the credit of successes was due not only to the dash
and courage of the Infantry but to the information sifted from one source or
another, weighed in the balance, and finally put forward as the premises on
which operations have been based. In our humble judgment the Army of the future
should take care that this branch of technical training receives a greater
measure of attention than it had received up to the commencement of the Great
War.