History of the 1/8th Battalion
HISTORY OF 1/8th BATTALION
BELLENGLISE
Sept. 26th, 1918.— Sept. 29th, 1918.
A great effort was to be made to break the Hindenburg Line. Preliminary orders
received on September 26th were to the effect that the 46th Division, as part of
a major operation (simultaneous attacks by the British and French taking place
at several other points), would at an early date cross the St. Quentin Canal
between Bellenglise and Riquerval Bridge, and capture the Hindenburg Line. The
general scheme was that the 137th Brigade were to capture the canal and hold the
crossings, advancing as far as the "Brown Line" shown on the map, whilst the
139th Brigade on the right and 138th Brigade on the left, were to pass through
them and consolidate up to and including the "Green Line." If all went well the
32nd Division were to pass through and make further progress. The 1st Division
were to protect our right flank, where the enemy were still occupying a large
area of ground which might be decidedly dangerous to us, and in the event of the
enemy withdrawing, they were to follow up and, if possible, capture Thorigny and
the high ground round about it. On our left the 30th American Division, attached
to the Australian Corps, were to seize the Bellicourt Tunnel (where the canal
ran underground) and continue the attack in that direction. Tanks were to cross
the canal by passing over the tunnel and come down to operate with the 138th and
139th Brigades and help them to reach their objectives.
In order to improve our position the 138th Brigade, who were holding the line
running along the high ground just East of "Victoria Cross Roads," carried out
an attack on September 27th against the German trenches on the high ground
North-East of "Chopper Ravine." This was successful and the trenches were handed
over to the 137th Brigade. Unfortunately, the following morning the enemy
delivered a heavy counter-attack against the Staffords, and recovered so much
ground that at night the latter had to withdraw from the portions still held and
come back to our original line. This set-back, however, had no ill result.
Our preparations had to be made on the assumption that the attack would take
place on the early morning of Sunday, September 29th, as it did.
From the line held by the Division it was possible to get a good view of the
canal and the ground beyond for some distance, and such reconnaissance as could
be carried out in the time at our disposal was made by observation from this
line.
Running diagonally across the front, through No Man's Land, down the slope to
the Riquerval Bridge, on the left, was a narrow road known as "Watling Street."
Immediately in front of our trenches was the ridge which we had had to evacuate,
and from there the land again sloped down to the canal. Immediately the other
side of the canal was the village of Bellenglise, about three-quarters-of-a-mile
from our present front line, but looking much closer. The canal ran in a
cutting, into which it was not possible to see, but from descriptions obtained
from various sources it appeared that it had steep banks twelve to eighteen
yards deep, and we were told that where there was water we might expect it to be
seven to eight feet deep. As a matter of fact the canal in some parts was quite
dry, and in other parts the water was held up by big dams of concrete. When we
did properly see it, it appeared to be more or less derelict. On the right
towards Bellenglise it was mostly dry. Rising from the canal on the other side
was a fairly gradual, but none the less decided, slope for some distance,
fortified with lines of trenches, barbed wire and concrete machine gun
emplacements, apparently a most unpromising position to attack—indeed, we
thought it impregnable, and no doubt the Boche did so, too. It was an ideal spot
for concealed dug-outs all along the canal banks. Many were found there, and
Bellenglise itself contained a wonderfully constructed tunnel, estimated to be
capable of holding at least a thousand men.
The problem of dealing with any water that might be found in the canal was a
difficult but important one, as every preparation had to be made for getting
across on the assumption that all the bridges would be destroyed. Accordingly
the 137th Brigade were equipped with a number of collapsible boats and rafts,
also mats for getting across any soft mud they might encounter, whilst almost at
the last moment, numbers of lifebelts were sent up for their use, taken from the
leave boats.
As it was doubtless realised that this great stronghold would require pounding
almost to atoms, arrangements were made for getting together what must have been
the largest array of guns that ever was collected, at any rate in such a short
space of time. Battery after battery of every known calibre took up positions in
one or other of the ravines and valleys behind the line. Indeed, there seemed no
room for them all and many of them were practically in the open.
Behind the line an immense amount of railway and road work was being carried out
in order to maintain supplies. Probably the most interesting piece of work was
the relaying of the railway line from Roizel to Vermand, preparatory to its
being continued into St. Quentin as soon as the latter should be liberated. We
enjoyed watching the Canadian Engineers at work rebuilding bridges and bringing
up and relaying fresh sleepers and metals, all the old ones having been removed
by the enemy for several miles. The rapid reconstruction of the line was of
vital importance, as it would form the main source of transport for all our
supplies.
On the night of September 27/28th, we moved from bivouacs near Vendelles, and
marched to our preliminary assembly position in some trenches near "Red Wood,"
about half-a-mile North-West of that well-known landmark "The Tumulus," a high
chalk mound from which an excellent view could be obtained, but where it was not
wise to pause to admire the scenery. Battalion Headquarters was in a dug-out at
"Hudson's Post," between Red Wood and the "Twin Craters." This move was carried
out without casualty, but the very dark night, coupled with a certain amount of
gas shelling, and the absence of good guiding marks, made going somewhat
difficult. A section from the 139th Trench Mortar Battery, which was to be
attached to us for the battle, joined us just before the move.
The attack was to be carried out under a creeping barrage, and the objective
allotted to us was the "Yellow Line" East of Bellenglise. The frontage allotted
to the Battalion was about 1,200 yards, and the advance in its final stages was
to be carried out with two Companies in the front line and two in support. In
each case there were to be three Platoons leading, with one in support, each
front Platoon thus having a frontage of about 200 yards. The distance between
front and support Companies was to be 200 to 250 yards. The Artillery barrage
was to move at the rate of 100 yards in four minutes, making long pauses after
each objective had been gained in order to allow time for the rear troops to
continue the advance. A machine gun barrage also was to be fired during the
opening stages of the attack, and for this purpose our Divisional Battalion was
strengthened by the addition of the 2nd Life Guards Machine Gun Battalion and
the 100th Machine Gun Battalion. By a happy coincidence some South Notts.
Yeomanry were included amongst these Machine Gunners. The Royal Engineers and
Monmouth Pioneers, detailed to put emergency bridges on cork piers across the
canal for foot traffic and artillery, were to follow in rear of the 137th
Brigade, and immediately in front of us. Second Lieut. Davis with ten men was to
keep touch with the last Battalion of the 137th Brigade, whilst 2nd Lieut. Plant
was detailed to act as Liaison Officer with the 137th Brigade Headquarters.
Second Lieut. Bradish was to do similar duty with the 139th Brigade, and 2nd
Lieut. Winter with the 6th Battalion, who were to follow immediately behind us,
the 5th Battalion bringing up the rear. Guides from each Company were detailed
to follow the 137th Brigade and direct their Companies to the canal crossings.
Flags were to be carried to mark Battalion and Company Headquarters. In addition
to red flares for notifying the position of the advanced troops to our 'contact
aeroplanes,' a number of tin discs were issued, which were to be waved by the
men carrying them so as to catch the eye of the Observers. "Success
Signals"—rifle grenades bursting into "white over white over white"—were to be
fired by the leading Companies as soon as they reached their objective. Pack
transport was arranged in readiness for taking forward ammunition, water and
other supplies, if required, as soon as it was possible to get them across the
canal.
Enough and more than enough work was entailed in all these details to keep us
busy during the short time available before the attack. Nevertheless all was
ready by the appointed time, and about 3 a.m. on the morning of September 29th,
after a most welcome issue of rum, which fortunately arrived just in time, we
began to move into our final assembly position on the Eastern side of "Ascension
Valley." The valley never had been a place to linger in, as most nights and
early mornings the Hun was in the habit of treating it liberally with high
explosive and gas shells, and this occasion was no exception, a combination of
the two making things very unpleasant. Further, it was a dark night, and, worse
than all, a dense fog came down over everything, so that movement over these
more or less open spaces with little or nothing to guide us was extremely
difficult. However, in the end everyone got into position in good time and
without accident. Fortunately most of the shells were then passing over us into
the valley behind. Companies were drawn up as follows: Right Front (A Company),
Capt. Thomas; Left Front (B Company), 2nd Lieut. Bloor; Right Support (C
Company), Lieut. Cairns, in the absence of Capt. Miners on leave; Left Support
(D Company), Capt. White. Capt. C. P. Elliott was acting as Second-in-Command,
Major Andrews being away on leave.
Zero was fixed for 5.50 a.m., at which time the 137th Brigade were to advance
from our front line. At the same time the 1st Division were to advance so as to
protect our right flank up to a point near Bellenglise Bridge.
Promptly at Zero an uncanny stillness was broken by an inferno of noise. With a
din and roar that can never be forgotten by those who heard it, one of the
greatest concentrations of artillery the World had ever seen came into action.
The crash and rattle were appalling. Sandwiched as we were, with machine guns
blazing away just in front, and 18-pounders belching out fire just behind, it
was perfect pandemonium. Speech was impossible. Though it was now practically
daylight the fog was so intense that you could not see a yard in front of you.
All over the battlefield it was the same. We could only imagine the difficulty
with which the Staffords were going, if they were going at all, and we could see
nothing. Our right Company, A, had been detailed to assist that Brigade to mop
up the enemy trenches West of the canal, and on completion re-form in the old
German front line, and await the arrival of the other Companies. This Company
advanced in Artillery formation as soon as the machine guns ceased firing, about
15 minutes after Zero, and reached these trenches without accident. Little was
found to be done there, and having distributed themselves in the trenches, they
awaited the time for the general advance to begin. The rest of the Battalion
moved forward at the same time in a similar formation to "Nib" and "Quill"
trenches on "Hélène Ridge." Even for this short move direction could only be
maintained by means of compasses. We made ourselves as comfortable as possible
there, as we knew that we should have some time to wait before advancing
further. In any case we were not to move without orders from Brigade
Headquarters, and it was not intended that we should be involved in the actual
fighting until the 137th Brigade were East of the canal, and then probably not
for some time unless they were in difficulties. The Boche had put down a
counter-barrage directly after our attack began, and a certain number of shells
and some machine gun bullets fell about the ridge where we were, but caused us
little inconvenience.
In spite of the fog wounded men were finding their way back, and odd lots of
German prisoners were being brought back by escorts of Staffords. How they did
it we never quite knew, but it was reported that in one case the escort of a
party of prisoners having been lost in the fog, got a captured German Officer to
act as guide by marching due West on a compass bearing! For over three hours we
were unable to get any definite news as to the progress of the battle. The first
official message which reached our Brigade Headquarters to the effect that the
137th Brigade were across the canal, arrived at 8.30 a.m., and orders were at
once sent to the three Battalions to get on the move and keep in close touch.
Unfortunately our telephone line to Brigade Headquarters was broken, and the
message had to be sent by runners, who after experiencing the greatest
difficulty owing to the fog, eventually reached us at 9.37 a.m. Orders were sent
to Companies as quickly as possible, and we moved off again in artillery
formation, keeping direction with our compasses. Progress, of course, was
extremely slow. By the time we reached the canal, which seemed much further away
than we had imagined, the fog began to clear and caused us no more trouble. The
canal was crossed by plank foot bridges, which, fortunately, were still more or
less intact, and Companies pushed on in a direction practically half-right
towards the villages of Bellenglise on the right and La Baraque on the left.
Here our first real fighting began, considerable opposition being met with from
isolated snipers and machine gun posts, particularly on the right, where A
Company had a very rough time. Two Platoons of that Company, under 2nd Lieuts.
Bradwell and Shackleton, worked their way along the bend of the canal sheltered
by a large ditch, and rushed several "pill-boxes" from the rear. At one large
concrete dug-out a Boche was discovered just emerging with his machine gun ready
to fire. Bradwell stopped him with a revolver bullet through the chest. The
bullet went through the next man behind him as well, and finished by lodging in
the throat of a third—a very useful shot! A little later the same Officer got a
sniper, who was obstinately holding up the advance with a small group of men, by
a rifle bullet neatly placed between the eyes at 300 yards. The left of A
Company also met with opposition from machine gun nests in the ruins of the
houses. Thomas himself, in rushing one machine gun, had no time to draw his
revolver, but put one Boche out of action by a kick under the jaw. C Company
reinforced A and shared with them the clearing of Bellenglise, but in doing so
they also had a bad time. Stanley Cairns led them with great dash, only to be
killed in an attack on a group of Boches who were holding up the left of A
Company. They were, however, eventually rushed and all bayoneted. On the left
some of B Company lost direction and strayed over to the 138th Brigade. Though
the resistance on this flank was not so great it was not altogether easy going,
and there was considerable shelling and machine gun fire. Bloor, in command, got
badly wounded, and Rawding, his very gallant Comp. Sergt.-Major also fell, dying
the next day. Mobilised with the Battalion he went out with it as a Private and
won promotion by sheer merit. All ranks of the Battalion had the greatest regard
for him and his loss was very keenly felt. D Company, under Capt. White, ably
assisted by 2nd Lieut. Smith, acting as Second-in-Command, also gave a hand in
the mopping up. Casualties were, of course, mounting, as there was heavy
shelling going on most of the time, particularly on the Eastern edge of
Bellenglise. Eventually, however, the village was cleared and we got to our next
starting-point, the "Brown Line," with our right on the canal, at 11.30 a.m.
This was only ten minutes after our scheduled time which, considering the almost
insuperable difficulties caused by the fog, must be considered excellent. It
meant, of course, that our barrage, which advanced again at 11.20 a.m.
(five-and-a-half hours after Zero) was slightly ahead of us, but that was now
too late to be altered and we had to make the best of it.
At this point we were to have been joined by a Company of five Tanks, but they
had not turned up. They arrived, however, a little later and were going forward
to help the attack of the 6th Battalion, who followed us, when they were put out
of action by enemy field guns firing from South of the canal and at point blank
range. Our final advance, therefore, had to be continued without their help. We
moved off this time in extended order and met with little opposition, though
there was considerable machine gun fire from the South side of the canal, which
was not particularly accurate and did little damage. We reached our final
objective about 12.15 p.m., only a few minutes after scheduled time, and the 6th
Battalion immediately pushed on through us.
Our right flank was somewhat exposed, as the enemy were still holding the ground
South of the canal, and one or two feeble attempts at counter-attacks were made
from that direction, but were easily broken up. The 1st Division had been unable
to advance to connect across with us at Bellenglise, but by their demonstration
they doubtless prevented the enemy from concentrating for a counter-attack in
that quarter, which was a decidedly weak spot.
Our advance had been extremely rapid and to a certain extent our success was due
to that fact. The enemy in many cases were taken before they had time to get to
their battle positions. At the same time every member of the Battalion was
determined to "get there." Particularly good work was done by Sergt. Peach, who
was acting Comp. Sergt.-Major of C Company, and himself accounted for three of
the enemy at one post, by Sergt. Oldham, Lance-Sergts. Field and Illger, and
Corpl. Slater, when in temporary command of Platoons, also by Sergt. Claxton,
Corpls. Gadsby, Skelton and W. Foster, L.-Corpl. R. Harvey. and Pvtes. Cook,
Titmus, Welbourne and Stapleton. Communication throughout the day was almost
entirely by runners, who had an exceptionally strenuous time, but in spite of
all their difficulties they never failed to get their messages through.
Specially valuable work was done in this respect by Pvtes. B. Smithurst,
Feighery, Sully, Colton and Parker. The Signallers had a thankless task in
trying to keep their lines repaired. A special word of praise is due to L.-Corpl.
J. North for his work in this connection. The Medical Officer, Capt. Homan, had
a difficult task in attending to the wounded in open trenches and often under
heavy shell fire. He got great help from Padre Sturt, who was always rendering
faithful service, and from a willing band of Stretcher Bearers, who worked
unceasingly throughout the battle, notably Corpl. Wrigglesworth and Pvtes.
Westnidge and Green. Comp. Sergt.-Major Stokes, who was acting as Regt.-Sergt.-Major,
was also of the greatest service in looking after ammunition and other stores.
The sight presented by the enemy defences East of the canal gave no room for
doubt that our guns had done most deadly work. The ground was literally torn to
pieces, trenches and wire being blown to atoms in all directions, and there
seemed to be scarcely a spot that had not been touched.
The prisoners taken by us numbered something like 300. There is no doubt that
our bombardment had caused many of them to become more or less senseless. In
many cases all they did was to retire to their dug-outs and await the end. Full
dug-outs emptied themselves at the first word, and poured out their garrisons,
which were as quickly marshalled by our men and led off to the prisoner cages in
batches, 50 or more in a batch, and very often not more than one of our men in
charge. In addition to prisoners we captured over 40 machine guns and 10 trench
mortars. Guns did not come within our province, as they were all beyond our
objective.
Our casualties, considering all things, were small, and this was doubtless due
to the great rapidity with which the advance had been carried out. In addition
to the two Officer casualties, our losses during the day were 14 other ranks
killed and 80 wounded.
The battlefield after the fog lifted presented a sight never to be forgotten. On
the left, Tanks could be seen working their way along the German trenches,
followed by groups of Infantry, who at once took possession of the ground
gained. Behind, guns were limbering up and being got forward to fresh positions;
pack ponies and limbers were being taken up with ammunition; parties of Boche
prisoners were wending their way back from the front areas in batches of 10's,
20's, up to 200 or more, presenting a very bedraggled appearance. Many of them
had been requisitioned for duty at the forward aid posts and were carrying back
our wounded. Add to the whole, shells bursting here and there—one knew not when
or where the next was coming and didn't care—and some idea may be formed of what
the battlefield of Bellenglise looked like. It was like an enormous circus.
The 138th Brigade on the left met with equal success, but North of them the
attack did not go so well, and at the end of the day the Australians and
Americans, though in a satisfactory position for continuing the attack, were
considerably behind their objective.
During the afternoon the 32nd Division came moving over the back areas by
Companies in artillery formation and pushed on through us, but there was no time
that day for them to make any fresh attacks, and they had to be content with
putting out outposts. There is no doubt that could their attack have been pushed
on at once the fighting of the next few days would not have been necessary. As
it was our line did not get further than the final objective of the 5th
Battalion, and further preparation was required to push the Boche from the few
remaining points that he still held in the Hindenburg Line. By the victory of
the 46th Division on September 29th the main portion of that line had been
absolutely smashed and the last great turning-point in the war passed, and from
now onwards the final defeat of the enemy was but a matter of days. It must be
confessed that the fog, which lasted practically the whole morning, largely
accounted for our success. Without it it is very difficult to conceive how we
could have managed to get possession of the canal and the high ground on the
East of it. A naturally strong defensive line itself, it formed with the
addition of the artificial defences made by the enemy, an almost impregnable
position. General Headquarters thought it was impregnable.
It has since transpired that our fears that our attack was only in the nature of
a "demonstration" were only too well founded, as it appears to be a fact that we
were not expected to cross the canal at all. Lieut.-General Sir John Monash, who
commanded the Australian Corps on our left, referring in his book, "The
Australian Victories in France in 1918,"[1] to the action of September 29th,
says:—
"Quite early in the day news came in that the IX Corps on my right hand had
achieved an astonishing success, that Bellenglise had been captured, and that
the deep canal had been successfully crossed in several places. It was the 46th
Imperial Division to which this great success was chiefly due.——There can be no
doubt that this success, conceived at first as a demonstration to distract
attention from the Australian Corps' front, materially assisted me in the
situation in which I was placed later on the same day."
For once General Headquarters' arrangements for the 46th Division miscarried.
Sappers got the Riquerval Bridge fit for transport early in the afternoon, and
by 3.0 p.m. guns and other horse transport were passing over it. Later in the
evening, after the 32nd Division had got clear, some of our Transport and
cookers came up, and our hardworking Quarter-Master-Sergts. brought us very
welcome and much-needed refreshment after a most strenuous day.