LCC index
CHAPTER VIII
Royal Air Force.
Like the Royal Navy the Royal Air Force served on all fronts, but, in view of
its extraordinary development during the war, its achievements can best be dealt
with as a whole.
Balloons, manned by detachments from the Royal Engineers, were used in the
British Army in 1879, and rendered good service in the Bechuanaland Expedition
in 1884 and during the South African War, 1899-1902. The first British
dirigible, the Nulli Secundus, was commenced in 1902 but did not make its first
flight until 1907. Experiments with army aeroplanes began in 1911 or perhaps a
little earlier. The Navy's experiments with dirigibles and aeroplanes date from
1908 and 1911 respectively. About this time only two small airships and fewer
than twelve efficient aeroplanes were available for all purposes, but the new
service rapidly developed, and on 13th May, 1912, the Royal Flying Corps, with
naval and military wings, and a central flying school, reserve and factory, was
established. In 1913 the dirigibles were transferred to the Navy, and in June,
1914, the naval wing became an independent force under the name of the Royal
Naval Air Service.
At the outbreak of war practically all the available machines of the R.F.C.,
forming rather more than three squadrons, crossed to France on 13th August,
1914, under the late Sir David Henderson, the majority landing near Amiens. On
the 16th they moved to Maubeuge, and on the 19th made their first
reconnaissances. Their value was soon proved for at Mons they were the first to
give warning of the French defeat on the British right and of the German attempt
to outflank the British left. They also reported Von Kluck's swerve to the
south-east from Amiens and the enemy's entrenchments on the Aisne.
When the opposing armies settled down into trench warfare, reconnaissance,
although still most important, became a matter of routine and new features were
developed. One of these was the regular photographing of the enemy's lines; by
comparing later with earlier photographs the position and nature of his works
and the progress made could be recorded. Another task was watching for the
gun-flashes which revealed the position of enemy batteries. The fire of our guns
was then brought to bear upon these points, corrections to the officers
controlling the fire being signalled at first by coloured lights, later by lamps
flashing the Morse code, and finally by wireless telegraphy. There had been
fights in the air even during the retreat from Mons, but these isolated combats
soon developed into systematic attempts to prevent the enemy's machines from
reaching our lines. Generally speaking, in the early fights, for fear of
shooting away the propeller, only rifles or machine-guns firing to the side
could be used. About the end of 1915 a German aeroplane was captured on which
the action of the machine-gun trigger was synchronised with the engine, so that
bullets could be fired, without damage to the blades, between the moving arms of
the propeller. This device was copied and fitted to most of our machines,
greatly improving their capacity for the offensive. Small bombs for attacking
ground targets were also used as early as the retreat but they were very
primitive in construction and limited in action.
Their size and efficiency, as well as the distance which they could be carried,
were rapidly increased, so that from Neuve Chapelle in 1915 all important
battles were preceded by aerial bombardments of railway and road centres, dumps,
batteries, troop trains, etc. Night flying was introduced early in 1916.
These developments, spread over 1915 and the early part of 1916, culminated in
the preparations for the Battle of the Somme. In this battle also one most
useful service was performed by the Corps for the first time. An army's
communications are always difficult to maintain, and, during a big battle, the
difficulties are increased a hundredfold. The heavy fire cuts all telephone
wires, the continual explosions raise clouds of smoke and dust through which no
signals can be seen, runners with messages cannot pass to and fro through the
artillery barrage. Attacking troops soon get out of touch with the higher
commanders, sometimes they are fired upon by their own artillery, at others they
are overwhelmed by counter-attacks of which their artillery cannot be warned.
The aeroplane contact patrols altered all this. The assault troops, by lighting
flares in the bottom of the captured trenches, signalled their position to
aeroplanes overhead, and a code of signals was devised covering the most urgent
of their needs. The higher command were thus kept informed of the phases of the
battle and could do what was best to help the advance.
Apart from what was done at Kut, aeroplanes were rarely used for conveying
stores; this work was not undertaken until the end of the war and then only upon
a small scale. Propaganda literature was often dropped, and from the Battle of
Messines, 1917, onwards, enemy troops, whether in trenches, in camps or on the
march, were frequently engaged by low-flying planes. One purpose to which
aeroplanes were put is of special interest. Our agents were taken behind the
enemy's lines, dropped by parachute, and not infrequently supplied with carrier
pigeons by the same means. There were rumours that occasionally agents were even
picked up after they had completed their task and brought back.
In the latter part of the war much of the work of artillery observation and of
watching enemy movements in forward areas was done by observers from captive
balloons. The most successful type was the stream-line shape, designed by Capt,
Caquot, a French officer, in which stability was secured by an air-inflated tail
with three air-inflated fins of equal size set at angles of 120 degrees. In
France these balloons were stationed at frequent intervals along the front,
three miles or so in rear of the line, eight or ten being usually in sight at
once; they were used on other fronts as well. The occupants ran special risks,
for the balloons were tempting targets for the enemy's artillery and aeroplanes,
some were struck by lightning and others broke loose in high winds. At sea an
adapted type was used for convoy escort work. They were towed by one of the
convoy to which they could telephone information concerning enemy submarines.
They were also used to support, at a height of some 10,000 feet, the aprons of
steel cables with which London was surrounded as a protection against aeroplane
attacks.
The R.N.A.S. was used chiefly for long distance bombing raids, for maintaining
coastal patrols by airships and aeroplanes against submarines, for scouting at
sea, and for the defence of London and the coast against attacks by air. A list
of the raids would fill several pages, so it must suffice to mention here by way
of illustration in 1914 alone the attacks on 22nd September on Zeppelin sheds at
Dusseldorf and Cologne, and on 21st November on the Zeppehn base at
Friedrichschafen on Lake Constance, the combined attack by sea and land on
Cuxhaven on Christmas Day and the incessant attacks upon submarine, etc., bases
at Ostend, Zeebrugge and Bruges. On 7th June 1915, Flight Sub. -Lieut. R. A.
Warneford at Ghent earned the distinction of being the first airman to destroy a
Zeppelin in the air, a feat for which he was awarded the V.C. An officer of the
R.N.A.S. was also the first airman to sink a submarine at sea, this happening on
26th August, 1915.
Both the R.F.C. and the R.N.A.S. served in all the main theatres of war, and in
each had to encounter new dangers and difficulties. In hot countries, such as
Mesopotamia and the tropics for instance, the machines were liable to be clogged
with sand, and water in the radiators boiled so easily that flying was usually
possible only in the early morning. The intense heat also caused wood-work to
warp, and machines of a special pattern in which metal was used instead of wood
had to be designed. In Northern Russia, on the other hand, the water in the
radiators was liable to freeze and difficult problems connected with lubrication
and ignition arose. At sea, and in Egypt and tropical Africa, there was always
the risk that the airmen might be compelled by engine or other trouble to alight
upon the sea or in the desert or jungle far from human aid. This danger was
partly guarded against by carrying on the planes pigeons which could be released
with messages for help.
The division of the air force into two independent parts engendered a healthy
spirit of emulation but it also had grave drawbacks. It is obvious that there
would be much overlapping, little or no standardisation of equipment, and such
keen competition for limited supplies as to prevent either from obtaining all
that was desired. To meet these difficulties the Joint War Air Committee was set
up in February, 1916, to co-ordinate questions of supplies and design, and three
months later an advisory Air Board was formed. The Board's functions gradually
expanded, in 1917 supplies were pooled, and at the end of the year Parliament
authorised the amalgamation of the two services. The Royal Air Force as thus
constituted came into being on 1st April, 1918.
The R.A.F. continued to develop the work of its predecessors but no details call
for special notice except perhaps the part played by the Force in the final
defeat of the Turks in Palestine. The neighbourhood of the enemy's aerodromes
was patrolled so effectively that none of their machines would venture out.
After the main battle on 19th September, 1918, our aeroplanes patrolled the only
road leading to the crossings of the Jordan and, by systematic bombing and
machine-gun fire, reduced the defeated troops into a mere rabble which on the
arrival of the cavalry and infantry surrendered without attempting to resist.
Similar but less complete results followed the defeats of the Bulgarians at Lake
Doiran in September, 1918, and the Austrians at Vittorio Veneto in October,
1918. The Germans in their final retreat on the western front were protected by
rain and ground mists from a like fate.
In June, 1918, the Independent Air Force, succeeding long-distance bombing units
of the R.N.A.S.; was formed for a definite purpose — the bombing of German
munition works. Much good work had already been done, for during the previous
eight months, which included the severe winter of 19 17-18, 142 raids, of which
57 were in Germany, had been made. The work of the R.A.F. can best be summarised
by stating that in five months 550 tons of bombs were dropped, 160 by day and
390 by night, and that of this amount 220 tons were dropped on aerodromes.
Special attention was devoted to railways and to blast furnaces, the reason for
this being that the Germans were very short of rolling stock, and serious damage
would therefore lead to important results. A section was formed for bombing
Berlin. The necessary machines, each with four engines of 375 horse power, were
not received until the end of October, and, although all ranks worked day and
night to equip them for their task, they were not ready until the Armistice was
about to be signed.
A few figures will help to illustrate the surprising growth of the R.A.F. and
its equipment. At the beginning of the war the R.F.C. and the R.N.A.S. comprised
only a few hundred officers and men ; at the Armistice there were in the R.A.F.
some 28,000 officers and 264,000 other ranks, making a total of nearly 300,000.
In 1914 only 40 pupils could be dealt with at a time; in 1918 30,000 cadets were
under instruction at once.
In 1914 the R.F.C. had four squadrons - up to strength and the R.N.A.S. rather
fewer. In 1916 the R.F.C. had 21 squadrons in France, eight in the Middle East
and a number at home. By March, 1918, these numbers had risen to 76 and 14
respectively, with 22 for home defence and special training. In November, 1918,
the number of squadrons was over 200, with another 200 for cadet training. The
number of machines had increased from less than 100 to about 22,000. The
machines had also improved. In 1914 the best machine had a speed of 73 miles an
hour and a climbing capacity of 3,000 feet in nine minutes; by 1917 speed had
been doubled and climbing capacity trebled. In place of a single engine of 70
horse power, the most powerful machines were fitted with two engines of 275
horse power each and even four engines of 375 horse power each. The potential
output of complete machines rose from 50 to 3,500 a month and of engines from 14
to 3,000 a month. The weight of the heaviest aerial bomb, which in 1914 was
about 14 lbs., increased in 1915 to 100 lbs., in 1916 to 336 lbs., and in 1918
to 1,600 lbs., or three-quarters of a ton. The seven airships of 1914 had
increased by 1918 to 103, including five rigids.
H. G. Hughes (R.N.A.S., Tram.) was killed on 26th April, 1915, in a flying
accident at Southampton Water, Lieut. F. E. Hollingsworth (R.F.C., Stores) on
night patrol in France on 15th September, 1916, Lieut. A. I. McKimmie (R.F.C.,
Educ.) on 23rd May, 1917, in a flying accident near Poperinghe, Lieut. E.
Churcher (R.F.C., Educ.) on 14th July, 1917, in the same way at the same place,
Lieut. J. W. Todd (R.F.C., Tram.) on 28th September, 1917, in a flying accident
in Norfolk, Lieut H. V. Thornton (R.A.F., Educ.) on 10th May, 1918, while flying
over the Austrian lines in Italy, Lieut. S. \V. James (R.A.F., Educ.) on 9th
June, 1918, in a flying accident near Taranto in Italy, Lieut. C. V. Todman
(R.A.F., Educ.) on 3rd August, 1918, in a fight against three German aeroplanes,
and Capt. F. Jefcoate, M.B.E. (R.A.F,, Educ.) on 14th February, 1919, in a
flying accident in Palestine.