4TH Battalion, The London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers) in the Great War 1914 - 1919
THE 2/4TH BATTALION IN THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME, 1918
I. Preparations for the German Offensive
The southward move of Gough's Fifth Army was for the purpose of extending the
British lines into an area hitherto occupied by the French. Between the 10th
January and the 3rd February 1918 a considerable sector, extending from the
River Omignon north of St Quentin to Barisis, in the Foret de St Gobain south of
La Fere, was taken over from the French. The responsibility for the whole of
this line, some thirty miles long, in addition to about twelve miles from
Gouzeaucourt to the Omignon, hitherto held by Byng's Third Army, fell upon
Gough.
The 58th Division was at first in reserve and was billeted in the Amiens area,
the 2/4th Londons being quartered on the evening of the 22nd January at
Thezy-Glimont, a pleasant village near the confluence of the Avre with the Noye,
about eight miles south-east of Amiens, where French pre-war civilisation was
still almost untouched. It is needless to remark how delightful to all ranks
were these peaceful surroundings after the ghastly shell-torn swamps of
Poelcapelle. About a fortnight passed at Thezy-Glimont in the usual routine of
training, during which one or two small drafts joined the Battalion. Lieut. B.
Rivers Smith left the Battalion on the 1st February for six months' duty in
England.
* Three Brigades of three battalions each, and one pioneer battalion.
The most important feature of the rest period was the reorganisation of
Divisions on a ten-battalion basis,of which a note has been given in the
preceding chapter. In the 58th Division, as in the 56th, the 4th London
Battalion was selected for continued existence, and at the end of January the
2/4th Battalion was strengthened by the transference from the disbanded 2/lst
Londons of 10 officers and 221 other ranks.
The officers who joined from the 2/lst Londons were Capt. W. D. Ramsey ; Lieuts.
W. C. Morton, G. J. L. Menges, W. B. Evans ; 2/Lieuts. R. H. J. Mendl, A.
Woodington, C. J. C. Wildman, W. H. Parslow, S. H. E. Crane and H. W. Durlacher.
After the reorganisation the infantry of the Division comprised the following
units :
173rd Brigade — 2/2nd London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers).
2/-4th ,, ,, ,, ,,
174th Brigade— 2/6th Loudon Regiment (Rifles).
7th
8th „ „ (Post Office).
175th Brigade— 9th London Regiment (Queen Victoria's
Rifles).
10th ,, ,, (Hackney).
12th ,, ,, (Rangers).
Before the Division left the Amiens area the imminence of a German offensive was
a matter of common knowledge to all ranks, and so impressed with the seriousness
of the situation was the High Command, that on the 5th February a most inspiring
message from General Gough was conveyed in a lecture by the Brigadier, to all
officers, warrant officers and sergeants of the Brigade.
The state of affairs was indeed critical and a grave crisis in the War was
approaching. Some slight account of the general conditions which had brought
this about has already been attempted, and there is no occasion now to
recapitulate the main factors of the situation in which the Allies found
themselves. We must, however, point to one or two conditions especially
attaching to the British front which had a pre-eminent influence on what
followed.
The gradual and ever-increasing numerical preponderance of the Germans on the
British front has been referred to ; translated into numbers the position may be
better appreciated. During the period from the 1st November 1917 to the 21st
March 1918, the number of German divisions on the Western front rose steadily
from 146 to 192, an increase of 46, against which the total number of British
divisions in France was but 58, and these sadly depleted in numbers. The
question of the falling off in the numbers of reinforcements sent to France at
this period has become the subject of an embittered controversy to which we do
not propose to offer any contribution. We are, however, concerned in pointing to
the result, whatever the cause, of this growing numerical disparity, which was
to confront G.H.Q. with a most anxious problem. The British front was now some
125 miles long, and a glance at any war map will show that the general trend of
the front was in a north-westerly direction, i.e. near its northern extremity
the line ran comparatively close to the sea. In other words, the space available
for manoeuvre in the event of a considerable break-through by enemy forces was
dangerously small in the vital neighbourhood of the Channel Ports ; and a
successful German offensive in this region might have the effect of rolling up
our forces against the sea. In the south the space between the lines and the sea
was greater, but a large enemy success in the southern area also had serious
possibilities as it might entail the complete isolation of the British Armies
from the French.
These were very briefly tlie two alternative possibilities which G.H.Q. had to
face, and the problem awaiting solution was how to provide with the inadequate
force at its disposal for the efficient defence of its lines no matter where the
blow might fall. The matter was further complicated. The French were equally
nervous of a sudden blow against their weak spots in Champagne and at Rheims,
which might lay open the German road to Paris, and this fear rendered it
impossible for them to place at the disposal of British G.H.Q. sufficient forces
to make up the very grave inequality of strength which existed on the British
front. The grouping of forces was, moreover, rendered more difficult by the fact
that, so great were the available German reserves, it might well prove that the
first enemy blow, although serious and energetic, might in reality not be the
main effort. This doubt would inevitably, whatever the Allies' dispositions
might be, have the effect of sterilising the British and French reserves for
some days until it was quite certain that the first blow was not a feint, to be
succeeded later by a still greater effort elsewhere.
Such was the problem, and surely never has a military commander been faced by a
more difficult situation ; for on the wisdom of G.H.Q.'s dispositions would
probably rest the fortunes of the whole British Empire.
Before stating the solution adopted by G.H.Q. in especial relation to the doings
of the 2/4th Battalion, we may perhaps be pardoned for glancing at one or two
aspects of Ludendorff's problem which, as is now known from his own book, was by
no means free from difficulty.
The vital necessity of a stern British defence of the Channel Ports was
appreciated by Ludendorff as fully as by the British G.H.Q., and he was
therefore alive to the possibility — knowing the British inferiority in numbers
— that the overwhelming importance of the north might lead to a concentration of
British divisions in the north at the expense of the southern area. But could he
be certain that this course would be adopted ? He might, after staking his all
in the south, find that British G.H.Q. had outwitted him and anticipated his
intention to attack at St Quentin. It was clearly essential that, to achieve the
sweeping victory which alone could save Germany, Ludendorff must endeavour to
encompass the temporary sterilisation of the Allied reserves which has been
alluded to. To ensure this his plans must be shrouded in secrecy till the last
moment ; and the organisation of so vast an attack as was ultimately launched
without disclosing its location to a vigilant enemy must have caused Ludendorff
acute anxiety. That it was in fact accomplished can only beget admiration on our
side for a most skilful opponent. And failure to Ludendorff, moreover, was
fraught with consequences quite as awful from his point of view as his success
would be to the British. Austria had gained a temporary respite in its victory
over the Italians, but its army was becoming disintegrated and lacking in
supplies ; and no one realised more keenly than Ludendorff that the Dual
Monarchy itself could not outlive a collapse of its army. In Germany the
revolutionary ideas from Russia were beginning to have a weakening effect on the
loyalty and steadfastness of an increasing section of the population ; hunger
was becoming intensified, for the comparative failure of the U-boat campaign
resulted in an ever- tightening Allied blockade. And ever in front of Ludendorff
loomed the spectre of gigantic American forces on their way to France, which the
U-boats were powerless to stop. How many Americans had landed ? How soon could
they be thrown into the battle line to turn the scale against the Central Powers
? These were questions to which Ludendorff must earnestly have sought an answer,
and which must have brought home to him the realisation that this gigantic bid
for victory he was preparing would for good or evil be the last effort which
Germany could make.
The decision of G.H.Q. on these questions was that the Channel Ports must be
adequately defended at all costs, and that if any sector of the line must be
left weakly defended, that sector must be in the southern area, which the Fifth
Army had now taken over. The depth of the space available for retirement in rear
of the lines in this area no doubt had its influence in this decision ; and in
addition, the fact that, in the event of a considerable withdrawal of our forces
under the pressure of the German attack, a natural line of defence in rear of
the forward positions seemed to be offered in the line of the Somme, which at
Peronne makes a wide sweep southwards, thus forming a natural barrier more or
less parallel with the British front in the St Quentin district. Possibly a
further factor was the apparent natural strength of the extreme south of the
front between Moy and La F^re, where the Oisc Canal and marshes formed a wide
and difficult obstacle between the Germans and our own troops. In the southern
area, moreover, it would in case of need be more easy to make use quickly of
such reserves as the French might be able to place at G.H.Q.'s disposal.
II. The Retreat Jrom La Fere
The Fifth Army was allotted a front of 42 miles, which was held by 17 divisions
in line and 3 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions in reserve. The sector was held
by four Corps, from left to right the VII (Congreve), the XIX (Watts), the XVIII
(Maxse), and the III (Butler).
The III Corps, with which alone we are concerned, comprised at the date of
battle the 14th, 18th and 58th Divisions on a front of 80,000 yards, a gigantic
sector for 27 battalions, not one of which was at war strength. In reserve were
the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions. The sector allotted to the 58th Division, in
which it relieved the 30th between the 7th and 9th February 1918, was the
extreme right of the British Armies and extended from north of Travecy, where it
touched the 18th Division on the left, to south of Barisis, where it linked up
with the French on its right. This enormous front of nearly 9| miles was held by
two brigades, the two subsectors finding their natural division in the Oise
marshes and the Canal de St Quentin, which at La Fere take a sudden turn
westward, thus running at right angles into the British positions. North of the
Canal the country is comparatively open and gently undulating, while south of it
the lines plunge through the hilly and densely wooded district of the Foret de
St Gobain.
The marsh area at La Fere is about a mile and a half wide, so that the frontage
which needed active defence by each Brigade was roughly four miles. On so vast a
frontage a defence by continuous trench lines was clearly out of the question,
and the British defence was designed to be in great depth. It was divided into
three zones of defence. The Forward Zone, about 1000 yards in depth, relied for
its defence on small company redoubts with the space between taken up by hidden
machine-guns. This zone was intended to act as a " shock-absorber " in which the
first intensity of the enemy's onslaught might be met and checked. The main
defence was to be offered in the Battle Zone, about 1500 yards in rear of the
Forward Zone. The Battle Zone occupied a depth of about 2000 yards and was to
consist of isolated and wired forts, again strengthened by inter-supporting
machine-guns. It was hoped that a final check might be administered to the
enemy's attempts in this zone, but in rear of it a further defensive system, in
this case a continuous line, was to be created as a Rear Zone. Beyond this again
the Somme line was to be put into a state of defence.
At the date of taking over this area from the French the defensive organisation
on the lines above indicated was practically non-existent. Very little depth was
provided for in the defence and in rear of the Forward Zone practically all was
yet to be done. The Battle Zone redoubts were inadequate and insufficiently
wired, while the Rear Zone line was merely spitlocked.
For weeks, therefore, the whole energies of every available formation, infantry
holding the line, engineers, pioneers and labour corps units from all parts of
the world, were concentrated on the enormous task of converting the G.H.Q.
scheme into a reality. Valuable time which could have been well spent in
training the infantry in defensive measures and counter-attack, and in
assimilating the new personnel which had been brought into battalions by the
reorganisation of January, was inevitably devoted to entrenching and wiring
work, wearying in itself and trying as only work done against time can become.
All ranks, however, were sufficiently impressed by the need, and all were
working with the zeal born of a grim determination to prove themselves equal to
the demands which would be made upon them.
The 173rd Brigade moved forward to take over the left or north brigade sector
or^^the 7th February. The 2/4th Battalion railed from Villers-Bretonneux to
Appilly, whence it marched to billets at Quierzy on the south bank of the Oise.
Here it was joined the following day by the transport which had moved by road.
On the evening of the 8th the Battalion was attached temporarily to the 174th
Brigade south of the Canal, and on the 9th moved to the Forward Zone, where it
relieved the 7th Londons. As was to be expected from the conditions under which
the line was held, the Battalion was now rather scattered. Headquarters and C
and D Companies being stationed at Amigny-Rouy, while A and B Companies were at
Sinceny and the stores and transport at Autreville. Enemy activity in this area
was almost non-existent and the whole energies of the Battalion were devoted to
entrenching work, which was carried out under Royal Engineer supervision. Large
working parties, totalling on some occasions 12 officers and 400 other ranks,
were called for daily for a variety of tasks to which the only relief was a
periodical exchange of companies for bathing at Sinceny. On the 24th February
the Battalion completed the Divisional relief and moved to the extremity of the
British lines, where it relieved the 8th East Surreys, Headquarters, C and D
Companies occupying Bernagousse Quarries, while A and B Companies were billeted
in Pierremande. In this area the Battalion spent a few quiet days, occupied in
strengthening the battle positions under the Royal Engineers. On the 27th it was
relieved by the 7th Londons, and returned to the 173rd Brigade, going into
Divisional reserve in rear of the northern brigade subsector. In this area the
Battalion was again much split up, Head-quarters, A and B Companies being at
Viry Noureuil, and C and D Companies at Tergnier. This day the Battalion was
joined by three more officers of the 2/1 st Londons, 2/Lieuts. L. F. Wardle, C.
B. Francis and C. W. Cumner.
The situation on the 173rd Brigade front during February had been remarkably
quiet. The policy adopted had been purely defensive, and our artillery had shown
but little activity. The distance separating the British lines from the enemy's
and the nature of the terrain had rendered observation a matter of some
difficulty ; but the enemy's energies appeared to be devoted to strengthening
his own defences of La F^re rather than to the preparation of an offensive
operation. The general impression gained from the Brigade Intelligence Summary
for this month is indeed that the idea of any attack being launched in the La
Fere area was rather ridiculous, and that everyone was quite prepared to settle
down at Fargniers for life. General Gough, however, as is well known, did not
share this comfortable optimism, for almost a month earlier at a conference of
his Corps Commanders at Catelet he had made what later proved to be an accurate
forecast of the location of the German attack.
The Battalion's work during the three weeks immediately preceding the battle
calls for little comment. After two days in Divisional reserve it moved forward
to the Battle Zone, in which it relieved the 3rd Londons on the 2nd March, and
this position it continued to hold until the offensive was launched, providing
daily working parties for the improvement of the defences. The early days of
March saw a slight increase of artillery and trench mortar activity on both
sides, but the area was still comparatively quiet with but little outward
indication of the storm which was shortly to burst over it.
On the 7th March 2/Lieut. D. F. Crawford joined the Battalion.
The skill with which the Germans continued to conceal their intentions was
indeed marvellous. For some time past the withdrawal of divisions from the line
had taken place, but so widely disseminated had this process been that it had
attracted comparatively little notice. The attack divisions had been assembled
well in rear of the lines, beyond the reach of our prying aeroplanes, and had
there been put through a very thorough course of training, which extended to the
smallest detail of what was expected of each division. Finally, about the middle
of March this gigantic force had begun to move towards the line, marching by
night and closely concealed by day, and by the evening of the 20th the enormous
concentration was complete. Von Hutier, commanding the Eighteenth German Army,
had now between the Omignon and Vendeuil 11 divisions in line, 8 in close
support and 2 in reserve ; Von Gayl opposite La Fere had 4 divisions and Von
Boehn at St Gobain another 2 ; making a total of 27 divisions. Opposed to this
colossal strength were Butler's 5 and Maxse's 4 weak divisions. Such were the
odds on the 21st March 1918.
Before proceeding to the battle itself there is one further point to which we
desire to refer, and that is the thick fog which lay over the marshes of the
Oise early on the morning of the 21st and the succeeding days. The effect of
this fog on what transpired had been variously estimated. The general concensus
of opinion of officers and men who took part in the battle is that it was a
great disadvantage to the defence. In many ways this was undoubtedly the case.
The complete blotting out of all landmarks beyond a few yards' radius rendered
any sort of co-operation with adjoining units impossible ; the inter-supporting
machine-guns between the redoubts were comparatively useless for they could not
see when and where to fire. The artillery was also handicapped for it knew not
where to lay its barrages to trap the advancing enemy. Many times in the course
of the battle, redoubts which thought themselves not yet attacked suddenly
realised that in the fog they had been surrounded and cut off. The general
result was that the defence degenerated into a series of isolated battles in
which companies and platoons made individual stands, unsupported by their
comrades and in ignorance of what was occurring on their flanks.
But there is another side to the picture, and the German opinion is equally
strong, that but for the fog their success would have been more far-reaching
than it actually proved to be. The inevitable loss of direction and touch
between attacking columns, the feeling of uncertainty born of drifting forwards
without seeing one's surroundings, the strange tricks which fog always plays in
the matters of distance and sound — all these could not but affect detrimentally
the speed and cohesion of the attack — and speed was of all things the essential
for complete German success. Swiftly though the attack came, from the very first
day the advances were made far behind schedule, and to this extent the German
attack failed. How far it failed through the fog we will not venture to estimate
; but that the fog was a contributory factor there can be no doubt.
On the afternoon of the 20th March the order " Prepare for attack " was received
from III Corps, and by 3.30 p.m. all companies of the Battalion were ready to
man their battle positions.
The scheme of defence has already been alluded to in general terms, and it has
been indicated that both the Forward and Battle Zones were divided into a series
of defended localities each held by a company. These localities comprised a main
keep, supported by two or more subsidiary redoubts, while the space intervening
between adjoining localities was covered by the guns of the Brigade Machine-Gun
Company.
Map No. 15 shows the relative positions of the various localities in the scheme
of defence, and in the Northern Brigade area, with which alone we are
henceforward concerned, the disposition of troops on the night 20th/21st March
was as follows :
Forward Zone — 2/2nd London Regiment.
Main Keep Locality : Headquarters and 1 company.
Jappy Locality : 1 company with a standing patrol at Beautor.
Brickstack Locality : 1 company.
Travdcy Locality : 1 company.
Battle Zone — 2/4th London Regiment.
Headquarters on the Crozat Canal, Fargniers.
Fargniers South Locality : A Company (Lieut. H. J. M. Williams).
Fargniers North Locality : B Company less 2 platoons (Capt. S. G. Askham).
Farm Rouge Locality : D Company (Capt, C. A. Clarke).
Triangle Locality : C Company (Lieut. G. E. Lester).
The two remaining platoons of B Company were detached as follows :
1 platoon (2/Lieut. D. F. Crawford) at the junction of the St Quentin and Crozat
Canals.
1 platoon (Lieut. W. F. Brown) at Condren, where there was also a squadron of
the Oxfordshire Hussars.
Quessy Locality : 1 company l/lth Suffolks (Pioneers). Brigade Headqviarters
were at Quessy Chateau near Crozat Canal, and the 3rd Londons were in Divisional
reserve at Viry Noureuil.
It will be seen that the bulk of the defensive force was concentrated — if such
a word may be applied to so attenuated a defence — on the right flank, where the
line of the Oise marshes, by now practically no obstacle owing to the unusually
dry spring, laid open the road to Chauny and Noyon. It was quite evident that
should the Germans succeed in breaking through on the St Firmin-Vendeuil front
they would almost certainly endeavour to expand the breach behind the British
lines and make a south-westerly dash towards Noyon and Compi^gnc in order to
complete the isolation of the British armies from the French. The Oise flank
therefore was vitally important, At 4.20 a.m. on the 21st March the enemy
barrage opened with terrific intensity. The messages to man battle positions
were already written in Brigade Head-quarters, but delay was caused in conveying
them to the various units concerned, for during the first few minutes of the
bombardment Brigade Signal Headquarters were knocked out by a direct hit, so
that this and subsequent messages had to be sent by runner. Lieut. -Col. Dann,
in fact, did not receive any orders to move until long after he had, on his own
initiative, despatched his companies to their posts.
It is rather difficult to understand why the companies were kept in billets such
as cellars under the ruins of Fargniers and Quessy until the last moment,
especially as warning of the attack had been received the previous afternoon.
Most platoons had several hundred yards, and some as much as a mile and a half,
to traverse to their trenches ; and under the intense and accurate barrage many
casualties were sustained during this forward move. By about 7.30 a.m., however,
the companies were all reported in position.
The actual time of the attack is not known, but it probably occurred between
6.30 and 7 a.m., for at 7.10 a.m. a message was received from Lieut. -Col.
Richardson (2/2nd Londons) that the enemy was in Jappy Keep, and about the same
time the bombardment of the Battle Zone positions became still more intense. It
must be borne in mind that fog hung over the whole area like a thick curtain,
completely cutting off the Forward Zone from the observation, which it had been
reasonably anticipated would be obtained over it. The Battle Zone troops and
Brigade Headquarters were thus in the dark as to what was going on in the
forward positions.
By 9 a.m. the enemy was reported in possession of Main Keep Locality, which
meant a serious incursion into the defences on the vital flank. Steps were at
once taken to employ the 3rd Londons (in reserve), one company being directed on
Fargniers, while artillery and machine-gun barrages were laid on the Canal
crossings at St Firmin and Beautor and on the area west of the captured
positions.
Lieut.-Col. Dann now ordered forward patrols from each of the companies to
endeavour to keep in touch with the situation, but it seems that if these orders
ever reached the companies — they certainly were not received by the left
company — the patrols themselves were destroyed by the enemy shell fire, for no
information of value was obtained.
All this time no word had been received from the Travecy Locality though
attempts were made to communicate from the 2/4!th Londons and from the 18th
Division on the left, and it is probable that the fog enabled the enemy to
surround the garrison before its commander was able to communicate with his
Headquarters.
During the morning Lieut.-Col. Richardson asked for counter-attack troops to be
sent forward to him in the hope that the enemy in the St Firmin area might be
ejected, but this request was refused by Division on the ground that the Battle
Zone garrisons must be maintained intact. In consequence, therefore, of the
extreme pressure on his front, Lieut.-Col. Richardson was compelled to order a
withdrawal of the few remaining details of his shattered battalion on to the
Fargniers area occupied by the 2/4th Londons, and by midday the fall of the
Forward Zone was complete.
Shortly after midday the fog lifted slightly, and the 2/4th Londons in the
Battle Zone became engaged with the enemy, who began to exert pressure on the
extreme right flank. At about 2 p.m. the platoon of A Company holding Distillery
Post next the Oise Canal was driven in and Lieut.-Col. Dann ordered the company
of the 3rd Londons in Fargniers to launch a counter-attack. This effort was only
partly successful, and Distillery Post remained in German hands.
About the same time the enemy advanced in large numbers all along the line,
especially against the Farm Rouge and Triangle Localities. The former of these
had always been regarded as a weak spot in the defences, and two reserve
machine-guns were at once turned on to the enemy advancing against it. By 3.45.
p.m., after a stubborn resistance against overwhelming numbers. Clarke's weak
company was ejected from the Farm Rouge itself, and its grip on the remainder of
the Locality much weakened. The assaulting columns continued to press on in the
direction of the Quessy Locality, thus isolating the Fargniers position in the
corner between the two Canals and completely cutting off Lester, who was still
hanging on to his position in the Triangle against impossible odds.
A prompt endeavour to counter this very serious turn of events was taken by
Brigade, who sent forward two platoons of the Suffolks to reinforce Clarke and
fill the gap between him and Askham. The 3rd Londons also were drawn on again,
and a second company was sent forward through Quessy to strengthen the Farm
Rouge Locality. Of this company, however, only two platoons ever reached their
objective, the others being destroyed by the enemy's fire at the crossing of the
Crozat Canal.
At about 6.50 p.m. the Battle Zone, in spite of repeated and heavy enemy
attacks, was still intact with the exceptions of the penetrations next the Canal
on the extreme right and in the Farm Rouge Locality, and it was decided to lay
down a provisional S.O.S. line on the forward edge of the Battle Zone. The
enemy, however, was continuing his attacks with great persistence, and the
gradual infiltration of his storm troops between our scattered positions was
constantly altering the situation. By 7.15 p.m. he had already overrun the new
S.O.S. line in the vicinity of the Distillery, and was beginning to close in on
Fargniers from the south.
In the 18th Division area on the left the struggle was also raging in the Battle
Zone, though one or two posts in the Forward Zone were continuing their glorious
yet hopeless struggle. Beyond the 18th Division the 14th had received a severe
blow and the Germans had penetrated some miles into the British positions. It
appeared by no means improbable that if the enemy's progress in this region were
unchecked the left flank of the III Corps would be entirely rolled up. A general
withdrawal was therefore inevitable to prevent the line being broken. To conform
with these movements it was decided by Division to effect a withdrawal to the
hne of the Crozat Canal from its junction with the St Quentin Canal as far north
as a line running due west between the Farm Rouge and Triangle Localities, which
latter was to be held.
Instructions to this end were immediately issued, and Lieut. -Col. Dann was
ordered to conduct the withdrawal of the whole of the mixed details now in the
Fargniers corner, and all troops in the Battle Zone were placed under his
orders. This withdrawal was really a stubborn rearguard action, for the enemy
was unrelenting in his efforts to drive in the Farm Rouge gap and reach the
Canal. But a stern resistance was offered in which gallant service was rendered
by the Suffolks at Quessy, and by midnight Lieut. -Col. Dann was enabled to
report his heterogeneous command in position on the west bank of the Canal, with
all iron rations, S.A.A., stores and Orderly Room records intact.
The defence of the Triangle Locality must now be referred to as it comprises,
owing to the wedge driven into the Farm Rouge Locality early in the day, an
isolated battle, and is a magnificent example of stem courage against
overwhelming numbers. The casualties suffered from gas shell in this area had
been numerous, but apart from the accurate shooting of the Bosche gunners, C
Company had been, like the rest of the Battalion, not closely engaged until the
Forward Zone was overrun. The lifting of the fog about midday disclosed a large
force of the enemy, which is estimated at about a battalion, advancing against
Lester's thinly held positions. From this time onwards no orders or messages of
any kind reached Lester from Battalion Headquarters or the adjoining companies,
and he was left to fight his own battle. The advancing enemy were hotly engaged
by rifle and Lewis gun fire, and large numbers were killed. Already D Company
were losing their grip on the Farm Rouge, but Lester decided that the only
course open to him was to await reinforcements. These never came, and probably,
owing to the utter severance of communications, it was never realised how urgent
his need was. The only support to this gallant company was one 18-pr. gun firing
over open sights from near Qiiessy. All the afternoon the unequal fight was
maintained, though the defenders were much harassed by low-flying German
'planes. With the approach of dusk the mist came down again, surrounding the
company with an impenetrable curtain. Again and again Lester sent out runners
and patrols to seek connection with the adjoining troops but these never
returned. " I still hoped against hope," he writes, "that we should be
reinforced, as the Colonel had kept rubbing it in at conferences before the
battle that we had to stand fast at all costs." At last it became clear that the
flanks were in the air and that the rear of the Company was being encircled, and
it was decided to fight back to the Crozat Canal. On the left the remains of two
platoons under Blair managed to get back, but of the others but two men got
away, and Lester, Wardle and the remainder of the company, nearly all wounded,
were captured.
This splendid fight, maintained till nearly 10 p.m. against hopeless odds, was
without doubt of enormous value in holding up the enemy and inflicting severe
loss on his picked troops. It also formed a strong buttress to the flank of the
18th Division, without which they would have found the right of their Battle
Zone turned ; and it gave time for the withdrawal of the 2/4th Londons to the
Canal line.
Lieut. -Col. Dann's mixed force on the Canal was of necessity in need of
organisation, and the 8th Londons, who had been in reserve at Pierremande, were
on their way to relieve the troops who had borne the day's fighting. By 6 a.m.
the relief was complete and the 8th Londons were established on the Canal line,
while Lieut. -Col. Dann's force, consisting of the remains of the 2/2nd, 3rd and
2/4th Battalions, the Suffolks, and elements of the 503rd Field Company R.E. and
of the 182nd Tunnelling Company, who had also been thrown into the fight, were
assembled on a line west of Voucl, with Headquarters on the Butte de Vouel. This
position was an unfinished work, in parts not more than a foot deep, and
extended from the Butte almost due south to the Chauny-Tergnier Road. Brigade
Headquarters had withdrawn overnight to Le Bas de Viry.
The Condren position, which had not been attacked on the 21st, remained intact
but was reinforced by a company of the Suffolks.
The results of the first day's fighting were tolerably serious. The Forward and
Battle Zones had been lost, and thus the greater part of the defences which had
been brought to a stage in any way approaching completion were in the enemy's
hands. The whole of the available reserves were already inextricably in the
fight, and should the attack extend to the Southern Brigade area from
Amigny-Rouy to Barisis there would be no means of assisting the defence in that
vicinity. Serious losses of personnel had been sustained, and the swiftness and
weight of the blow had had their effect, though the morale of the troops were
still high. On the other hand the enemy had by no means gained the success which
he had anticipated. On the Brigade front of some 5000 yards, held by two weak
battalions reinforced by parts of one other battalion, he had employed nearly
four divisions, and in spite of these ridiculous odds had only advanced an
average of about 5000 yards to find that the defence had successfully withdrawn
bdiind an obstacle of much natural strength. The defence was shaken, but it was
not in the least broken, and a break through was the only means of ultimate
success to the Germans.
On arrival in the Vouel line in the early hours of the 22nd March, the
Battalion, which occupied the north end of the position near the Butte, was
reorganised in three companies, with A Company under 2/Lieut. F. G. Williams on
the right, B under Capt. Askham in the centre and D under Capt. Clarke on the
left. As on the 21st, a dense mist appeared with the early hours, and until it
rose, shortly after midday, no infantry movement took place. Under cover of the
mist the Battalion was able to do a good deal of work on the Vouel line, and in
this they were not much interfered with, as most of the German shells were
falling on the road in front.
About 1.15 p.m. the enemy attack opened with great vigour and immense weight on
the Canal line and Tergnier. The crossing of the Canal was rendered easier to
the enemy by reason of the unfortunate fact that one or two bridges had not been
entirely demolished after our withdrawal. All had long before been prepared for
demolition, but for some reason the charges did not explode in every case. A
certain bewilderment was caused to the defenders at first as the Germans appear
to have gained their first footing west of the Canal disguised in British
uniforms stolen from the fallen men of the 2/2nd Londons. But as soon as the 8th
Londons appreciated what was happening they put up a very stubborn resistance.
After getting across the Canal the Bosche seems to have tried to extend north
and south along the western bank, and in this he was successful in the northern
area. In the south, however, the magnificent fight made by the two companies in
Tergnier checked his progress, and time after time his attacks were stopped.
During the afternoon the German 'planes were seeking for the next position held
by us, and in spite of the hasty efforts of the Battalion to camouflage its
trench, the Vouel line was soon discovered, and ranging on it by the German
batteries rapidly ensued. No infantry attack was delivered on the Vouel line,
probably on account of the enemy's lack of success at Tergnier.
Late in the afternoon the enemy's pressure on the 8th Londons grew ahnost
intolerable, and little by little he was working his way into Tergnier. It was
therefore decided to vacate the position, and after dusk the 8th Londons fell
back on to the Vouel line, which they extended to the right from the
Viry-Tergnier Road as far as the railway. The two companies in Tergnier were
ably extricated by their commander and managed to get clear across the Oise,
joining the garrison at Condrcn, which had not been attacked.
The Vouel line was now the most advanced position, and at 6.30 p.m. the
Headquarters of the 3rd, 2/4th and 8th Londons were withdrawn from it to
Noureuil. The night passed without any further attempt on the enemy's part to
advance, and on our side a good deal of patrolling activity took place. This led
to several encounters with small parties of enemy, and resulted in the
collection of a quite useful bag of German prisoners as well as a machine-gun
and team. Under cover of darkness also touch was regained with the Condren
garrison.
Information was received on the evening of the 22nd that French troops were
rapidly advancing to our assistance, and that they would be ready to
counter-attack the next morning with the object of retaking the Crozat Canal
line.
On the 23rd March mist appeared yet once more, considerably hampering our
defence and giving the enemy an opportunity of massing for attack. Shortly after
8 a.m. the French attack was launched by two battalions of the 125th French
Infantry which passed forward through the Vouel line. The result of the attack
is not definitely known as it was impossible to see beyond a radius of about 15
yards. It is certain, however, that it failed to reach Tergnier, and by 11 a.m.
the French advance was broken and the troops beginning to drift back into our
lines. It should be pointed out in fairness to our Allies that they had been
rushed up into the line, incomplete in equipment and transport, and that they
were called on to operate without previous reconnaissance over ground which was
shrouded in mist and unknown to them. On the extreme left the withdrawal was
conducted in some disorder, and it was reported that the 18th Division on our
left was also being forced back through Frieres Wood. The Vouel line, unfinished
and shallow as it was, was already occupied to its fullest capacity, and the
French falling back on it caused considerable congestion in the well -dug parts.
About the same time the German artillery, which had been plastering the Vouel
line fairly steadily all the morning, lifted, and was at once succeeded by an
accurate and intense machine-gun barrage. This further tended to create
difficulty in the position, for in view of the congestion of the trench it
became very hard to get orders along, while work on the gaps between the well
dug portions was almost impossible.
Shortly afterwards the mist cleared and the awkwardness of the situation became
more apparent. The 18th Division were being pressed back towards
Villequier-Aumont, and the left flank was entirely in the air, while the
constant pushing of small highly trained bodies of the enemy was enabling them
to progress along the Oise marshes on the right. Vouel itself was strongly
occupied, and troops were massing for attack. By 12 noon the position was no
longer tenable. The enemy was advancing frontally and from both flanks, and
Lieut. -Col. Dann ordered a withdrawal on to the Green line. This was a partly
dug position which formed a portion of the Rear Zone and was held by troops of
the 6th Dismounted Cavalry Brigade and the 18th Entrenching Battalion, on a line
east of Noureuil and Viry-Noureuil from the St Quentin Canal to the
Vouel-Villequier Road. The withdrawal to the Green line from the Vouel position
averaged about 1500 yards, and so hard were the enemy pressing that some
platoons had to fight their way back. An attempt was made by the French
machine-gunners in the Vouel line to cover the Battalion's withdrawal, but this
was not effective and, together with several of our own men, they were captured.
The situation was now critical. The falling back of the 18th Division on the
left revealed a gap between the Vouel-Villequier Road and Frieres Wood of which
the enemy was not slow to take advantage, and there appeared every likelihood
that the 173rd Brigade would be cut off from the 18th Division and rolled up
against the St Quentin Canal. To meet this threat the left flank of the Green
line position, consisting of troops of the Dismounted Brigade and details of the
8th Londons, was thrown back and extended towards Villequier-Aumont in an
attempt to gain touch once more with the 18th Division. This line was thin, and
under the continued German pressure it suffered severely. During the afternoon
the enemy thrust south again and entered Noureuil, thus driving a wedge behind
the flank of the Green line troops. A glance at the map will show that a further
withdrawal was inevitable if the whole Brigade was not to be rounded up. This
began about 6 p.m. and the troops, including all that was left of the fighting
ranks of the 2/4th Londons, about 120 all told under Capt. Askham, fell back to
a position west of Viry-Noureuil, which village was yielded to the enemy.
During the afternoon, while the fate of the bulk of the Brigade was still in the
balance, and it was obviously imperative to check the enemy's advance into
Chauny by all available means, the Brigadier ordered Major Grover of the 2 /4th
Londons, who was at Chauny with battle surplus, to organise all available
details for the defence of the town. With remarkable skill and despatch Major
Grover collected a heterogeneous force of clerks, cooks, officers' servants,
transport drivers — anyone who could hold a rifle — and by dusk reported himself
in position on the eastern outskirts of Chauny with a force of 10 officers and
270 other ranks at his command. Of these, 2 officers and 54 other ranks were of
the 2 /4th Londons. This very brilliant piece of work no doubt did much to save
the situation, and " Grover's Force " beyond question deserves to rank high
among the various similar " scarecrow armies " which these critical days
produced.
During the afternoon Lieut. -Col. Dann was attached for duty to Brigade
Headquarters, and the remains of the 2/4th and 8th Londons came under command of
Lieut. -Col. Derviche-Jones of the latter Battalion.
The withdrawal from the Green line to the River Helot position was considerably
impeded by the French troops who were streaming in a westerly direction, and
Brigade therefore endeavoured to ascertain what the intentions of the French
Commander were. These were found to be to hold a line from Viry-Noureuil to
Villequier-Aumont, and accordingly it was decided that the whole of the 173rd
Brigade Group should be withdrawn and reorganised in positions to support the
French. This re-organisation was successfully carried out. In view of the rapid
and confusing moves which had followed each other in such quick succession, it
may be well to state in detail the Brigade positions at dawn on the 24th March :
Brigade Headquarters at Abbycourt
Grover's Force — Covering the eastern exits of Chauny from the St Quentin Canal
to north of the Chauny — Viry-Noureuil Road.
18th Entrenching Battalion — Astride the St Quentin Canal on the right of
Grover's Force.
6th Dismounted Cavalry Brigade — On the left of Grover's Force east of the
Chauny — Villequier-Aumont Road.
Details of the 2/4th and 8th Londons — On the left of Grover's Force west of the
Chauny — Villequier-Auinont Road.
The Condren garrison substantially maintained its original positions and was in
touch by means of patrols with the 18th Entrenching Battalion, while on the
extreme right the 174th Brigade, which had not been attacked, continued to hold
the Amigny-Rouy — Barisis front.
On the left of the conglomerate force which now formed the 173rd Brigade Group
tlie line was continued by the 18th and 14th Divisions, with whom French troops
were interspersed in the direction of Cugny.
The whole line was strained to breaking-point under the unceasing enemy
pressure. Every available man was in the firing line, and the Battalion, which
had been now fighting and marching without intermission for three days, was
getting worn. But in spite of the enormous odds the Battalion clung on with
determination, for it knew that the saving of the situation rested with itself,
and attack after attack had failed to give the German masses the break-through
which was essential for them.
For the fourth day in succession the Germans were favoured with a thick fog
which enshrouded their movements, and under cover of which they were able to
prepare a further heavy blow. Early in the morning they attacked and broke
through the French outpost line on the River Helot, and about 11 a.m. the
lifting of the mist revealed them attacking Grover's Force east of Chauny, and
also endeavouring to work round the south of the position next the Canal. This
was serious, for a wedge driven in between the Chauny line and the Condren
bridgehead, which was also under great pressure from the enemy, might possibly
involve the loss of the Oise line, the retention of which was vital for us.
Arrangements were at once made by Brigade for a further withdrawal, and this was
rendered the more imperative by the rapid advance made on the left of the Corps
front during the day. In this region the enemy were already threatening
Guiscard, eight miles north-west of Chauny, and the security of Noyon itself was
seriously in doubt.
For several hours Grover's details and the tiny Condren force maintained their
fight, but in the afternoon the withdrawal began in accordance with the orders
already issued. Under Grover's command the mixed force was skilfully withdrawn,
fighting a stubborn rearguard action, to a prepared position about 1000 yards
east of Abbecourt, while the detached portion of the 2/4th Londons on Grover's
left, now about CO strong, fell back to Ognes, and marched into Besme across the
Oise about midnight. Early in the afternoon Major Grover was wounded and Capt.
Askham took over his command. By 4.30 p.m. the Abbecourt position, being no
longer tenable, was vacated and the whole of the 173rd Group, including 2/4th
and 8th Londons, 503rd Field Company, R.E. and the 6th Dismounted Cavalry
Brigade, had crossed the Oise at Manicamp. About the same time the Condrcn
garrison which had held manfully to its positions since the opening of the
battle got clear across the river.
Before this withdrawal was completed the whole of the Oise bridges, and also the
R.E. Dump at Chauny, were demolished, and it may be remarked that during the
four days of fighting not a single gun had been lost except those destroyed by
enemy shell fire.
With the withdrawal across the Oise the hardest of the Battalion's fighting in
this great battle was finished, though it remained in contact with the enemy
with very little rest. The Division now held a river front of over nine miles on
the south bank of the Oise from Quierzy to Servais, in addition to the original
four miles held by the 174th Brigade in the Foret de St Gobain. With this
enormous front in contact with an enterprising enemy no rest was yet to be
expected. The early hours of the 25th March were devoted to sorting out the
hopeless tangle of units which the battle had caused, and at 11.30 a.m. Lieut.
-Col. Dann became responsible (in conjunction with the 6th Dismounted Cavalry
Brigade) for the defence of the river crossings at Quierzy, with a composite
force comprising details of four battalions, reorganised in companies as follows
:
1 Coy. representing 2/2nd Londons guarding Quierzy bridge.
1 ,, „ 3rd Londons on its right.
1 ,, ,, 8th Londons on its left.
1 ,, ,, 2/4 th Londons in support.
This company of the 2 /4th Londons was the party of 60 which had reached Besme
the previous evening, and was now under 2/Lieut. Griffiths.
The same night (25th/26th March) this composite force was reheved by the 246th
French Regiment and withdrew to Besme to refit, Lieut. -Col. Dann taking charge
of another composite force of troops of the 175th Brigade. In the meantime the
remainder of the 2/4th Londons, which had formed part of Grover's Force and were
now under Askham, took up a defensive position under orders of Lieut.-CoL Chart,
18th Entrenching Battalion, east of Manicamp, on the south side of the Canal and
the Ailette River. At night this party was also relieved by Lieut.-Col. Dann's
force and joined the remainder of the Battalion at Besme.
The 173rd Brigade was now entirely extricated from the line, and a day of
reorganisation and collection of scattered details from the various composite
forces, which the needs of the moment had created, was of urgent necessity. This
respite was obtained on the 26th March when the three original units were
re-organised as one battalion, known as the Fusilier Battalion as follows :
No. 1 Coy.— 117 other ranks 2/ith Londons under Capt. Askham.
No. 2 Coy.— 88 other ranks 2/4th „ ,, 2/Lieut. Blair.
No. 3 Coy.— 179 „ „ 2/2nd „ „ Capt. Wright.
No. 4 Coy.— 189 „ „ 3rd „ ., 2/Lieut. Curtis.
Lieut.-Col. Dann returned from the 175th Brigade to command this newly
constituted force. In addition to the Fusilier Battalion, the Brigade included
temporarily the 12th Londons under Lieut.-Col. Bayliffe, C.M.G., and the 18th
Entrenching Battalion under Lieut.-Col. Chart.
The whole of the III Corps had now been brought south of the Oise, and Noyon
fell into the enemy's hands on the 26th. The main weight of the German offensive
continued to sweep westward in the direction of Amiens, but with the details of
this part of the fight we are not concerned. The 58th Division, however, was not
yet out of the fight, and the enemy made repeated efforts to force a breach in
the long river line which it held, but without success. The French troops were
now numerous in this area, and though General Butler continued to command his
own Corps, the supreme command of the area was taken by the French.
In this battle the Battalion had the extraordinary experience of being driven
entirely out of the battle area. It had lost severely and borne several days of
the most terrific ordeal that it had yet been called on to face, but with the
exception of a deep indentation in its positions at Farm Rouge on the first day
there had never been any semblance of a break-through on its front. Frequently
hard pressed, often almost surrounded, it had been forced back day after day,
stubbornly fighting but never broken.
Constituted as described above the 173rd Brigade took over the Manicamp sector
from the 175th on the evening of the 27th March, the 12th Londons occupying the
right subsector, with the Fusilier Battalion on the left adjoining Manicamp
village. The two 2/4th London Companies were stationed on the Ailette River and
in the village. The Brigade remained in these positions strengthening the
defences until the night of 2nd/3rd April, when it was relieved by the French,
the Fusilier Battalion reaching Bl^rancourt at midnight. The daylight hours of
the 3rd April were occupied in resting and cleaning up, and after dark the
Battalion moved to Andignicourt, where it was accommodated in an enormous cave
probably large enough to hold a brigade at full strength.
The following afternoon the route was continued and the Battalion reached
Ambl^ny at 8 p.m. Here the Fusilier Battalion broke up, its component companies
being once more organised as three battalions under their respective commanders.
The 12th Londons returned to their own brigade, being replaced in the 173rd
Brigade by the 16th Entrenching Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Nicholls).
The 2/4th Londons were joined on the 3rd April by Major F. G. Tollworthy, 1st
Londons, as second in command vice Major Grover wounded.
On the 5th April another evening march was made to Dommiers, and the next day
after a very trying march the Battalion reached Villers Cotterets at 8 p.m. Here
it entrained with the remainder of the Division for an area further north to
which the III Corps had been transferred. The total casualties sustained by the
2/4th Battalion in the second battle of the Somme between 21st March and 3rd
April amounted to :
Officers — Lient. J. Cairns, missing, believed killed ; 2/Lieut. F. G. Williams,
died of wounds; Major A. Grover, M.C., Capt. C. A. Clarke, M.C., Lieut. H. J. M.
AVilliams, 2/Lieuts. R. W. Chamberlain, C. C. H. Clifford, A. Woodington, E. M.
Cutlibertson and C. B, Francis, wounded ; Lieut. W. F. Brown, gassed; Lieuts. G.
E. Lester, H. W. Durlacher, M.C., 2/Lieuts. D. F. Crawford and L. F. Wai'dle,
captured. N.C.O.'s and men : 37 killed, 125 wounded and 217 missing.
The total losses of the Division for the same period were 2204, of whom 57
officers and 1606 other ranks were missing.
III. The Action at Villers-Bretonneux
In the first portion of this chapter we have endeavoured to give some account of
the manner in which the 2/4th Battalion, with the 58th Division and the whole of
Butler's III Corps, had been literally pushed aside by the main force of the
German onslaught and had been extricated from the fight due southwards through
French territory, while the advancing enemy bad swept on in a westerly direction
towards Amiens.
By the evening of the 28th March, that is to say, a week after the opening of
the battle, the Fifth and Third Armies had been forced back from the line of the
Somme and over the old Somme battlefields, and had reached the Amiens defence
line south of the Somme, while on the north bank the enemy had occupied Albert.
On the 28th March a further attack was delivered on a wide front from north of
Arras to Puisieux which resulted in a severe defeat for the Germans ; but as
only the l/4th Battalion is concerned in the fighting on this day we propose to
defer the account of it to another chapter, and to pursue for the moment the
fortunes of the 2/4th Battalion until the final stabilisation of the line in
front of Amiens. The German offensive on the Somme front was now showing signs
of weakening, though owing to the enormous losses incurred by our divisions in
personnel and material the enemy was still able to make progress. The defences
of Amiens in particular were threatened, and Gen. Gough had been entrusted by
G.H.Q. with the task of extending and strengthening them. The last days of March
saw fierce fighting in this area, and by the 31st of the month the Fifth Army
south of the Amiens-Peronne Road had fallen back to the line
Villers-Bretonneux-Hangard, both villages inclusive to the British, while on the
right the French were holding a small corner of the angle between the Luce and
Avre Rivers on the line Hangard-Moreuil Station. The German attacks finally
exhausted themselves by April 5th, after which date there was a short period of
trench warfare.
It was to this area, still on the extreme right of the British Armies, that the
58th Division was now directed. From Villers Cotterets, which it left on 6th
April, the 2/4th Battalion was railed to Longueau, a suburb of Amiens. The
battle line was now quite close to the Amiens-Paris line, a lateral railroad of
vital importance to us, and as the Battalion passed Boves the British field guns
were in action within a quarter of a mile of the train.
On detrainment the Battalion marched to a reserve position in the Bois de
Gentelles, where a long day was devoted to reorganisation. The losses of the
latter end of March had not yet been made good by reinforcements, and it was
therefore decided to make use of the 16th Entrenching Battalion for this
purpose. Accordingly on the 7th April two companies of this unit were
transferred to the 2/4th Battalion, making an increase of strength of 4 officers
(Capt. B. H. C. Hettler, M.C., and 2/Lieuts. J. W. Bocking, E. V. Grimsdell and
W. T. Millar) and 344 other ranks. With this valuable reinforcement it was
possible once again to organise four companies as follows :
No. 1 Coy. under Capt. G. H. Hetley \ o/i^-i t i „ ^
¦NTo i-,^c./-.Aii,f 2/4tli London men.
No. 2 „ ,, Capt. S. G. Askham I '
No. 3 „ „ (^apt. B. H. C. Hettler \ 16th Entrenching
No. 4 ,, ,, 2/Lieut. E. V. Grimsdell ] Battalion men.
It should be remarked in passing that the Entrenching Battalions had no
connection with the Labour Corps. They were trained and combatant troops whose
existence as Entrenching BattaUons only dated from the Divisional
reorganisations of the preceding January, and they represented in effect the
troops which had been " left over " after the reorganisation was completed. The
bulk of the reinforcement which thus came to the 2/4th Battalion were enlisted
in the 6th K.O.Y.L.I., and were undoubtedly some of the finest reinforcements
the Battalion ever received : although young they were very keen, and included
some most reliable non-commissioned officers.
At 7.45 p.m. on the 7th April the Battalion relieved the 12th Londons in the
Reserve system between the village of Gentelles and the Amiens-Roye Road, Nos. 3
and 4 Companies occupying the front line with Nos. 1 and 2 in support to them
and Headquarters in the Bois de Gentelles. For ten days the Battalion continued
to occupy these positions, constantly employed in working parties on its own
defences and on elaborately wiring the lines in conjunction with the R.E.'s.
This wire was strengthened to form a considerable obstacle for the Gentelles
line, which was the final line of the Amiens defences and was to be held at all
costs. During this tour of duty the 2/4th Battalion suffered somewhat from
German shell fire, for the British batteries were close behind the Gentelles
line.
It was confidently anticipated that the enemy would endeavour once more to break
the Amiens defences in this area. The village of Villers-Bretonneux stands on a
somewhat prominent hill seven miles east of Amiens, and its possession would
have enabled the Germans to play havoc by their artillery with the city itself
and our important road and railway communications which radiate from it. Its
value to the Germans rendered it a matter of the highest importance to us to
defend it stubbornly. In anticipation of an attack, therefore, the battle
surplus was sent out of the trenches on the 10th and the work of strengthening
the defences pressed on with vigour.
Further reinforcements were received from the Base, numbering in all 127 other
ranks. These were" mostly young lads under nineteen years of age whose despatch
overseas had been rendered necessary by the impossibility of otherwise replacing
the deficiencies in the ranks. They were all extremely keen and had received a
good groundwork of training at home. But they reached the Battalion at a time
when it had just been shaken by one battle and was about to become involved in
another, and it can only be deplored that circumstances prevented any
opportunity for assimilating them into the Battalion and for giving them some
preliminary experience of warfare under quieter conditions. The whole Battalion
was indeed rather conglomerate, for of a total of some 650 rifles about 450 were
strange to the Battalion and called upon to go into action under a command
unknown to them : this important point should be borne in mind in considering
the battle which followed.
On the evening of the 18th April the 58th Division took over from the 5th
Australian Brigade the front line east of Cachy, the 173rd Brigade occupying the
whole sector. This sector extended from the immediate left of Hangard, through
the Bois de Hangard to the Villers-Bretonneux-Demuin Road, the 3rd Londons on
the right, the 2/2nd in the centre and the 2/4th on the left. The 2/4th
Battalion's subsector, in which it relieved the 19th Australian Battalion, about
1500 yards frontage, was held with three companies (Nos. 1, 2 and 4) in the
front line and one (No. 3) in support. Headquarters occupying a quarry east of
Cachy. The 175th Brigade took over the Blue line while the 174th was in reserve
in Cagny.
The Battalion was now straining every nerve to complete the defences. Much work
was still to be done. The front line had originally existed as a line of
isolated posts, and these were not yet completely connected up nor were they
adequately wired. A great deal was to be done in providing efficient fire
positions throughout the line in order that if lateral movement should become
necessary the defence of the position might not be impaired.
Orders were received that the front line would be held till the last. The
support company would be employed for counter-attack purposes in the event of
the enemy gaining a footing in our positions ; and the success of the defence
would clearly depend on the rapidity and skill with which this local reserve was
used. The right flank of the Brigade front was further strengthened by the 10th
Londons, who were temporarily attached in Brigade reserve.
On the 21st the Battalion suffered a severe loss in the adjutant, Capt. F. W.
Walker, D.S.O., who was wounded, his duties being taken by Lieut. S. A. Seys,
the assistant adjutant. On the 23rd Capt. Hetley was attached to the 131st
French Divisional Headquarters as liaison officer, and his company was handed
over temporarily to Capt. W. C. Morton.
The same day information was obtained from Alsatian deserters that the enemy
attack would take place at dawn the following morning.
We may restate the distribution of companies in the trenches as follows :
In Front — No. 2 (Askham) on the right.
No. 1 (Morton) in the centre.
No. 4 (Grimsdell) on the left.
In Snpport— No. 3 (Hettler).
By an extraordinary chance the enemy was yet once more favoured by the weather,
for, when his barrage dropped on our lines at 4 a.m. on the 24th April with
bitter intensity and great accuracy, the day was dawning on a dense mist which
impeded observation beyond a radius of about 50 yards. The bombardment was
severe, and in the area of forward battery positions included gas shell.
The attack appears to have developed at widely different hours in different
parts of the line : the S.O.S. was received from the 8th Division on the left as
early as 5.40 a.m., and from Hangard at 6 a.m., but it was not until 6.20 a.m.
that reports indicated that the 173rd Brigade front was generally engaged. On
the 2/4th Battalion front all was ready to receive the advancing waves of German
infantry, but it must be admitted that some of the stoutest hearts were filled
with something approaching dismay when out of the fog, at a distance of 40 to 50
yards, loomed the weird forms of German tanks.
So far as can be ascertained about six tanks were directed on the 2/4th
Battalion's sector, and it was the only Battalion of the Brigade against which
they advanced. The tanks seem to have been uncertain of their bearings in the
mist and not too skilfully handled. One at least devoted its energies to
describing small circles, firing wildly into the ground where none of our troops
were posted.
In spite of this unskilful manoeuvring, however, there is no doubt that the
sudden appearance of these monsters shook our defence for a moment, and the men
fell back a short distance. They remained perfectly under control, and were
rapidly rallied by their officers a short distance in rear of the front trench,
after which the German infantry, advancing in three waves close behind the
tanks, were hotly engaged with rifle and Lewis gun fire, which inflicted heavy
loss on them. Askham was hit about twenty minutes after the attack began, and
after his departure to the Aid Post charge of affairs in the firing line, so far
as control was possible over a wide front in the mist, was assumed by Morton of
No. 1 Company. The first news of what was occurring in front was received at
Battalion Headquarters from Morton in a message timed 6.30 a.m. : " Tanks have
crossed front line trenches, front line has fallen back, have rallied them at
Coy. H.Q. line."
Steadily the tanks pressed our line back though our retirement was carried out
gradually and at ghastly loss to the German infantry ; and finally Morton was
able to collect all available men of the 2/4th Battalion in the Cachy Switch.
The support company put up a good fight — ^Hettler was hit early — and
eventually was nearly surrounded ; but it cut its way out and managed also to
gain the Cachy Switch. The Divisional records time our retirement to the Cachy
Switch at 7.40 a.m., but there seems no doubt that the Battalion's resistance
was much more prolonged than this would indicate. Certainly Morton was not able
to report the organisation of his new position till 10.15 a.m. By this time only
about one hundred men of the Battalion with three subalterns. Prince, Sheppard
and Ewing, were under Morton's hand, though others rejoined later. The 2/4th
Battalion's retirement had involved the risk of leaving the left flank of the
2/2nd Londons on its right in the air, but this Battalion conformed to our
movement, though a gap ensued between the two units. This was promptly filled by
Brigade, who sent forward a company of the 2/lOth Londons. By midday our line
was more or less stabilised on a line from the Cachy Switch immediately in front
of Cachy village along the Hangard Road. This meant that Hangard Wood was lost,
and from the left flank the bad news was also received that Villers-Bretonneux
had fallen into the enemy's hands.
Beyond artillery activity no further action of importance occurred on the
Battalion's front during the afternoon, which was busily occupied in forming a
line of shell hole defences in the new position and in feeling out to the flanks
to gain touch with adjoining units.
This was the only occasion on which either Battalion of the regiment was called
on to face tanks. There can be no question as to the tremendous moral effect of
these machines, though their actual destructiveness — handled as they were — was
not great. Under the conditions of mist which prevented any warning of their
approach, and the conglomerate composition of the Battalion, a little initial
unsteadiness on the part of the less trained elements of the Battalion was
almost to be expected in face of such an ordeal. The rapid recovery and steady
rearguard fight back to the Cachy line, however, showed that after the first
shock the innate discipline of the Londoner asserted itself and the number of
enemy dead counted on the field was evidence of the heavy cost to the Germans of
their success.
2/Lieut. Ewing should be mentioned. " His behaviour was splendid throughout.
During the preliminary bombardment he was constantly up and down his sector
encouraging his men, and when the enemy ultimately appeared his fire orders were
clear and effective." He was awarded the M.C., as was also Capt. Morton, who
displayed throughout the day marked qualities of leadership and coolness, Pte.
Petrie, a stretcher-bearer who gained the M.M., exhibited an utter disregard of
personal danger in pursuing his work of bringing in and tending wounded.
The heavy casualties sustained this day in " missing " were due to the fact that
in retirement the Battalion was forced to leave many men, who might otherwise
have been saved, in the enemy's hands. But the R.A.M.C. staff under Lieut.
Dunaway worked magnificently under heavy shell fire till the last moment,
thereby retrieving many wounded men who must otherwise have been captured.
We have already pointed to the great importance of Villers-Bretonneux in the
defence of Amiens, and it is not surprising therefore that its loss was followed
by an immediate order from Army Headquarters that it must be recaptured at all
costs.
The counter-attack was delivered at 10 p.m. on the 24th April by the 9th Londons,
the 54th Brigade and the Australians. Villers-Bretonneux again passed into our
hands, while on the 58th Division's front the line was advanced about half-way
forward from the Cachy Switch to the original front line.
During the 25th April the 2/4th Battalion was not engaged, though it was all day
long subjected to severe artillery fire, which inflicted a good many casualties.
On the evening of the 25th the 2/4th Battalion was relieved by troops of the
French Moroccan Division, and withdrew on relief to bivouacs in open country
east of Boves.
The casualties of the two days' action were :
2/Lieut. J. W. Docking, killed; Capts, S. G, Askham, M.C.,
B. H. C. Hettler, M.C., 2/Lieuts. S. F. G. Hears, P. J. Payne and L. H.
Sheppard, wounded ; 2/Lieuts. S. C. Geering and C. W. Cumner, missing ; and in
N.C.O.'s and men 23 killed, 108 wounded and 203 missing.
During the 26th April the Moroccan Division continued the counter-attack, and at
the end of the day the line was substantially restored to its position prior to
the German attack.
This was the last serious German attempt to reach Amiens. The line had bent
perilously, but the offensive in this area had been fought to a standstill. At
this point, therefore, we may leave the 2/4th Battalion and deal with the
defence of Arras, in which the l/4th Battalion bore a part.