4TH Battalion, The London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers) in the Great War 1914 - 1919
THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE DEFENCE OF ARRAS, 1918
On the 11th March 1918 the l/4th Londons took over the Oppy Trenches from the
Kensingtons.
There was no room for doubt now that the Germans intended sooner or later to
launch a big attack in this area, and the only thing was to ensure that the
troops holding the line should be ready whenever the storm might burst. The
dispositions now taken up were, therefore, those which had been finally decided
on for the scheme of defence, and it was arranged that companies should
henceforth always occupy the same positions in order the better to know their
ground. These positions will be stated in detail later.
So far as the infantry in the line were concerned the period of suspense was
mainly characterised by very hard work on the defences and by particularly
active patrolling. Each front line post nightly pushed forward to the enemy wire
a listening patrol to give early warning of signs of the enemy's assembly for
attack. On the evening of the 12th March 2/Lieut. G. G. Lewis took a patrol into
the German trenches near Crucifix Corner, but found them unoccupied. The tour of
duty passed quietly, with the exception of a very severe bombardment with
mustard gas shells, which began at about 7 p.m. on the 15th March and continued
till about 8 a.m. the following morning. At the time this caused little damage,
but the heat of the sun later in the day accentuated the effects of the gas, and
Lieuts. A. Bath and O. D. Garratt, M.C., 2/Lieuts. G. W. Fisher, E. A. Ratcliffe
and 109 other ranks became casualties.
Intelligence reports pointed to the probability of the attack developing on the
12th March ; but although nothing occurred, from this date onwards the whole
Division daily stood to arms from one hour before dawn till 8.30 a.m., while the
Divisional and Corps artillery put a slow barrage on the enemy lines at
daybreak. The " stand-to " order was strictly enforced as far back as the
transport lines and the Quartermaster.
On the 18th the l/4th Londons were relieved by the Kensingtons and withdrew in
Brigade reserve to Roclin-court, leaving two platoons in support attached to the
Kensingtons, and one in front trenches attached to the London Scottish. A
rearrangement of the method of holding the line was now ordered by Corps, and
the necessary changes which were effected on the night of 21st/22nd March
resulted in each division holding its sector with two brigades in line and one
in reserve. Each front line brigade had two battalions in trenches and one in
support. The effect of this in the 56th Division was to leave the 169th and
168th Brigades in the line, while the 167th was withdrawn to the support area.
The 21st March saw the opening of the great German offensive on the Fifth Army
front, but no attack developed opposite the 56th Division. The day was marked by
very greatly increased artillery activity on the enemy's part, gas shell being
freely used on the Bailleul- Wilier val line. This indication of the imminence
of active operations caused the cancellation of the relief of the 56th Division
by the 62nd. The next day warning was received that the 2nd Canadian Division
would take over the line, but this order was also subsequently cancelled.
No definite news of the offensive was received during the 21st March, though it
was reported that the enemy had gained the high ground near Wancourt Tower, and
was likely by his assault on Monchy to lay the Corps right flank open to attack.
Arras was heavily shelled, and all the civilians were cleared out. St Pol also
was bombarded by a long-range gun, while low-flying Bosche aeroplanes were over
the lines and at night dropped bombs on Thelus.
On the evening of the 24th the l/4th Londons returned to the front line. Aerial
reports of great activity behind the German lines now made it clear that the
attack was imminent, and final preparations for the struggle were completed. All
spare Lewis guns and magazines were brought up from the transport lines. The men
were in splendid fettle, and the high probability that the long weeks of
suspense would shortly be over increased their good humour. All were absolutely
confident in themselves and each other, and their only anxiety was as to whether
they would have the good fortune to be in front trenches to meet the enemy.
At this time Gen. Loch and Lieut. -Col. Marchment made strong representations
that the three front line posts ought to be much more lightly held, and that the
Company Headquarters in Beatty should be withdrawn to the Marquis line, on the
grounds that it was useless to pack men into posts only 100 yards from the
enemy, where they were certain to suffer severely from the hostile bombardment
and where they had no room to fight. These representations were not received
favourably by Corps though the event showed they were well founded. As it was
Lieut. -Col. Marchment moved one platoon from Oppy Post, but even with this
alteration the Marquis line was too lightly held.
News from the area of battle in the south was still vague, though it was known
that the Fifth Army had been forced to give a great deal of ground, and that the
Third Army on its left had also retreated, though to a less degree, and to
conform to the movements of its neighbour. As the day wore on, however, the
enemy's pressure on the Third Army south of the Scarpe increased and by the 27th
he had captured Monchy-le-Preux. It became evident that he was aiming at a
movement to envelop Arras from the south. A reasonable deduction from this
situation was that the blow at Arras would shortly develop also on the north of
the Scarpe, by means of an assault on the Vimy Ridge.
In the early hours of the 25th March, shortly after the l/4th Londons had taken
over the line, 2/Lieut. C. H. Board and Coy. Sergt. -Major Matthews of B Company
were visiting the sentry groups in Beatty Post when two of the enemy, who had
entered the trench by stealth, tried to drag the Coy. Sergt. -Major out of it. A
scuffle ensued in which another officer and an N.C.O. joined. The two Germans
unfortunately got away after slightly wounding both Board and Matthews.
During the day the artillery on both sides became more active, though no
infantry action occurred, and the men were kept busy in constructing trench
blocks and improving firesteps. The right flank of the l/4th Londons' sector had
always been regarded as a rather weak spot in the defence, and in view of the
expectation that the enemy would assault the Vimy Ridge from the south, it was
desirable to provide for the formation by the Battalion of a defensive flank
facing south should this area become threatened. To this end work was pushed
forward in constructing and improving firesteps in Ouse Alley for its possible
use as a " switch line." This precaution, as will be seen, was justified by
events.
During the evening a report was received of the examination of a prisoner of the
471st Infantry Regiment, who had been taken near Mill Post on the previous
evening. This was to the effect that the attack was to be made on the morning of
the 26th, and that the 219th and 23rd Reserve Divisions had been brought forward
for the purpose. These troops were accommodated in the Drocourt-Queant line.
They had just arrived from Riga and would attack in conjunction with the 240th
and 5th Bavarian Reserve Divisions. They would assemble in the front line system
and would advance to a depth of four miles with their right flank on Oppy, then
swing round towards Vimy. Three special divisions would capture the Vimy Ridge
the next day. The 471st Regiment had already 60 trench mortars in position, and
8 more trench mortar companies were to arrive on the night of the 25th ; most of
the ammunition was already in the line.
This message, bringing as it did a hope that the wearisome suspense was at last
at an end, was received with satisfaction, and instructions to prepare for
battle were issued. All night our artillery maintained a heavy fire on the
enemy's supposed assembly positions, while No Man's Land was occupied by our
listening patrols. At 4 a.m. these came in and the heavy artillery placed a slow
barrage on the German front lines. At 4.45 a.m. the Battalion stood to arms,
blocks were lowered in the communication trenches and all made ready. No attack
developed, and at 7.30 a.m. the order to stand down was received from Brigade,
the remainder of the day passing comparatively quietly.
In the evening, in response to urgent appeals from Corps for an identification,
all battalions in the line sent patrols to the enemy trenches to try to get
prisoners. From the l/4th Londons two parties went forward at 10.30 p.m. after
wire-cutting preparations by the field artillery. 2/Lieut. G. G. Lewis with a
platoon of A Company entered the enemy line opposite Oppy Post, but the sentry
group was heard running away and no bag was obtained. From C Company 2/Lieut. R.
E. Campkin took two men to the German trenches near Crucifix Corner, and had a
lively little scrap in the dark with the sentry group. In this case also the
Bosche took to their heels, and, in spite of a good set to with fists, managed
to get away pursued by Campkin. After remaining two hours in the enemy line both
patrols returned bringing some trench notice boards.
The 27th March passed remarkably quietly, nothing of interest occurring beyond
the movements of a low-flying Bosche 'plane which appeared to be particularly
interested in our trenches. A relief of the German division opposite the
Battalion was suspected, but the report was incorrect.
On the night 27th/28tli March orders were received that the XIII Corps boundary
was to be extended north-wards as far as the Souchez River, and that the 56th
Division would " side-step " northwards. The side-step was effected by
transferring the Kensingtons from the right flank of the l/4th Londons to the
left flank, the Kensingtons taking over two new posts north of the l/4th Londons
from the 8th Canadian Brigade. The gap thus created on the right flank of the
Battalion was filled by the 169th Brigade, which extended its left flank. Why
this redistribution was effected at the eleventh hour we do not know : obviously
it must have been for some very important reason. But whatever the cause, the
result was distinctly weakening to the defence. We have already alluded to the
well -recognised risk of the l/4th Londons' right flank being laid open, and now
at the last moment the area was occupied by a Battalion entirely strange to the
ground. The relief in fact was not completed before the battle opened, for when
the Bosche barrage fell on the morning of the 28th March the L.R.B. had not
taken over Bailleul East Post, while a company of the 1st Canadian Rifles in the
Brown line was still awaiting relief. By the courtesy of the Canadian Brigadier
this company was placed under the orders of Brig. -Gen. Loch.
In addition to this eleventh hour change of dispositions a certain difficulty
appears to have beset the High Command in reconciling the roles of the three
divisions composing the Corps, and this resulted in a stream of orders each of
which altered its predecessor. The Corps order, under which the extension of the
56th Division's line was carried out, laid down that the Bailleul-Willerval line
(Red line) was to be the line of resistance, and that the front line system
would be regarded as outposts. Later in the evening the front line system was
ordered to be held at all costs to conform with the 4th Division on our right ;
but still later a modification of this was made on the left of the line in order
to conform to the defensive line of the 3rd Canadian Division on our left, and
the garrison of Arleux Post was ordered, if heavily attacked, to withdraw to the
Arleux Loop.
The final dispositions therefore provided five lines of defence, each to be
defended at all costs in default of a Divisional order to withdraw. There were :
1. Front line system.
2. Red line (Bailleul-Willerval).
3. Brown line (Farbus-Vimy).
4. Green line (Thtilus).
5. La Targette line.
The order of battle of Brigade was as follows
169th Brigade (bight) :
Front line system :
Red line :
Brown line :
Reserve :
168th Brigade (left) ;
Front line system :
Queen's Westminsters in Towy Post on the right.
London Rifle Brigade in Mill,
Bradford and Bird Posts on the left.
l/2nd Londons.
1 coy. l/5th Cheshire Pioneers,
2 coys. 1st Londons (attd. from 167th Brigade).
Wood and l/4th Londons in Beatty, Oppy Posts on the right.
Kensingtons in Tommy and Arleux Posts on the left.
Red line : London Scottish.
Brown line : 2 platoons l/5th Cheshire Pioneers.
Green line : 2 coys, 1st Londons, IJ coys. l/5th Cheshire
Pioneers.
Divisional Reserve :
167th Brigade (less 1st Londons) and 3 field coys. R.E.
The companies of the l/4th Londons were disposed as
follows :
Right : B Company (Spicer) H.Q. and 2 platoons in Beatty
Post. 1 platoon in Marquis and Earl line.
Centre : C Company (Duthie) 1 platoon in Wood Post. 1
platoon in Marquis line. H.Q. and 1 platoon in
South Duke St.
Left : A Company (H. N. Williams) 1 platoon in Oppy Post.
1 platoon between Oppy Post and Marquis line.
H.Q. and 1 platoon in Marquis line.
Advanced Battalion H.Q. : (Major F. A. Phillips) in South Duke
St. (with C Coy.)
Support : D Company (Cooper) in Bow Trench.
Battalion H.Q. : (Lieut.-Col. Marchment) in Ouse Alley west of
Bow Trench.
During the night 2/Lieut. R. E. Campkin with two men of C Company again crossed
No Man's Land and returned shortly before 3 a.m. on the 28th March reporting
that he had seen long lines of men carrying up to the enemy front line what
appeared to be large biscuit tins — doubtless the trench mortar ammunition
coming in. Evidently this was The Day !
At 3 a.m. on the 28th March the enemy opened an intense high explosive shell
fire on Bow Trench, Ouse Alley and Rear Battalion Headquarters, as well as on
all the rearward defensive posts. This bombardment, which continued throughout
the day, was at first mingled with mustard gas. The forward area was hardly
affected by this shelling except for the fact that the wind carried the gas
eastward over the front line posts, the garrisons of which had to wear masks for
over an hour.
At 5.40 a.m. a terrific trench mortar fire fell on the forward posts doing very
severe damage, and causing many casualties. Ouse Alley and the Earl-Marquis line
at first escaped this, though later the area of bombardment was extended and
they received a full share of it.
A strictly chronological account of an action such as this, in which different
parts of the Battalion became involved in the fight at varying hours, is almost
an impossibility if the reader is to glean anything but the most confused
impression of what occurred. We propose, therefore, to deal first of all with
the fight for the front line posts gradually working our narrative westward.
The S.O.S. signal was received in Battalion Head-quarters from Oppy Post by wire
at 7.15 a.m., and a few moments later flares were sent up from Wood and Beatty.
The signal was repeated backwards to Brigade by Battalion Headquarters. " We
stood on top," writes Lieut. -Col. Marchment, " to have a look round but could
see very little as it was not fully light. We could, however, hear a pleasant
noise — very heavy rifle fire ! "
Oppy Post on the left had been very badly knocked about by the trench mortaring
and the garrison seriously reduced before the enemy came over. A gallant attempt
at resistance was put up and rifle and Lewis gun fire were opened as soon as the
attacking lines made their appearance. One Lewis gun team was seen from the rear
to have climbed on to the parapet, and the gun was being fired from the hip. But
it was hopeless from the first. The enemy lines were very close, and by sheer
weight of numbers the Post was quickly swamped. Of a garrison of 2 officers and
48 other ranks but 1 officer (2/Lieut. Athey) and 5 other ranks were able to
make their way back to the Marquis line which they did by way of Boyne Trench.
On the right Beatty Post had suffered from the trench mortar fire more severely
than any, and by the time the Germans appeared its trenches were practically
effaced. The attackers appeared in fairly close formation, and in considerable
depth, some of the leading wave firing rifle grenades from the hip. Apparently
the enemy's trench mortar preparation, severe as it had been, had not dealt
effectively with our wire, for the leading wave of attackers was delayed in
getting through it, causing those following to bunch up to it. The rapid rifle
and Lewis gun fire opened by the garrison of the post was thus able to inflict
very severe loss. For about fifteen minutes the garrison stoutly held its own,
but at the end of that time it was found that the enemy had already swept over
the posts to the right held by the L.R.B., and was working into Marine Trench
and Ouse Alley in great numbers. Again sheer weight of numbers made further
resistance impossible, and 2/Lieut. G. R. Pitman brought the six surviving men
back to the Marquis line over the open, leaving 2 officers (Capt. E. E. Spicer
and 2/Lieut. Coombes) and 78 other ranks fallen at their posts.
In the centre a magnificent stand was made by the garrison of Wood Post under
Lieut. H. F. Dade and 2/Lieut. H. O. Morris. The night position of the post had
been changed a few days before the battle, and the German trench mortar
preparation therefore fell harmlessly on the former position. When the trench
mortar fire ceased the enemy was seen advancing in an extended line over the
open ground left of the Wood and coming through the Wood in groups of about 10
men 50 yards apart. This line was followed by groups of about 30 men some 200
yards in rear. The whole garrison (2 officers, 45 other ranks and 2 Lewis guns)
at once opened a heavy fire which undoubtedly caused very severe loss to the
enemy. A party of Germans tried to force the block in the trench leading from
the new post to the old, but they were effectively disposed of with rifle
grenades. For a full hour this gallant garrison held their own, completely
checking the enemy in the wood. On the right, however, the enemy had, as aheady
recounted, swept over Beatty Post and was now working his way round Wood Post
from the south. Ammunition and bombs were beginning to run short. After a
consultation Dade and Morris decided that the position was no longer tenable,
and they withdrew their men along Bedford Row and Boyne Trench to the Marquis
line. This withdrawal was skilfuly executed, the move of the riflemen down Boyne
Trench being covered by Lewis guns in Bedford Row. That the garrison held their
own to the last is evidenced by the fact that before the post was finally
evacuated the Headquarters dugout was in the hands of the enemy, while our own
artillery was already shelling the post. The defence of Wood Post cost 25
casualties in other ranks.
The value of the defence of Wood Post can hardly be overestimated. Apart from
the heavy losses which the fire of its garrison undoubtedly inflicted on the
enemy, it is certain that its prolonged resistance saved the Marquis line from
being overrun in the vicinity of Advanced Battalion Headquarters.
As soon as Williams reported the men back from Oppy Post Lieut. -Col. Marchment
had a 6-inch howitzer battery turned on to Oppy Wood.
The forward posts having fallen, the Marquis line became almost immediately
engaged, and Capt. H.N.Williams (A Company) displayed great qualities of
leadership in his defence of the position. We cannot do better than to relate
this phase of the battle in the words of the official account of the action
submitted by Lieut. -Col. Marchment :
The Marquis line easily held up the advancing enemy after the posts had gone. On
the right the enemy was strongly established in the Earl line and Viscount
Street about fifteen minutes after zero. Major F. A. Phillips at once gave
orders to 2/Lieut. O. C. Hudson, whose platoon was in the Marquis line astride
Ouse Alley, to form the defensive flank at once. This had been rehearsed
previously and consisted not only in manning the block in Ouse Alley to the
front, but also in Earl to the right, and manning firesteps facing to the right
along Ouse Alley. 2/Lieut. Hudson maintained this position with great gallantry
and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, whom he caught in enfilade as they
broke through over Earl to Viscount Street. The defensive flank was prolonged by
Headquarter details who continued on the firestep in Ouse Alley and held a block
near the Aid Post in South Duke Street.
At about 9.30 a.m. a strong party was seen working up Ouse Alley from Viscount
Street towards Forward Battalion Headquarters. Major F. A. Phillips at once
attacked over the open with about 20 Headquarter details, the men following most
gallantly under heavy fire. The enemy were ejected and a block established in
Ouse Alley towards Viscount Street. A block was established here and
successfully defended with grenades by a party under Sergt. Udall.
In the centre of the Marquis line the attack was not pressed until the Wood Post
Garrison had withdrawn. After this the enemy gradually built up a large volume
of rifle fire from Oppy Wood, but was prevented from debouching by well-directed
rifle and Lewis gun fire from the Marquis line. Rifle grenades were also used on
New Cut and Baker Street where the enemy had established himself.
On the left of the Marquis line excellent targets were presented on the left of
the Wood, the Lewis gun in the bank (near the junction of Clarence Trench and
Kent Road) doing most excellent work.
During the next three hours the enemy twice broke into the line near Boyne, but
was thrown out, leaving a good many dead in the trench. Rifle and Lewis gun fire
was opened whenever a good target presented itself, and a large number of dead
were seen between Wood and Beale Trenches.
Later on the enemy broke in on the left from Clarence Trench. The Lewis gun on
the left had finished its ammunition, but reinforced by a few men, the team
ejected the enemy with rifle fire and grenades.
Thus, at about 11 a.m., the forward troops were holding the Marquis line beating
off attacks to the front and holding a block on the left. On the right, although
the enemy pressure was considerable, he was held up splendidly in Earl and South
Duke Street and in front and behind in Ouse Alley ; the enemy holding Viscount
Street on the right and pushing on towards the Red line.
During the whole of this fight information as to the situation came in to Rear
BattaUon Headquarters rapidly, thanks to a buried cable, and throughout the
battle communication was maintained with the troops in front and with Brigade
Headquarters and the artillery in rear. Advantage of this was taken when
definite news of the fall of the post line was received, and the artillery
barrage was dropped to conform to the situation, Earl Trench being shelled with
good effect.
We must now turn for a moment to the course of events in the rearward area. The
enemy's preparatory bombardment had fallen heavily on Bow Trench, but the
garrison (D Company, Cooper) was kept in dugouts, sentries being changed each
half -hour, and few casualties were sustained. At 5 a.m. the blocks in Ouse
Alley were lowered, and rum and extra S.A.A. issued to the men. On the S.O.S.
signal being received the trench was manned ; and at the same time Lieut. -Col.
Marchment sent the Headquarter Company round to join D Company, retaining with
him only a few signallers to work the line, two clerks and a few scouts, in
addition to Boutall (Adjutant), Lorden (Works Officer) and Padre Green " to
create a calm atmosphere." Lorden was hit here at about 7.45 a.m.
From about 8 a.m. the Headquarters area was quite in the air. The front line
system in the adjoining sector on the right (169th Brigade) had gone, with the
exception of Towy Post held by the Queen's Westminsters ; and the Bosche had
worked up the valley on the left and was also for a time in Ouse Alley, and
attacking Bailleul East Post in the Red line (held by the London Scottish).
For a time trouble was caused by low-flying enemy aeroplanes, but these went
back as soon as our own R.E. 8's appeared. Good contact work was done throughout
the day with these machines which called at intervals for flares. Luckily all
flares were carried on the men, and they were thus available to show our
positions to the aeroplanes. At one time the Battalion code and position call,
Q.J.B., was sent to the contact aeroplane by Lucas Lamp worked by Sergt. Hurst,
and satisfactorily received.
At about 9 a.m. the enemy was in Viscount Trench, and as stragglers from the
L.R.B. reported that he was also working down Ouse Alley, D Company was ordered
to despatch one platoon to man Ouse Alley forward of Bow Trench. This was
quickly done, and the men, taking up positions on the firesteps facing
south-east, were able to engage small parties of the enemy who appeared over the
crest in front of Bailleul East Post.
Later in the morning when news was received of the severe odds against which the
gallant Marquis line garrison was struggling, the remainder of D Company was
ordered to bomb up Ouse Alley to try to join hands with Major Phillips and thus
complete the defensive flank. At the same time a carrying party was detailed
from Head-quarters to carry S.A.A. to the front line should D Company succeed.
The place of D Company in Bow Trench was taken by two platoons of the London
Scottish placed at Lieut. -Col. Marchment's disposal.
The bombing attack was pushed forward for some 400 yards. Enemy opposition was
not very severe and about a dozen were killed. The Germans were, however,
continuing to press forward over the open from the right and it seemed likely
that D Company would get cut off. A block was therefore made in Ouse Alley which
was held by a few men, while another small party manned the firesteps to the
right to engage the advancing enemy. The remainder of D Company moved over the
open in the valley north of Ouse Alley towards Boyne Dump to carry S.A.A. to the
Marquis line, taking full advantage of the ground.
By 11.30 a.m. the situation of the Marquis line troops had become precarious in
the extreme. The Germans in Oppy Wood were being reinforced and were developing
a considerable volume of fire from that direction. The right and right rear of
the position were almost enveloped and an attack was being launched against the
left flank. Bombs and ammunition were giving out. It seemed clear that further
resistance could only lead to useless loss of life. Influenced by these weighty
considerations Major Phillips, after a consultation with his senior officers,
decided to try to save the remnants of the garrison by a withdrawal to the Red
line. The only available trench for withdrawal, Oiise Alley, was, however,
already occupied by the enemy in rear of the position, and the valley from Boyne
Dump on the left offered the only loophole of escape from the closing pincers.
Lieut. -Col. Marchment writes of this withdrawal :
The withdrawal was witnessed by myself from my headquarters. I watched it
through my glasses. It was carried out in a very steady and orderly way, the men
leaving in groups of about a dozen. Although exposed to heavy fire from the
front and flanks, they made excellent use of the ground and had few casualties.
The men of D Company, who were meanwhile carrying S.A.A. up to the Marquis line,
met the survivors returning and covered their withdrawal.
It is hard to find adequate words in praise of this gallant defence and skilful
and well-timed withdrawal. All ranks alike behaved with the greatest spirit
under very trying circumstances.
A great loss was suffered in this defence in the capture by the enemy of the
Regimental Aid Post. Capt. Maloney, the M.O. was a most popular man in the
Battalion, and Sergt. Rossington and the two orderlies, Palmer and Simpson, had
all done excellent work. By an irony of fate 2/Lieut. Morris, who had done such
good work in the defence of Wood Post earlier in the morning, was hit later, and
was having his wounds dressed in the Aid Post when it was captured.
Major F. A. Phillips who, at Forward Headquarters, was in charge of the whole
defence of the forward system, did excellent work. He was continually up and
down the lines encouraging the men, and was able to keep Rear Battalion
Headquarters constantly in touch with the rapid changes in the situation.
The enemy was now in great force in Viscount Street and was beginning to bomb
heavily down Ouse Alley, while he showed increasing signs of strength on the
ridge to the right of that trench. The party of D Company in Ouse Alley was
therefore withdrawn as soon as the survivors of the Marquis line garrison had
reached Bow Trench, to avoid the risk of being cut off. Later the enemy appeared
in great strength against the block in Ouse Alley forward of Bow Trench. This
block was defended by a " slit " cut in the side of Ouse Alley which was covered
by a Lewis gun post in Bow Trench and seven of the enemy were killed by Lewis
gun fire.
As soon as the Battalion was concentrated in Bow Trench and the Red line, the
artillery barrage was dropped to a line about 400 yards in front of Bow Trench,
and arrangements were made to increase it to intense should the S.O.S. signal be
sent up from Battalion Headquarters.
The enemy skirmishers having been definitely checked the situation now became
quieter, and for the next hour there was a distinct lull in the battle.
The Kensingtons on the left had not been attacked but had withdrawn to the Red
line to conform to the l/4th Londons' new position.
In Towy Post, the extreme right of the Divisional front, the Queen's
Westminsters had put up a most gallant fight, but the remainder of the 169th
Brigade front had rapidly been swamped by weight of enemy numbers, and in this
sector the 169th Brigade troops were thrown back to the Red line while the Wood
Post garrison was still holding its ground.
The development of this great German attack was a remarkable confirmation of the
statement which had been made by the prisoner captured on the 24th March. All
the troops mentioned by him were identified in the course of the fighting. On
the l/4th Londons' front two German regiments were identified : the 249th I.
Regt. at Oppy Post, and the 10th R.I. Regt. in the shape of a gentleman who
broke into Sergt. Plumblcy's canteen in Ouse Alley. But having armed himself
with a tin of pineapple this luckless marauder fell into the arms of D Company
bombing up the trench !
Eleven German divisions took part in this great battle, but they were all
checked by the divisions holding the line, the 56th and 4th north of the Scarpe
and the 3rd and 15th south of it. That the almost complete failure of the enemy
on the 28th March was a severe blow to the German High Command there can be no
doubt, and Ludendorff says, " It was an estabhshed fact that the enemy's
resistance was beyond our strength."
The regiment has every reason to be proud of its defence this day. For over four
hours it retained the front line system under the weight of heavy shell fire and
repeated attacks by vastly superior numbers, and, when finally it was forced to
give ground to avoid extinction, it withdrew fighting. The casualties were
heavy, but considering the enormous service rendered the price paid was not
unduly great.
At about 4 p.m. the enemy began to shell the Red line rather heavily, but no
infantry attack matured. Shortly afterwards the l/4th Londons were withdrawn,
and by 6 p.m. were under cover of the Railway Embankment north-east of Bailleul,
reorganised in two companies (Cooper and Williams). S.A.A. was replenished and
arrangements made to man the Brown line and posts south of the Bailleul Road
should the enemy break through the Red line. Bow Trench had been handed over to
the London Scottish.
The experience of this battle showed the need for holding front line posts
lightly, and purely for observation purposes. The uselessness of locking up
large garrisons in them — unless they can be effectively concealed as in the
case of Wood Post — was clearly demonstrated. The system of trench blocks to
which much thought had previously been devoted fully proved its value, while the
advantage of rehearsing companies in the roles they may be expected to play, and
especially of acquainting all ranks with the " overland " routes within the area
was much in evidence.
The casualties sustained by the l/4th Londons in this action were :
Officers: Capt. E. E. Spicer, 2/Lieuts. R. E. Campkin, H. T. Hannay and H. V.
Coouibes, killed ; Capt. A. M. Duthie, D.S.O,, and Lieut. H. M. Lorden, Wounded
;
Capt. Maloney, 2/Lieuts. C. W. Denning (attached to 168th L.T.M. Battery), H. O.
Morris and C. S. Richards, captured.
N.C.O.'s and men : 15 killed, 43 wounded and 168 missing.
Decorations were awarded to the following :
Lieut.-Col. A. F. Marchment, M.C., and Major F. A. Phillips, the D.S.O. ; Capts.
A. M. Duthie, D.S.O., T. B. Cooper, M.M., and H. N. Williams, the M.C. ; O.S.M.
T. Lock, M.M., the D.C.M. ; L.-Corpl. W. J. Hutchin, M.M., Bar to M.M. ; Sergts.
F. G. Udall, H. V. R. Randall and C. J. Gibbs, Corpls. G. Hayes and A. Parker,
L.-Corpls. S. G. Coates, C. L. Husk and A. J. Deadman, and Ptes. W. A. G.
Battershall, P. C. Swinchatt, A. J. Sellars and J. R. Phillips, the M.M.
During the 29th March the l/4th Londons remained in Brigade support. Much
movement was observed in the enemy's lines during the morning, and our artillery
was active in anticipation of a renewal of the attack, but as the day wore on it
became evident that the enemy was engaged in relieving the attacking divisions.
That evening at 7 p.m. the Battalion handed over its trenches to the 87th
Canadian Battalion (4th Canadian Division) and marched out to billets at Mont St
Eloy, arriving there at 2 a.m. on the 30th March.