LCC index
CHAPTER IX.
Gallipoli.
British influence with Turkey, at one time considerable, had, during the last
thirty years or so, been, much weakened. One cause of this was the occupation of
Egypt and Cyprus, another was the resentment aroused by the spirited
condemnations in England of Turkish misrule, a third was the support given by
Great Britain after the first Balkan war in 1912-13 to the successful claims of
Bulgaria and Greece to Turkish territory, a fourth was the growing understanding
between Great Britain and Russia, the hereditary enemy of Turkey. While British
influence waned, that of Germany increased. German capital was forthcoming both
for public and private purposes, Germany aided the negotiations for the
construction of the Bagdad railway, a German general with a German staff was
appointed to re-organise the army.
When the Great War broke out Great Britain was seen to side with Russia, and the
Turks were further annoyed and alarmed by the fact that two battleships, built
for them and intended to strengthen their very weak navy, were detained in
England. At the same time the German war vessels Goeben and Breslau, eluding the
Allied fleet in the Mediterranean, escaped to Constantinople, and, when their
dismantlement was demanded, were sold or given to Turkey. After three months'
hesitation, Turkey on 31st October, asserting that her fleet had been fired upon
by Russians, declared war.
The Allies soon dealt with the new combatant, and decided to do this by means of
a naval attack on Constantinople. They realised that the fall of the city would
check Turkish activities in the Caucasus, Mesopotamia and Egypt, would ensure
the passage of munitions to, and of food from, Russia, and also would lead to
the neutrality, if not the assistance, of Bulgaria, the safety of Serbia and the
co-operation of Greece.
The approach to Constantinople from the Mediterranean lies through the
Dardanelles, the strait, from one to six miles wide, which separates the
peninsula of Gallipoli from Asia Minor. To make clear what follows it will be
convenient to introduce here a brief description of the district. The length of
Gallipoli is a little over fifty miles, and its breadth varies from about three
miles at Bulair in the north-east to twenty-four east of Suvla and about seven
in the south-west; south of Suvla and west of Maidos the width for a short
distance drops to less than five miles. It is a rolling, waterless country, very
beautiful in the spring when the hills are covered with flowers, but, as these
fade under the summer sun, it takes on a tawny, dusty hue. There is little
cultivation, the southern half being covered chiefly with heather and scrub.
Most of the coast line consists of steep cliffs, a hundred feet high or more,
pierced here and there by gullies which open out into narrow strips of beach two
or three hundred yards wide. The chief hills are Sari Bair, nearly a thousand
feet high, to the south of Suvla and commanding Suvla Bay and Anzac Cove, and
Achi Baba, six hundred feet high, which commands the beaches near Cape Helles at
the southern end of the peninsula. Some of the latter, if not all, can also be
fired upon from the mainland of Asia Minor.
As a preliminary to the attack upon Constantinople forts guarding the entrance
to the Dardanelles were bombarded from the Aegean on 3rd November, 1914, but it
was not until 19th February, 1915, after what appeared to be much vacillation in
the higher conduct of the enterprise, that the reduction of the defences was
seriously undertaken by the British and French navies, acting alone. When the
weather permitted during the next four weeks the bombardment was renewed, and
several of the forts were at least silenced, if not destroyed An attempt,
however, on 18th March to force the Narrows failed with the loss of several
ships, and it was then determined that the next assault should be in conjunction
with troops on land. The nearest place at which troops or stores could be
collected was Egypt, 700 miles away. To facilitate the work an advanced base was
formed at Mudros, in the island of Lemnos, but even this was fifty miles from
Gallipoli, and only the simplest equipment could be provided there. As the
peninsula was for the most part barren and waterless it was necessary, in
addition to arranging for the transport of the attacking troops with their guns
and ammunition, to make complete arrangements for supplying them with all the
food and water they required, and for providing food and water for the transport
animals and shelter and medical stores for the sick. These preparations occupied
four weeks, although some of the delay would not have been necessary if, owing
to faulty organisation, men had not been conveyed separately from their
ammunition, guns from the gun-carriages, and wagons from their horses. As it
was, many of the transports, when they arrived at Mudros, had to be taken back
to Egypt, where their contents were re-arranged. The Turks, warned by the naval
bombardments and by the traffic at sea, to expect an attack, had every
opportunity to complete their preparations. Troops and guns were hurried into
the peninsula, stores and ammunition were collected, trenches were dug on
commanding sites, and the few and narrow approaches, including even the shallow
parts of the sea, were obstructed with strong wire entanglements.
The landing, under Sir Ian Hamilton as commander-in-chief, was attempted at dawn
on Sunday, 25th April, at five points around the southern end of the peninsula
and at one to the north of Gaba Tepe on the western coast. The assault on the
former was entrusted to the 29th Division, composed of units of the Regular
Army, and to the newly formed R. Naval Division, and that on the latter to
troops from Australia and New Zealand. Each landing, so far as possible, was to
be protected by the guns of the ships. The French effected a diversion by
landing at Kum Kale in Asia Minor opposite Helles, Having done this they
withdrew some days later and took over the right of the British line at Helles.
Reckoning from the east, the positions assailed on the peninsula were S beach,
or De Tott's Battery, V Beach near Sedd-el-Bahr, W Beach (or " Lancashire
Landing," from the heroism displayed by the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers) between
Capes Helles and Tekke, X Beach to the north of Cape Tekke, Y Beach three miles
further north, and Z Beach, afterwards known as Anzac, ten miles north of Y
Beach.
At V Beach three companies of the 1st R. Dublin Fusiliers, and a party from the
Anson Battalion, R.N.D., while being landed from boats were shot down. The
collier River Clyde was run aground, and the troops on board endeavoured to
reach the shore across a bridge of boats. In doing this and in maintaining the
bridge, three companies of the 1st R. Munster Fus. and two of the 2nd Hants were
almost destroyed, only a remnant finding, under a low sand-bank, protection from
the terrible rifle and machine-gun fire which ' The word was coined from the
initial letters of the title " Australian and New Zealand Army Corps." swept the
beach. The remainder of these three battalions stayed on board under continual
fire until nightfall, when they managed to land. Having joined the survivors on
shore they attacked the village and old fort of Sedd-el-Bahr, but in the
darkness and unknown country the attack miscarried, and the force was almost
overwhelmed by a counter-attack. Early on the morning of the 26th the attempt
was renewed, and, aided by the guns from the fleet, was successful.
At W Beach the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers, supported by the 4th Worcesters and the
1st Essex, and at X Beach the 2nd R. Fusiliers, with a working-party from the
Anson Battalion, R.N.D., and assisted by the 1st R. Inniskilling Fusiliers, were
even more successful, and the landings were secured on the first day with
casualties which, though heavy, were not so heavy as at V Beach. The attacks at
S and Y Beaches were planned chiefly with the object of diverting the enemy's
reserves and of thus protecting the main attack at V, W and X Beaches. That at S
Beach by the 2nd S. Wales Borderers succeeded, and the ground won was
permanently held, but at Y Beach the 1st Kings Own Scottish Borderers and the
Plymouth Battalion, R.N.D., having accomplished their purpose, were withdrawn on
the 26th. At Anzac the troops forced a landing, pressed on up steep gullies,
beat off numerous counter-attacks, and by the evening of the 26th had made good
their advance on a front of over two miles to a depth in parts of nearly one
mile. Units of the R.N.D., supported by the Navy, made a feint attack upon the
enemy's lines at Bulair at the neck of the peninsula, but no landing was
seriously attempted.
When the positions gained on the various beaches had been consolidated and while
stores and ammunition were being landed our men had some sort of a respite. This
was badly needed, for many, exhausted by lack of food, water and sleep, by the
toil of digging for most of the day under a hot sun and of carrying heavy loads
most of the night, and by the strain of frequent counter-attacks, were nearing
the limits of their endurance. About this time some Indian troops and units from
the 42nd Division arrived as reinforcements. During May the line was slowly
advanced from Helles towards Krithia, a village on the slopes of Achi Baba, the
chief assaults being on 6th-8th May and on 4th and 28th June. Counter-attacks
were frequent and in particular one on the night of 19th/20th May at Anzac,
where the lines had been stationary since the landing, was so violent and the
Turkish losses so heavy that they were granted an armistice in which to bury
their dead. Two British submarines, E11 and E14, gallantly penetrating the
minefields in the straits torpedoed several Turkish transports carrying
reinforcements. By the end of the month, that is, in six weeks from the first
landing, the casualties among the British and Anzacs amounted to nearly 40,000,
a number which exceeded the total battle casualties in the whole of the South
African War.
The next two months were marked by frequent attacks and counter-attacks, leading
to no definite result, and it became clear that, although our forces had been
strengthened by the arrival of the 13th and 52nd Divisions, the Turkish line
could not be carried by direct assault. A plan was therefore formed to land a
force at Suvla Bay three miles to the north of Anzac, and then to advance from
Anzac upon the Sari Bair ridge. It was hoped in this way to cut the enemy's
communications and to turn his position. Accordingly on 6th August the enemy's
attention was engaged near Helles by an attack (which happened just to forestall
an attack which he was planning) and during the night following a landing was
effected at Suvla by part of the 10th and by the 11th Divisions. The 53rd and
54th Divisions landed later. The opposition was comparatively slight, and, if
prompt action had been taken, a great success might have been achieved. The
delay in pressing our advantage was due partly to the exhaustion of the soldiers
who, notwithstanding elaborate precautions, suffered terribly from lack of
water, but still more to inertia and confusion in the local higher command upon
which Sir Ian Hamilton commented somewhat severely in his despatch. The 6th E.
Yorks who had occupied Scimitar Hill with hardly any fighting were, in error,
withdrawn in order to attack elsewhere. The Turks were able to bring up
reinforcements and the advance which might with so little loss of life have led
to great results was checked. Meanwhile the advance from Anzac by British,
Dominion and Indian troops, although impeded by the partial failure at Suvla,
proceeded slowly up almost precipitous heights covered with scrub, and early in
the morning of 8th August a ridge near Chunuk Bair was seized which commanded a
view across the peninsula to the Narrows. The 6th S. Lancs from the 13th
Division and some Gurkhas, however, who so gallantly captured it came under the
fire of their own guns, troops which should have supported them lost their way,
and under heavy counter-attacks the ridge had to be abandoned. Although the
attack thus failed, the area held at Anzac was enlarged from less than one mile
to about eight.
The troops having been reinforced by a dismounted Yeomanry division from Egypt,
a further attempt to advance from Suvla Bay was made on 21st August. After
severe fighting which continued during the night, positions were gained on
Scimitar Hill. It was decided that these would be untenable by day and our men
were withdrawn.
After the failure at Suvla the fighting died down into the routine of trench
warfare. Early in October two of the English and one of the French divisions
were sent to Salonica and towards the middle of the month Sir Ian Hamilton was
ordered to advise upon the evacuation of the peninsula. A few days later he was
recalled to England and Sir Charles Monro was appointed in his place. This
officer reported strongly in favour of evacuation and his opinion was confirmed
by Lord Kitchener who, towards the middle of November, inspected portions of the
lines at Helles, Anzac and Suvla.
A striking incident showed the risk of remaining during the winter. On 27th
November a sudden gale from the south-west destroyed several piers and landing
stages and did much damage among the smaller transports. At the same time a
deluge of rain converted the trenches into torrents in which friend and foe,
stores and mules, were swept away. This was followed by a blizzard, lasting for
nearly two days and nights, and this again by a heavy frost. The troops suffered
terribly from the unusual cold, many died, and about 10,000 sick had to be
removed.
The evacuation was begun at Anzac and Suvla and was completed there on the night
of 19th/20th December, just in time to avoid a storm which arose a few hours
later. More than 83,000 men were embarked (with the accidental loss of only two
men), with 5,000 horses and mules, 2,000 wagons and 200 guns. At Helles our men
were even more fortunate, for a south-westerly gale was beginning to blow as the
last of them left the shore. There the evacuation was completed in the early
morning of 9th January, 1916, and included 35,000 men, 4,000 animals and no
guns.
The assault upon the peninsula, urged with such gallantry for so many months and
in face of so many difficulties, thus ended in failure. This was not due to any
lack of bravery, daring, skill or endurance on the part of the rank and file,
but rather to the inability of the superior commands to meet the demands of so
great an enterprise and to the fact that, in spite of repeated requests,
adequate reinforcements were not forthcoming. In the House of Commons on 20th
March, 1917, Mr. Asquith, commenting upon the report of the Dardanelles
Commission, claimed that the expedition had saved the position of Russia in the
Caucasus, had delayed for months the defection of Bulgaria, had kept immobilised
at least 300,000 Turks, and had contributed to the favourable development of
events in Egypt, Mesopotamia and Persia.
Arthur Roake (R.N.R., L.F.B.) was awarded the D.S.M. for his gallantry on 25th
April, 1915, when, being one of a small party which had been landed to
reconnoitre, he carried a wounded officer under heavy fire back to the boats,
and the next day acted as a guide to a second party. Sergeant W. F. Bird (1st
Co. of London Yeoman, Educ.) was awarded the D.C.M. for conspicuous gallantry,
on 21st August, 1915, at Suvla, when, as medical orderly, he remained under fire
attending the wounded, and displayed great bravery and devotion to duty. E.
Griffiths (R.F.R., L.F.B.) won the D.S.M.
The casualties were: killed 28,200, wounded 78,095, missing 11,254, making a
total of 117,549; there were also nearly 100,000 sick, chiefly cases of
dysentery, malaria, and, towards the end of the occupation, frost-bite. The
deaths among the Council's staff were:
25th April, J. G. Everett (H.M.S. Eitryalus, Tram.) killed at W Beach ; 28th, F.
A. Dolan (R.E., Ch. Engr.) ; 29th, G. H. Morgan (R. Naval Div., Tram.); 6th May,
C. E. Hutchings (R. Naval Div., L.F.B.) of wounds received on the 3rd, and
William West (R. Naval Div., Asylums) ; 25th, Sergeant F. Blanchard (R. Naval
Div., Educ); 4th June, William Perriman (H.M.S. Bacchante, Ch. Engr.) of wounds
received on 25th April at the landing at Anzac; 21st, James Childs (Hamps,
Asylums); 28th, Albert Cox (Essex, Tram.); 6th August, Captain Francis Falcon
(4th Worcesters, Ch. Engr.) and Samuel Russell (2nd Hamps., Tram.), both at
Helles, and Sergeant E. D. Long (Wilts, Tram.) near Anzac; 7th, Capt. C. S.
Blake (S. Lancs, attd. 6th Lancs Fus.) near Helles; 8th, 158 William Tuffey (7th
Glouc, Stores) near Chunuk Bair; 13th, Lance-Corp. S. H. Butler (W. Riding,
Asylums) of wounds received near Suvla on the 10th; 14th, Arthur Olney (R.A.S.C,
Tram.) on H.M.S. Royal Edward when she was torpedoed; 15th, Lieut. H. J. Hoare,
B.Sc. (Econ.), LL.B. (10th London, Clerk) and Sergeant A. T. F. Beaumont (10th
London, Tram.) both near Suvla; 21st, E. S. Miller (City of London Yeo., Educ),
near Suvla; 27th September, William Wilson (2nd Scottish Horse, Tram.); 4th
November, W. J. Filbee (R. Fusiliers, Tram.), near Suvla; 11th, Capt. A. M.
Philips (Yorks L.L, attached 9th W. Yorks., Arch.), near Suvla; 27th, Edwin
Barnard (R.E., Arch.), near Suvla. Frank Murrell (H.M.S. Glory, L.F.B.) on 15th
August, D. G. King (Essex, Asylums) on 22nd November and H. J. R. Marson (Essex,
Tram.) on 24th November, died of dysentery. T. H. Baker (R.F.A., Asylums) died
on 6th December of tuberculosis.